1 /*-
2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
3 *
4 * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 Netflix Inc.
5 *
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
13 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
14 *
15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
16 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
18 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
19 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
20 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
21 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
22 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
23 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
24 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
25 * SUCH DAMAGE.
26 */
27
28 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
29 #include "opt_inet.h"
30 #include "opt_inet6.h"
31 #include "opt_kern_tls.h"
32 #include "opt_ratelimit.h"
33 #include "opt_rss.h"
34
35 #include <sys/param.h>
36 #include <sys/kernel.h>
37 #include <sys/domainset.h>
38 #include <sys/endian.h>
39 #include <sys/ktls.h>
40 #include <sys/lock.h>
41 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
42 #include <sys/mutex.h>
43 #include <sys/rmlock.h>
44 #include <sys/proc.h>
45 #include <sys/protosw.h>
46 #include <sys/refcount.h>
47 #include <sys/smp.h>
48 #include <sys/socket.h>
49 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
50 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
51 #include <sys/taskqueue.h>
52 #include <sys/kthread.h>
53 #include <sys/uio.h>
54 #include <sys/vmmeter.h>
55 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
56 #include <machine/pcb.h>
57 #endif
58 #include <machine/vmparam.h>
59 #include <net/if.h>
60 #include <net/if_var.h>
61 #ifdef RSS
62 #include <net/netisr.h>
63 #include <net/rss_config.h>
64 #endif
65 #include <net/route.h>
66 #include <net/route/nhop.h>
67 #include <netinet/in.h>
68 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
69 #include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
70 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
71 #include <netinet/tcp_offload.h>
72 #endif
73 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
74 #include <opencrypto/ktls.h>
75 #include <vm/vm.h>
76 #include <vm/vm_pageout.h>
77 #include <vm/vm_page.h>
78 #include <vm/vm_pagequeue.h>
79
80 struct ktls_wq {
81 struct mtx mtx;
82 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) m_head;
83 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) so_head;
84 bool running;
85 int lastallocfail;
86 } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
87
88 struct ktls_reclaim_thread {
89 uint64_t wakeups;
90 uint64_t reclaims;
91 struct thread *td;
92 int running;
93 };
94
95 struct ktls_domain_info {
96 int count;
97 int cpu[MAXCPU];
98 struct ktls_reclaim_thread reclaim_td;
99 };
100
101 struct ktls_domain_info ktls_domains[MAXMEMDOM];
102 static struct ktls_wq *ktls_wq;
103 static struct proc *ktls_proc;
104 static uma_zone_t ktls_session_zone;
105 static uma_zone_t ktls_buffer_zone;
106 static uint16_t ktls_cpuid_lookup[MAXCPU];
107 static int ktls_init_state;
108 static struct sx ktls_init_lock;
109 SX_SYSINIT(ktls_init_lock, &ktls_init_lock, "ktls init");
110
111 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, tls, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
112 "Kernel TLS offload");
113 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, stats, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
114 "Kernel TLS offload stats");
115
116 #ifdef RSS
117 static int ktls_bind_threads = 1;
118 #else
119 static int ktls_bind_threads;
120 #endif
121 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, bind_threads, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
122 &ktls_bind_threads, 0,
123 "Bind crypto threads to cores (1) or cores and domains (2) at boot");
124
125 static u_int ktls_maxlen = 16384;
126 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, maxlen, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
127 &ktls_maxlen, 0, "Maximum TLS record size");
128
129 static int ktls_number_threads;
130 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RD,
131 &ktls_number_threads, 0,
132 "Number of TLS threads in thread-pool");
133
134 unsigned int ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct = 2;
135 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
136 &ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, 2,
137 "Max percent bytes retransmitted before ifnet TLS is disabled");
138
139 static bool ktls_offload_enable;
140 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
141 &ktls_offload_enable, 0,
142 "Enable support for kernel TLS offload");
143
144 static bool ktls_cbc_enable = true;
145 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, cbc_enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
146 &ktls_cbc_enable, 1,
147 "Enable support of AES-CBC crypto for kernel TLS");
148
149 static bool ktls_sw_buffer_cache = true;
150 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw_buffer_cache, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
151 &ktls_sw_buffer_cache, 1,
152 "Enable caching of output buffers for SW encryption");
153
154 static int ktls_max_reclaim = 1024;
155 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, max_reclaim, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
156 &ktls_max_reclaim, 128,
157 "Max number of 16k buffers to reclaim in thread context");
158
159 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_tasks_active);
160 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, tasks_active, CTLFLAG_RD,
161 &ktls_tasks_active, "Number of active tasks");
162
163 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_pending);
164 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_pending, CTLFLAG_RD,
165 &ktls_cnt_tx_pending,
166 "Number of TLS 1.0 records waiting for earlier TLS records");
167
168 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_queued);
169 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
170 &ktls_cnt_tx_queued,
171 "Number of TLS records in queue to tasks for SW encryption");
172
173 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_rx_queued);
174 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_rx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
175 &ktls_cnt_rx_queued,
176 "Number of TLS sockets in queue to tasks for SW decryption");
177
178 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_total);
179 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, offload_total,
180 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_total,
181 "Total successful TLS setups (parameters set)");
182
183 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_enable_calls);
184 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, enable_calls,
185 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_enable_calls,
186 "Total number of TLS enable calls made");
187
188 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_active);
189 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, active, CTLFLAG_RD,
190 &ktls_offload_active, "Total Active TLS sessions");
191
192 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_corrupted_records);
193 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, corrupted_records, CTLFLAG_RD,
194 &ktls_offload_corrupted_records, "Total corrupted TLS records received");
195
196 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_failed_crypto);
197 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, failed_crypto, CTLFLAG_RD,
198 &ktls_offload_failed_crypto, "Total TLS crypto failures");
199
200 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_ifnet);
201 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD,
202 &ktls_switch_to_ifnet, "TLS sessions switched from SW to ifnet");
203
204 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_sw);
205 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_sw, CTLFLAG_RD,
206 &ktls_switch_to_sw, "TLS sessions switched from ifnet to SW");
207
208 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_failed);
209 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
210 &ktls_switch_failed, "TLS sessions unable to switch between SW and ifnet");
211
212 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail);
213 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
214 &ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, "TLS sessions unable to switch to SW from ifnet");
215
216 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok);
217 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_ok, CTLFLAG_RD,
218 &ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, "TLS sessions able to switch to SW from ifnet");
219
220 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_destroy_task);
221 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, destroy_task, CTLFLAG_RD,
222 &ktls_destroy_task,
223 "Number of times ktls session was destroyed via taskqueue");
224
225 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
226 "Software TLS session stats");
227 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
228 "Hardware (ifnet) TLS session stats");
229 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
230 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, toe, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
231 "TOE TLS session stats");
232 #endif
233
234 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_cbc);
235 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_cbc,
236 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
237
238 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_gcm);
239 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_gcm,
240 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
241
242 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_chacha20);
243 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
244 &ktls_sw_chacha20,
245 "Active number of software TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
246
247 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_cbc);
248 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
249 &ktls_ifnet_cbc,
250 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
251
252 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_gcm);
253 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
254 &ktls_ifnet_gcm,
255 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
256
257 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_chacha20);
258 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
259 &ktls_ifnet_chacha20,
260 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
261
262 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset);
263 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset, CTLFLAG_RD,
264 &ktls_ifnet_reset, "TLS sessions updated to a new ifnet send tag");
265
266 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped);
267 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_dropped, CTLFLAG_RD,
268 &ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped,
269 "TLS sessions dropped after failing to update ifnet send tag");
270
271 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed);
272 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
273 &ktls_ifnet_reset_failed,
274 "TLS sessions that failed to allocate a new ifnet send tag");
275
276 static int ktls_ifnet_permitted;
277 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, permitted, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
278 &ktls_ifnet_permitted, 1,
279 "Whether to permit hardware (ifnet) TLS sessions");
280
281 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
282 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_cbc);
283 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
284 &ktls_toe_cbc,
285 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
286
287 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_gcm);
288 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
289 &ktls_toe_gcm,
290 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
291
292 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_chacha20);
293 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
294 &ktls_toe_chacha20,
295 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
296 #endif
297
298 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTLS, "ktls", "Kernel TLS");
299
300 static void ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending);
301 static void ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending);
302 static void ktls_work_thread(void *ctx);
303 static void ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx);
304
305 static u_int
ktls_get_cpu(struct socket * so)306 ktls_get_cpu(struct socket *so)
307 {
308 struct inpcb *inp;
309 #ifdef NUMA
310 struct ktls_domain_info *di;
311 #endif
312 u_int cpuid;
313
314 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
315 #ifdef RSS
316 cpuid = rss_hash2cpuid(inp->inp_flowid, inp->inp_flowtype);
317 if (cpuid != NETISR_CPUID_NONE)
318 return (cpuid);
319 #endif
320 /*
321 * Just use the flowid to shard connections in a repeatable
322 * fashion. Note that TLS 1.0 sessions rely on the
323 * serialization provided by having the same connection use
324 * the same queue.
325 */
326 #ifdef NUMA
327 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1 && inp->inp_numa_domain != M_NODOM) {
328 di = &ktls_domains[inp->inp_numa_domain];
329 cpuid = di->cpu[inp->inp_flowid % di->count];
330 } else
331 #endif
332 cpuid = ktls_cpuid_lookup[inp->inp_flowid % ktls_number_threads];
333 return (cpuid);
334 }
335
336 static int
ktls_buffer_import(void * arg,void ** store,int count,int domain,int flags)337 ktls_buffer_import(void *arg, void **store, int count, int domain, int flags)
338 {
339 vm_page_t m;
340 int i, req;
341
342 KASSERT((ktls_maxlen & PAGE_MASK) == 0,
343 ("%s: ktls max length %d is not page size-aligned",
344 __func__, ktls_maxlen));
345
346 req = VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_NODUMP | malloc2vm_flags(flags);
347 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
348 m = vm_page_alloc_noobj_contig_domain(domain, req,
349 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
350 VM_MEMATTR_DEFAULT);
351 if (m == NULL)
352 break;
353 store[i] = (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(m));
354 }
355 return (i);
356 }
357
358 static void
ktls_buffer_release(void * arg __unused,void ** store,int count)359 ktls_buffer_release(void *arg __unused, void **store, int count)
360 {
361 vm_page_t m;
362 int i, j;
363
364 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
365 m = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)store[i]));
366 for (j = 0; j < atop(ktls_maxlen); j++) {
367 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(m + j);
368 vm_page_free(m + j);
369 }
370 }
371 }
372
373 static void
ktls_free_mext_contig(struct mbuf * m)374 ktls_free_mext_contig(struct mbuf *m)
375 {
376 M_ASSERTEXTPG(m);
377 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(m->m_epg_pa[0]));
378 }
379
380 static int
ktls_init(void)381 ktls_init(void)
382 {
383 struct thread *td;
384 struct pcpu *pc;
385 int count, domain, error, i;
386
387 ktls_wq = malloc(sizeof(*ktls_wq) * (mp_maxid + 1), M_KTLS,
388 M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
389
390 ktls_session_zone = uma_zcreate("ktls_session",
391 sizeof(struct ktls_session),
392 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
393 UMA_ALIGN_CACHE, 0);
394
395 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
396 ktls_buffer_zone = uma_zcache_create("ktls_buffers",
397 roundup2(ktls_maxlen, PAGE_SIZE), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
398 ktls_buffer_import, ktls_buffer_release, NULL,
399 UMA_ZONE_FIRSTTOUCH);
400 }
401
402 /*
403 * Initialize the workqueues to run the TLS work. We create a
404 * work queue for each CPU.
405 */
406 CPU_FOREACH(i) {
407 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].m_head);
408 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].so_head);
409 mtx_init(&ktls_wq[i].mtx, "ktls work queue", NULL, MTX_DEF);
410 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
411 pc = pcpu_find(i);
412 domain = pc->pc_domain;
413 count = ktls_domains[domain].count;
414 ktls_domains[domain].cpu[count] = i;
415 ktls_domains[domain].count++;
416 }
417 ktls_cpuid_lookup[ktls_number_threads] = i;
418 ktls_number_threads++;
419 }
420
421 /*
422 * If we somehow have an empty domain, fall back to choosing
423 * among all KTLS threads.
424 */
425 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
426 for (i = 0; i < vm_ndomains; i++) {
427 if (ktls_domains[i].count == 0) {
428 ktls_bind_threads = 1;
429 break;
430 }
431 }
432 }
433
434 /* Start kthreads for each workqueue. */
435 CPU_FOREACH(i) {
436 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_work_thread, &ktls_wq[i],
437 &ktls_proc, &td, 0, 0, "KTLS", "thr_%d", i);
438 if (error) {
439 printf("Can't add KTLS thread %d error %d\n", i, error);
440 return (error);
441 }
442 }
443
444 /*
445 * Start an allocation thread per-domain to perform blocking allocations
446 * of 16k physically contiguous TLS crypto destination buffers.
447 */
448 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
449 for (domain = 0; domain < vm_ndomains; domain++) {
450 if (VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain))
451 continue;
452 if (CPU_EMPTY(&cpuset_domain[domain]))
453 continue;
454 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_reclaim_thread,
455 &ktls_domains[domain], &ktls_proc,
456 &ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.td,
457 0, 0, "KTLS", "reclaim_%d", domain);
458 if (error) {
459 printf("Can't add KTLS reclaim thread %d error %d\n",
460 domain, error);
461 return (error);
462 }
463 }
464 }
465
466 if (bootverbose)
467 printf("KTLS: Initialized %d threads\n", ktls_number_threads);
468 return (0);
469 }
470
471 static int
ktls_start_kthreads(void)472 ktls_start_kthreads(void)
473 {
474 int error, state;
475
476 start:
477 state = atomic_load_acq_int(&ktls_init_state);
478 if (__predict_true(state > 0))
479 return (0);
480 if (state < 0)
481 return (ENXIO);
482
483 sx_xlock(&ktls_init_lock);
484 if (ktls_init_state != 0) {
485 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
486 goto start;
487 }
488
489 error = ktls_init();
490 if (error == 0)
491 state = 1;
492 else
493 state = -1;
494 atomic_store_rel_int(&ktls_init_state, state);
495 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
496 return (error);
497 }
498
499 static int
ktls_create_session(struct socket * so,struct tls_enable * en,struct ktls_session ** tlsp,int direction)500 ktls_create_session(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en,
501 struct ktls_session **tlsp, int direction)
502 {
503 struct ktls_session *tls;
504 int error;
505
506 /* Only TLS 1.0 - 1.3 are supported. */
507 if (en->tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE)
508 return (EINVAL);
509 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO ||
510 en->tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
511 return (EINVAL);
512
513 if (en->auth_key_len < 0 || en->auth_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
514 return (EINVAL);
515 if (en->cipher_key_len < 0 || en->cipher_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
516 return (EINVAL);
517 if (en->iv_len < 0 || en->iv_len > sizeof(tls->params.iv))
518 return (EINVAL);
519
520 /* All supported algorithms require a cipher key. */
521 if (en->cipher_key_len == 0)
522 return (EINVAL);
523
524 /* No flags are currently supported. */
525 if (en->flags != 0)
526 return (EINVAL);
527
528 /* Common checks for supported algorithms. */
529 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
530 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
531 /*
532 * auth_algorithm isn't used, but permit GMAC values
533 * for compatibility.
534 */
535 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
536 case 0:
537 #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD12
538 /* XXX: Really 13.0-current COMPAT. */
539 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
540 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
541 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
542 #endif
543 break;
544 default:
545 return (EINVAL);
546 }
547 if (en->auth_key_len != 0)
548 return (EINVAL);
549 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
550 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
551 if (en->iv_len != TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN)
552 return (EINVAL);
553 break;
554 case TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE:
555 if (en->iv_len != TLS_1_3_GCM_IV_LEN)
556 return (EINVAL);
557 break;
558 default:
559 return (EINVAL);
560 }
561 break;
562 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
563 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
564 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
565 break;
566 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
567 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
568 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
569 return (EINVAL);
570 break;
571 default:
572 return (EINVAL);
573 }
574 if (en->auth_key_len == 0)
575 return (EINVAL);
576
577 /*
578 * TLS 1.0 requires an implicit IV. TLS 1.1 and 1.2
579 * use explicit IVs.
580 */
581 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
582 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO:
583 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CBC_IMPLICIT_IV_LEN)
584 return (EINVAL);
585 break;
586 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE:
587 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
588 /* Ignore any supplied IV. */
589 en->iv_len = 0;
590 break;
591 default:
592 return (EINVAL);
593 }
594 break;
595 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
596 if (en->auth_algorithm != 0 || en->auth_key_len != 0)
597 return (EINVAL);
598 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO &&
599 en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
600 return (EINVAL);
601 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CHACHA20_IV_LEN)
602 return (EINVAL);
603 break;
604 default:
605 return (EINVAL);
606 }
607
608 error = ktls_start_kthreads();
609 if (error != 0)
610 return (error);
611
612 tls = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
613
614 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
615
616 refcount_init(&tls->refcount, 1);
617 if (direction == KTLS_RX) {
618 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag, tls);
619 } else {
620 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag, tls);
621 tls->inp = so->so_pcb;
622 in_pcbref(tls->inp);
623 tls->tx = true;
624 }
625
626 tls->wq_index = ktls_get_cpu(so);
627
628 tls->params.cipher_algorithm = en->cipher_algorithm;
629 tls->params.auth_algorithm = en->auth_algorithm;
630 tls->params.tls_vmajor = en->tls_vmajor;
631 tls->params.tls_vminor = en->tls_vminor;
632 tls->params.flags = en->flags;
633 tls->params.max_frame_len = min(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2, ktls_maxlen);
634
635 /* Set the header and trailer lengths. */
636 tls->params.tls_hlen = sizeof(struct tls_record_layer);
637 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
638 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
639 /*
640 * TLS 1.2 uses a 4 byte implicit IV with an explicit 8 byte
641 * nonce. TLS 1.3 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
642 */
643 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
644 tls->params.tls_hlen += sizeof(uint64_t);
645 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
646 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
647 break;
648 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
649 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
650 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
651 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) {
652 /* Implicit IV, no nonce. */
653 tls->sequential_records = true;
654 tls->next_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
655 STAILQ_INIT(&tls->pending_records);
656 } else {
657 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
658 }
659 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
660 SHA1_HASH_LEN;
661 break;
662 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
663 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
664 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
665 SHA2_256_HASH_LEN;
666 break;
667 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
668 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
669 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
670 SHA2_384_HASH_LEN;
671 break;
672 default:
673 panic("invalid hmac");
674 }
675 tls->params.tls_bs = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
676 break;
677 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
678 /*
679 * Chacha20 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
680 */
681 tls->params.tls_tlen = POLY1305_HASH_LEN;
682 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
683 break;
684 default:
685 panic("invalid cipher");
686 }
687
688 /*
689 * TLS 1.3 includes optional padding which we do not support,
690 * and also puts the "real" record type at the end of the
691 * encrypted data.
692 */
693 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
694 tls->params.tls_tlen += sizeof(uint8_t);
695
696 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_hlen <= MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN,
697 ("TLS header length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_hlen));
698 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_tlen <= MBUF_PEXT_TRAIL_LEN,
699 ("TLS trailer length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_tlen));
700
701 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) {
702 tls->params.auth_key_len = en->auth_key_len;
703 tls->params.auth_key = malloc(en->auth_key_len, M_KTLS,
704 M_WAITOK);
705 error = copyin(en->auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
706 en->auth_key_len);
707 if (error)
708 goto out;
709 }
710
711 tls->params.cipher_key_len = en->cipher_key_len;
712 tls->params.cipher_key = malloc(en->cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK);
713 error = copyin(en->cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
714 en->cipher_key_len);
715 if (error)
716 goto out;
717
718 /*
719 * This holds the implicit portion of the nonce for AEAD
720 * ciphers and the initial implicit IV for TLS 1.0. The
721 * explicit portions of the IV are generated in ktls_frame().
722 */
723 if (en->iv_len != 0) {
724 tls->params.iv_len = en->iv_len;
725 error = copyin(en->iv, tls->params.iv, en->iv_len);
726 if (error)
727 goto out;
728
729 /*
730 * For TLS 1.2 with GCM, generate an 8-byte nonce as a
731 * counter to generate unique explicit IVs.
732 *
733 * Store this counter in the last 8 bytes of the IV
734 * array so that it is 8-byte aligned.
735 */
736 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
737 en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
738 arc4rand(tls->params.iv + 8, sizeof(uint64_t), 0);
739 }
740
741 *tlsp = tls;
742 return (0);
743
744 out:
745 ktls_free(tls);
746 return (error);
747 }
748
749 static struct ktls_session *
ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session * tls,int direction)750 ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
751 {
752 struct ktls_session *tls_new;
753
754 tls_new = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
755
756 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
757
758 refcount_init(&tls_new->refcount, 1);
759 if (direction == KTLS_RX) {
760 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag,
761 tls_new);
762 } else {
763 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag,
764 tls_new);
765 tls_new->inp = tls->inp;
766 tls_new->tx = true;
767 in_pcbref(tls_new->inp);
768 }
769
770 /* Copy fields from existing session. */
771 tls_new->params = tls->params;
772 tls_new->wq_index = tls->wq_index;
773
774 /* Deep copy keys. */
775 if (tls_new->params.auth_key != NULL) {
776 tls_new->params.auth_key = malloc(tls->params.auth_key_len,
777 M_KTLS, M_WAITOK);
778 memcpy(tls_new->params.auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
779 tls->params.auth_key_len);
780 }
781
782 tls_new->params.cipher_key = malloc(tls->params.cipher_key_len, M_KTLS,
783 M_WAITOK);
784 memcpy(tls_new->params.cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
785 tls->params.cipher_key_len);
786
787 return (tls_new);
788 }
789
790 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
791 static int
ktls_try_toe(struct socket * so,struct ktls_session * tls,int direction)792 ktls_try_toe(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
793 {
794 struct inpcb *inp;
795 struct tcpcb *tp;
796 int error;
797
798 inp = so->so_pcb;
799 INP_WLOCK(inp);
800 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
801 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
802 return (ECONNRESET);
803 }
804 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
805 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
806 return (ECONNRESET);
807 }
808 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
809 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_TOE)) {
810 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
811 return (EOPNOTSUPP);
812 }
813
814 error = tcp_offload_alloc_tls_session(tp, tls, direction);
815 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
816 if (error == 0) {
817 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE;
818 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
819 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
820 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, 1);
821 break;
822 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
823 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, 1);
824 break;
825 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
826 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, 1);
827 break;
828 }
829 }
830 return (error);
831 }
832 #endif
833
834 /*
835 * Common code used when first enabling ifnet TLS on a connection or
836 * when allocating a new ifnet TLS session due to a routing change.
837 * This function allocates a new TLS send tag on whatever interface
838 * the connection is currently routed over.
839 */
840 static int
ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb * inp,struct ktls_session * tls,bool force,struct m_snd_tag ** mstp)841 ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls, bool force,
842 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
843 {
844 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
845 struct ifnet *ifp;
846 struct nhop_object *nh;
847 struct tcpcb *tp;
848 int error;
849
850 INP_RLOCK(inp);
851 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
852 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
853 return (ECONNRESET);
854 }
855 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
856 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
857 return (ECONNRESET);
858 }
859 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
860
861 /*
862 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
863 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
864 *
865 * - Always permit 'force' requests.
866 * - ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0: always deny.
867 */
868 if (!force && ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
869 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
870 return (ENXIO);
871 }
872
873 /*
874 * XXX: Use the cached route in the inpcb to find the
875 * interface. This should perhaps instead use
876 * rtalloc1_fib(dst, 0, 0, fibnum). Since KTLS is only
877 * enabled after a connection has completed key negotiation in
878 * userland, the cached route will be present in practice.
879 */
880 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
881 if (nh == NULL) {
882 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
883 return (ENXIO);
884 }
885 ifp = nh->nh_ifp;
886 if_ref(ifp);
887
888 /*
889 * Allocate a TLS + ratelimit tag if the connection has an
890 * existing pacing rate.
891 */
892 if (tp->t_pacing_rate != -1 &&
893 (if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS_RTLMT) != 0) {
894 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT;
895 params.tls_rate_limit.inp = inp;
896 params.tls_rate_limit.tls = tls;
897 params.tls_rate_limit.max_rate = tp->t_pacing_rate;
898 } else {
899 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS;
900 params.tls.inp = inp;
901 params.tls.tls = tls;
902 }
903 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
904 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
905 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
906 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
907
908 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_MEXTPG) == 0) {
909 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
910 goto out;
911 }
912 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
913 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS6) == 0) {
914 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
915 goto out;
916 }
917 } else {
918 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS4) == 0) {
919 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
920 goto out;
921 }
922 }
923 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
924 out:
925 if_rele(ifp);
926 return (error);
927 }
928
929 /*
930 * Allocate an initial TLS receive tag for doing HW decryption of TLS
931 * data.
932 *
933 * This function allocates a new TLS receive tag on whatever interface
934 * the connection is currently routed over. If the connection ends up
935 * using a different interface for receive this will get fixed up via
936 * ktls_input_ifp_mismatch as future packets arrive.
937 */
938 static int
ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(struct inpcb * inp,struct ktls_session * tls,struct m_snd_tag ** mstp)939 ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls,
940 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
941 {
942 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
943 struct ifnet *ifp;
944 struct nhop_object *nh;
945 int error;
946
947 if (!ktls_ocf_recrypt_supported(tls))
948 return (ENXIO);
949
950 INP_RLOCK(inp);
951 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
952 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
953 return (ECONNRESET);
954 }
955 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
956 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
957 return (ECONNRESET);
958 }
959
960 /*
961 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
962 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
963 */
964 if (ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
965 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
966 return (ENXIO);
967 }
968
969 /*
970 * XXX: As with ktls_alloc_snd_tag, use the cached route in
971 * the inpcb to find the interface.
972 */
973 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
974 if (nh == NULL) {
975 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
976 return (ENXIO);
977 }
978 ifp = nh->nh_ifp;
979 if_ref(ifp);
980 tls->rx_ifp = ifp;
981
982 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
983 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
984 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
985 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
986 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
987 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
988 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = 0;
989
990 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
991
992 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
993 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS6)) == 0) {
994 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
995 goto out;
996 }
997 } else {
998 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS4)) == 0) {
999 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
1000 goto out;
1001 }
1002 }
1003 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
1004
1005 /*
1006 * If this connection is over a vlan, vlan_snd_tag_alloc
1007 * rewrites vlan_id with the saved interface. Save the VLAN
1008 * ID for use in ktls_reset_receive_tag which allocates new
1009 * receive tags directly from the leaf interface bypassing
1010 * if_vlan.
1011 */
1012 if (error == 0)
1013 tls->rx_vlan_id = params.tls_rx.vlan_id;
1014 out:
1015 return (error);
1016 }
1017
1018 static int
ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket * so,struct ktls_session * tls,int direction,bool force)1019 ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction,
1020 bool force)
1021 {
1022 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1023 int error;
1024
1025 switch (direction) {
1026 case KTLS_TX:
1027 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, force, &mst);
1028 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1029 goto done;
1030 break;
1031 case KTLS_RX:
1032 KASSERT(!force, ("%s: forced receive tag", __func__));
1033 error = ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, &mst);
1034 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1035 goto done;
1036 break;
1037 default:
1038 __assert_unreachable();
1039 }
1040
1041 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET;
1042 tls->snd_tag = mst;
1043
1044 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1045 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1046 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, 1);
1047 break;
1048 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1049 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, 1);
1050 break;
1051 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1052 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, 1);
1053 break;
1054 default:
1055 break;
1056 }
1057 done:
1058 return (error);
1059 }
1060
1061 static void
ktls_use_sw(struct ktls_session * tls)1062 ktls_use_sw(struct ktls_session *tls)
1063 {
1064 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_SW;
1065 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1066 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1067 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, 1);
1068 break;
1069 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1070 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, 1);
1071 break;
1072 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1073 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, 1);
1074 break;
1075 }
1076 }
1077
1078 static int
ktls_try_sw(struct ktls_session * tls,int direction)1079 ktls_try_sw(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
1080 {
1081 int error;
1082
1083 error = ktls_ocf_try(tls, direction);
1084 if (error)
1085 return (error);
1086 ktls_use_sw(tls);
1087 return (0);
1088 }
1089
1090 /*
1091 * KTLS RX stores data in the socket buffer as a list of TLS records,
1092 * where each record is stored as a control message containg the TLS
1093 * header followed by data mbufs containing the decrypted data. This
1094 * is different from KTLS TX which always uses an mb_ext_pgs mbuf for
1095 * both encrypted and decrypted data. TLS records decrypted by a NIC
1096 * should be queued to the socket buffer as records, but encrypted
1097 * data which needs to be decrypted by software arrives as a stream of
1098 * regular mbufs which need to be converted. In addition, there may
1099 * already be pending encrypted data in the socket buffer when KTLS RX
1100 * is enabled.
1101 *
1102 * To manage not-yet-decrypted data for KTLS RX, the following scheme
1103 * is used:
1104 *
1105 * - A single chain of NOTREADY mbufs is hung off of sb_mtls.
1106 *
1107 * - ktls_check_rx checks this chain of mbufs reading the TLS header
1108 * from the first mbuf. Once all of the data for that TLS record is
1109 * queued, the socket is queued to a worker thread.
1110 *
1111 * - The worker thread calls ktls_decrypt to decrypt TLS records in
1112 * the TLS chain. Each TLS record is detached from the TLS chain,
1113 * decrypted, and inserted into the regular socket buffer chain as
1114 * record starting with a control message holding the TLS header and
1115 * a chain of mbufs holding the encrypted data.
1116 */
1117
1118 static void
sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf * sb)1119 sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf *sb)
1120 {
1121 struct mbuf *m;
1122
1123 m = sb->sb_mb;
1124 sb->sb_mtls = m;
1125 sb->sb_mb = NULL;
1126 sb->sb_mbtail = NULL;
1127 sb->sb_lastrecord = NULL;
1128 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1129 KASSERT(m->m_nextpkt == NULL, ("%s: m_nextpkt != NULL",
1130 __func__));
1131 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_NOTAVAIL) == 0, ("%s: mbuf not avail",
1132 __func__));
1133 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc >= m->m_len, ("%s: sb_acc < m->m_len",
1134 __func__));
1135 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
1136 sb->sb_acc -= m->m_len;
1137 sb->sb_tlscc += m->m_len;
1138 sb->sb_mtlstail = m;
1139 }
1140 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc == 0 && sb->sb_tlscc == sb->sb_ccc,
1141 ("%s: acc %u tlscc %u ccc %u", __func__, sb->sb_acc, sb->sb_tlscc,
1142 sb->sb_ccc));
1143 }
1144
1145 /*
1146 * Return information about the pending TLS data in a socket
1147 * buffer. On return, 'seqno' is set to the sequence number
1148 * of the next TLS record to be received, 'resid' is set to
1149 * the amount of bytes still needed for the last pending
1150 * record. The function returns 'false' if the last pending
1151 * record contains a partial TLS header. In that case, 'resid'
1152 * is the number of bytes needed to complete the TLS header.
1153 */
1154 bool
ktls_pending_rx_info(struct sockbuf * sb,uint64_t * seqnop,size_t * residp)1155 ktls_pending_rx_info(struct sockbuf *sb, uint64_t *seqnop, size_t *residp)
1156 {
1157 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
1158 struct mbuf *m;
1159 uint64_t seqno;
1160 size_t resid;
1161 u_int offset, record_len;
1162
1163 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1164 MPASS(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX);
1165 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1166 resid = sb->sb_tlscc;
1167 m = sb->sb_mtls;
1168 offset = 0;
1169
1170 if (resid == 0) {
1171 *seqnop = seqno;
1172 *residp = 0;
1173 return (true);
1174 }
1175
1176 for (;;) {
1177 seqno++;
1178
1179 if (resid < sizeof(hdr)) {
1180 *seqnop = seqno;
1181 *residp = sizeof(hdr) - resid;
1182 return (false);
1183 }
1184
1185 m_copydata(m, offset, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
1186
1187 record_len = sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length);
1188 if (resid <= record_len) {
1189 *seqnop = seqno;
1190 *residp = record_len - resid;
1191 return (true);
1192 }
1193 resid -= record_len;
1194
1195 while (record_len != 0) {
1196 if (m->m_len - offset > record_len) {
1197 offset += record_len;
1198 break;
1199 }
1200
1201 record_len -= (m->m_len - offset);
1202 offset = 0;
1203 m = m->m_next;
1204 }
1205 }
1206 }
1207
1208 int
ktls_enable_rx(struct socket * so,struct tls_enable * en)1209 ktls_enable_rx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1210 {
1211 struct ktls_session *tls;
1212 int error;
1213
1214 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1215 return (ENOTSUP);
1216
1217 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1218
1219 /*
1220 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1221 * invokes this function.
1222 */
1223 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1224 return (EINVAL);
1225
1226 /*
1227 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1228 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1229 */
1230 if (so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1231 return (EALREADY);
1232
1233 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1234 return (ENOTSUP);
1235
1236 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_RX);
1237 if (error)
1238 return (error);
1239
1240 error = ktls_ocf_try(tls, KTLS_RX);
1241 if (error) {
1242 ktls_free(tls);
1243 return (error);
1244 }
1245
1246 /*
1247 * Serialize with soreceive_generic() and make sure that we're not
1248 * operating on a listening socket.
1249 */
1250 error = SOCK_IO_RECV_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1251 if (error) {
1252 ktls_free(tls);
1253 return (error);
1254 }
1255
1256 /* Mark the socket as using TLS offload. */
1257 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
1258 if (__predict_false(so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL))
1259 error = EALREADY;
1260 else if ((so->so_rcv.sb_flags & SB_SPLICED) != 0)
1261 error = EINVAL;
1262 if (error != 0) {
1263 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1264 SOCK_IO_RECV_UNLOCK(so);
1265 ktls_free(tls);
1266 return (EALREADY);
1267 }
1268 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1269 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info = tls;
1270 so->so_rcv.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX;
1271
1272 /* Mark existing data as not ready until it can be decrypted. */
1273 sb_mark_notready(&so->so_rcv);
1274 ktls_check_rx(&so->so_rcv);
1275 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1276 SOCK_IO_RECV_UNLOCK(so);
1277
1278 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1279 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1280 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_RX);
1281 if (error)
1282 #endif
1283 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_RX, false);
1284 if (error)
1285 ktls_use_sw(tls);
1286
1287 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1288
1289 return (0);
1290 }
1291
1292 int
ktls_enable_tx(struct socket * so,struct tls_enable * en)1293 ktls_enable_tx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1294 {
1295 struct ktls_session *tls;
1296 struct inpcb *inp;
1297 struct tcpcb *tp;
1298 int error;
1299
1300 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1301 return (ENOTSUP);
1302
1303 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1304
1305 /*
1306 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1307 * invokes this function.
1308 */
1309 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1310 return (EINVAL);
1311
1312 /*
1313 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1314 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1315 */
1316 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1317 return (EALREADY);
1318
1319 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1320 return (ENOTSUP);
1321
1322 /* TLS requires ext pgs */
1323 if (mb_use_ext_pgs == 0)
1324 return (ENXIO);
1325
1326 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_TX);
1327 if (error)
1328 return (error);
1329
1330 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1331 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1332 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_TX);
1333 if (error)
1334 #endif
1335 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_TX, false);
1336 if (error)
1337 error = ktls_try_sw(tls, KTLS_TX);
1338
1339 if (error) {
1340 ktls_free(tls);
1341 return (error);
1342 }
1343
1344 /*
1345 * Serialize with sosend_generic() and make sure that we're not
1346 * operating on a listening socket.
1347 */
1348 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1349 if (error) {
1350 ktls_free(tls);
1351 return (error);
1352 }
1353
1354 /*
1355 * Write lock the INP when setting sb_tls_info so that
1356 * routines in tcp_ratelimit.c can read sb_tls_info while
1357 * holding the INP lock.
1358 */
1359 inp = so->so_pcb;
1360 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1361 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so);
1362 if (__predict_false(so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL))
1363 error = EALREADY;
1364 else if ((so->so_snd.sb_flags & SB_SPLICED) != 0)
1365 error = EINVAL;
1366 if (error != 0) {
1367 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1368 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1369 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1370 ktls_free(tls);
1371 return (error);
1372 }
1373 so->so_snd.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1374 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls;
1375 if (tls->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
1376 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1377 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0);
1378 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1;
1379 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
1380 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1);
1381 }
1382 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1383 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1384 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1385
1386 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1387
1388 return (0);
1389 }
1390
1391 int
ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket * so,int * modep)1392 ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1393 {
1394 struct ktls_session *tls;
1395 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1396
1397 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1398 return (EINVAL);
1399 inp = so->so_pcb;
1400 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1401 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
1402 tls = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info;
1403 if (tls == NULL)
1404 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1405 else
1406 *modep = tls->mode;
1407 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1408 return (0);
1409 }
1410
1411 /*
1412 * ktls_get_rx_sequence - get the next TCP- and TLS- sequence number.
1413 *
1414 * This function gets information about the next TCP- and TLS-
1415 * sequence number to be processed by the TLS receive worker
1416 * thread. The information is extracted from the given "inpcb"
1417 * structure. The values are stored in host endian format at the two
1418 * given output pointer locations. The TCP sequence number points to
1419 * the beginning of the TLS header.
1420 *
1421 * This function returns zero on success, else a non-zero error code
1422 * is returned.
1423 */
1424 int
ktls_get_rx_sequence(struct inpcb * inp,uint32_t * tcpseq,uint64_t * tlsseq)1425 ktls_get_rx_sequence(struct inpcb *inp, uint32_t *tcpseq, uint64_t *tlsseq)
1426 {
1427 struct socket *so;
1428 struct tcpcb *tp;
1429
1430 INP_RLOCK(inp);
1431 so = inp->inp_socket;
1432 if (__predict_false(so == NULL)) {
1433 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1434 return (EINVAL);
1435 }
1436 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1437 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1438 return (ECONNRESET);
1439 }
1440
1441 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1442 MPASS(tp != NULL);
1443
1444 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1445 *tcpseq = tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc;
1446 *tlsseq = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno;
1447 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1448
1449 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1450
1451 return (0);
1452 }
1453
1454 int
ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket * so,int * modep)1455 ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1456 {
1457 struct ktls_session *tls;
1458 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1459
1460 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1461 return (EINVAL);
1462 inp = so->so_pcb;
1463 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1464 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so);
1465 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1466 if (tls == NULL)
1467 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1468 else
1469 *modep = tls->mode;
1470 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1471 return (0);
1472 }
1473
1474 /*
1475 * Switch between SW and ifnet TLS sessions as requested.
1476 */
1477 int
ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket * so,int mode)1478 ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int mode)
1479 {
1480 struct ktls_session *tls, *tls_new;
1481 struct inpcb *inp;
1482 struct tcpcb *tp;
1483 int error;
1484
1485 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1486 return (EINVAL);
1487 switch (mode) {
1488 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1489 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1490 break;
1491 default:
1492 return (EINVAL);
1493 }
1494
1495 inp = so->so_pcb;
1496 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1497 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1498
1499 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) {
1500 /* Don't allow enabling ifnet ktls multiple times */
1501 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit)
1502 return (EALREADY);
1503
1504 /*
1505 * Don't enable ifnet ktls if we disabled it due to an
1506 * excessive retransmission rate
1507 */
1508 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis)
1509 return (ENXIO);
1510 }
1511
1512 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1513 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1514 if (tls == NULL) {
1515 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1516 return (0);
1517 }
1518
1519 if (tls->mode == mode) {
1520 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1521 return (0);
1522 }
1523
1524 tls = ktls_hold(tls);
1525 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1526 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1527
1528 tls_new = ktls_clone_session(tls, KTLS_TX);
1529
1530 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1531 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX, true);
1532 else
1533 error = ktls_try_sw(tls_new, KTLS_TX);
1534 if (error) {
1535 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1536 ktls_free(tls_new);
1537 ktls_free(tls);
1538 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1539 return (error);
1540 }
1541
1542 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1543 if (error) {
1544 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1545 ktls_free(tls_new);
1546 ktls_free(tls);
1547 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1548 return (error);
1549 }
1550
1551 /*
1552 * If we raced with another session change, keep the existing
1553 * session.
1554 */
1555 if (tls != so->so_snd.sb_tls_info) {
1556 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1557 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1558 ktls_free(tls_new);
1559 ktls_free(tls);
1560 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1561 return (EBUSY);
1562 }
1563
1564 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1565 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1566 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls_new;
1567 if (tls_new->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
1568 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0);
1569 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1;
1570 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
1571 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1);
1572 }
1573 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1574 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1575
1576 /*
1577 * Drop two references on 'tls'. The first is for the
1578 * ktls_hold() above. The second drops the reference from the
1579 * socket buffer.
1580 */
1581 KASSERT(tls->refcount >= 2, ("too few references on old session"));
1582 ktls_free(tls);
1583 ktls_free(tls);
1584
1585 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1586 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_ifnet, 1);
1587 else
1588 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_sw, 1);
1589
1590 return (0);
1591 }
1592
1593 /*
1594 * Try to allocate a new TLS receive tag. This task is scheduled when
1595 * sbappend_ktls_rx detects an input path change. If a new tag is
1596 * allocated, replace the tag in the TLS session. If a new tag cannot
1597 * be allocated, let the session fall back to software decryption.
1598 */
1599 static void
ktls_reset_receive_tag(void * context,int pending)1600 ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending)
1601 {
1602 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
1603 struct ktls_session *tls;
1604 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1605 struct inpcb *inp;
1606 struct ifnet *ifp;
1607 struct socket *so;
1608 int error;
1609
1610 MPASS(pending == 1);
1611
1612 tls = context;
1613 so = tls->so;
1614 inp = so->so_pcb;
1615 ifp = NULL;
1616
1617 INP_RLOCK(inp);
1618 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1619 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1620 goto out;
1621 }
1622
1623 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1624 mst = tls->snd_tag;
1625 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1626 if (mst != NULL)
1627 m_snd_tag_rele(mst);
1628
1629 ifp = tls->rx_ifp;
1630 if_ref(ifp);
1631 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1632
1633 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
1634 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
1635 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
1636 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
1637 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
1638 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
1639 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = tls->rx_vlan_id;
1640 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1641
1642 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
1643 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS6) == 0)
1644 goto out;
1645 } else {
1646 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS4) == 0)
1647 goto out;
1648 }
1649
1650 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, &mst);
1651 if (error == 0) {
1652 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1653 tls->snd_tag = mst;
1654 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1655
1656 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1657 } else {
1658 /*
1659 * Just fall back to software decryption if a tag
1660 * cannot be allocated leaving the connection intact.
1661 * If a future input path change switches to another
1662 * interface this connection will resume ifnet TLS.
1663 */
1664 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1665 }
1666
1667 out:
1668 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1669 tls->reset_pending = false;
1670 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1671
1672 if (ifp != NULL)
1673 if_rele(ifp);
1674 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
1675 sorele(so);
1676 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1677 ktls_free(tls);
1678 }
1679
1680 /*
1681 * Try to allocate a new TLS send tag. This task is scheduled when
1682 * ip_output detects a route change while trying to transmit a packet
1683 * holding a TLS record. If a new tag is allocated, replace the tag
1684 * in the TLS session. Subsequent packets on the connection will use
1685 * the new tag. If a new tag cannot be allocated, drop the
1686 * connection.
1687 */
1688 static void
ktls_reset_send_tag(void * context,int pending)1689 ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending)
1690 {
1691 struct epoch_tracker et;
1692 struct ktls_session *tls;
1693 struct m_snd_tag *old, *new;
1694 struct inpcb *inp;
1695 struct tcpcb *tp;
1696 int error;
1697
1698 MPASS(pending == 1);
1699
1700 tls = context;
1701 inp = tls->inp;
1702
1703 /*
1704 * Free the old tag first before allocating a new one.
1705 * ip[6]_output_send() will treat a NULL send tag the same as
1706 * an ifp mismatch and drop packets until a new tag is
1707 * allocated.
1708 *
1709 * Write-lock the INP when changing tls->snd_tag since
1710 * ip[6]_output_send() holds a read-lock when reading the
1711 * pointer.
1712 */
1713 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1714 old = tls->snd_tag;
1715 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1716 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1717 if (old != NULL)
1718 m_snd_tag_rele(old);
1719
1720 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(inp, tls, true, &new);
1721
1722 if (error == 0) {
1723 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1724 tls->snd_tag = new;
1725 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1726 tls->reset_pending = false;
1727 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1728 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1729
1730 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1731
1732 /*
1733 * XXX: Should we kick tcp_output explicitly now that
1734 * the send tag is fixed or just rely on timers?
1735 */
1736 } else {
1737 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
1738 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1739 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
1740 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1741 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
1742 tp = tcp_drop(tp, ECONNABORTED);
1743 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1744 if (tp != NULL) {
1745 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 1);
1746 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1747 }
1748 } else
1749 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1750 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et);
1751
1752 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1753
1754 /*
1755 * Leave reset_pending true to avoid future tasks while
1756 * the socket goes away.
1757 */
1758 }
1759
1760 ktls_free(tls);
1761 }
1762
1763 void
ktls_input_ifp_mismatch(struct sockbuf * sb,struct ifnet * ifp)1764 ktls_input_ifp_mismatch(struct sockbuf *sb, struct ifnet *ifp)
1765 {
1766 struct ktls_session *tls;
1767 struct socket *so;
1768
1769 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1770 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
1771 __func__, sb));
1772 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
1773
1774 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
1775 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1776 if_ref(ifp);
1777 tls->rx_ifp = ifp;
1778
1779 /*
1780 * See if we should schedule a task to update the receive tag for
1781 * this session.
1782 */
1783 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1784 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1785 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1786 soref(so);
1787 tls->so = so;
1788 tls->reset_pending = true;
1789 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1790 }
1791 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1792 }
1793
1794 int
ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb * inp,struct ktls_session * tls)1795 ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls)
1796 {
1797
1798 if (inp == NULL)
1799 return (ENOBUFS);
1800
1801 INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1802
1803 /*
1804 * See if we should schedule a task to update the send tag for
1805 * this session.
1806 */
1807 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1808 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1809 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1810 tls->reset_pending = true;
1811 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1812 }
1813 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1814 return (ENOBUFS);
1815 }
1816
1817 #ifdef RATELIMIT
1818 int
ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session * tls,uint64_t max_pacing_rate)1819 ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session *tls, uint64_t max_pacing_rate)
1820 {
1821 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params = {
1822 .rate_limit.max_rate = max_pacing_rate,
1823 .rate_limit.flags = M_NOWAIT,
1824 };
1825 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1826
1827 /* Can't get to the inp, but it should be locked. */
1828 /* INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); */
1829
1830 MPASS(tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET);
1831
1832 if (tls->snd_tag == NULL) {
1833 /*
1834 * Resetting send tag, ignore this change. The
1835 * pending reset may or may not see this updated rate
1836 * in the tcpcb. If it doesn't, we will just lose
1837 * this rate change.
1838 */
1839 return (0);
1840 }
1841
1842 mst = tls->snd_tag;
1843
1844 MPASS(mst != NULL);
1845 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT);
1846
1847 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
1848 }
1849 #endif
1850
1851 static void
ktls_destroy_help(void * context,int pending __unused)1852 ktls_destroy_help(void *context, int pending __unused)
1853 {
1854 ktls_destroy(context);
1855 }
1856
1857 void
ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session * tls)1858 ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session *tls)
1859 {
1860 struct inpcb *inp;
1861 struct tcpcb *tp;
1862 bool wlocked;
1863
1864 MPASS(tls->refcount == 0);
1865
1866 inp = tls->inp;
1867 if (tls->tx) {
1868 wlocked = INP_WLOCKED(inp);
1869 if (!wlocked && !INP_TRY_WLOCK(inp)) {
1870 /*
1871 * rwlocks read locks are anonymous, and there
1872 * is no way to know if our current thread
1873 * holds an rlock on the inp. As a rough
1874 * estimate, check to see if the thread holds
1875 * *any* rlocks at all. If it does not, then we
1876 * know that we don't hold the inp rlock, and
1877 * can safely take the wlock
1878 */
1879 if (curthread->td_rw_rlocks == 0) {
1880 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1881 } else {
1882 /*
1883 * We might hold the rlock, so let's
1884 * do the destroy in a taskqueue
1885 * context to avoid a potential
1886 * deadlock. This should be very
1887 * rare.
1888 */
1889 counter_u64_add(ktls_destroy_task, 1);
1890 TASK_INIT(&tls->destroy_task, 0,
1891 ktls_destroy_help, tls);
1892 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread,
1893 &tls->destroy_task);
1894 return;
1895 }
1896 }
1897 }
1898
1899 if (tls->sequential_records) {
1900 struct mbuf *m, *n;
1901 int page_count;
1902
1903 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq, n) {
1904 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
1905 while (page_count > 0) {
1906 KASSERT(page_count >= m->m_epg_nrdy,
1907 ("%s: too few pages", __func__));
1908 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
1909 m = m_free(m);
1910 }
1911 }
1912 }
1913
1914 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, -1);
1915 switch (tls->mode) {
1916 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1917 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1918 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1919 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, -1);
1920 break;
1921 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1922 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, -1);
1923 break;
1924 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1925 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, -1);
1926 break;
1927 }
1928 break;
1929 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1930 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1931 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1932 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, -1);
1933 break;
1934 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1935 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, -1);
1936 break;
1937 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1938 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, -1);
1939 break;
1940 }
1941 if (tls->snd_tag != NULL)
1942 m_snd_tag_rele(tls->snd_tag);
1943 if (tls->rx_ifp != NULL)
1944 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1945 if (tls->tx) {
1946 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1947 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1948 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 1);
1949 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 0;
1950 }
1951 break;
1952 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1953 case TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE:
1954 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1955 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1956 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, -1);
1957 break;
1958 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1959 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, -1);
1960 break;
1961 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1962 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, -1);
1963 break;
1964 }
1965 break;
1966 #endif
1967 }
1968 if (tls->ocf_session != NULL)
1969 ktls_ocf_free(tls);
1970 if (tls->params.auth_key != NULL) {
1971 zfree(tls->params.auth_key, M_KTLS);
1972 tls->params.auth_key = NULL;
1973 tls->params.auth_key_len = 0;
1974 }
1975 if (tls->params.cipher_key != NULL) {
1976 zfree(tls->params.cipher_key, M_KTLS);
1977 tls->params.cipher_key = NULL;
1978 tls->params.cipher_key_len = 0;
1979 }
1980 if (tls->tx) {
1981 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1982 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp) && !wlocked)
1983 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1984 }
1985 explicit_bzero(tls->params.iv, sizeof(tls->params.iv));
1986
1987 uma_zfree(ktls_session_zone, tls);
1988 }
1989
1990 void
ktls_seq(struct sockbuf * sb,struct mbuf * m)1991 ktls_seq(struct sockbuf *sb, struct mbuf *m)
1992 {
1993
1994 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1995 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
1996 ("ktls_seq: mapped mbuf %p", m));
1997
1998 m->m_epg_seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1999 sb->sb_tls_seqno++;
2000 }
2001 }
2002
2003 /*
2004 * Add TLS framing (headers and trailers) to a chain of mbufs. Each
2005 * mbuf in the chain must be an unmapped mbuf. The payload of the
2006 * mbuf must be populated with the payload of each TLS record.
2007 *
2008 * The record_type argument specifies the TLS record type used when
2009 * populating the TLS header.
2010 *
2011 * The enq_count argument on return is set to the number of pages of
2012 * payload data for this entire chain that need to be encrypted via SW
2013 * encryption. The returned value should be passed to ktls_enqueue
2014 * when scheduling encryption of this chain of mbufs. To handle the
2015 * special case of empty fragments for TLS 1.0 sessions, an empty
2016 * fragment counts as one page.
2017 */
2018 void
ktls_frame(struct mbuf * top,struct ktls_session * tls,int * enq_cnt,uint8_t record_type)2019 ktls_frame(struct mbuf *top, struct ktls_session *tls, int *enq_cnt,
2020 uint8_t record_type)
2021 {
2022 struct tls_record_layer *tlshdr;
2023 struct mbuf *m;
2024 uint64_t *noncep;
2025 uint16_t tls_len;
2026 int maxlen __diagused;
2027
2028 maxlen = tls->params.max_frame_len;
2029 *enq_cnt = 0;
2030 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
2031 /*
2032 * All mbufs in the chain should be TLS records whose
2033 * payload does not exceed the maximum frame length.
2034 *
2035 * Empty TLS 1.0 records are permitted when using CBC.
2036 */
2037 KASSERT(m->m_len <= maxlen && m->m_len >= 0 &&
2038 (m->m_len > 0 || ktls_permit_empty_frames(tls)),
2039 ("ktls_frame: m %p len %d", m, m->m_len));
2040
2041 /*
2042 * TLS frames require unmapped mbufs to store session
2043 * info.
2044 */
2045 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
2046 ("ktls_frame: mapped mbuf %p (top = %p)", m, top));
2047
2048 tls_len = m->m_len;
2049
2050 /* Save a reference to the session. */
2051 m->m_epg_tls = ktls_hold(tls);
2052
2053 m->m_epg_hdrlen = tls->params.tls_hlen;
2054 m->m_epg_trllen = tls->params.tls_tlen;
2055 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC) {
2056 int bs, delta;
2057
2058 /*
2059 * AES-CBC pads messages to a multiple of the
2060 * block size. Note that the padding is
2061 * applied after the digest and the encryption
2062 * is done on the "plaintext || mac || padding".
2063 * At least one byte of padding is always
2064 * present.
2065 *
2066 * Compute the final trailer length assuming
2067 * at most one block of padding.
2068 * tls->params.tls_tlen is the maximum
2069 * possible trailer length (padding + digest).
2070 * delta holds the number of excess padding
2071 * bytes if the maximum were used. Those
2072 * extra bytes are removed.
2073 */
2074 bs = tls->params.tls_bs;
2075 delta = (tls_len + tls->params.tls_tlen) & (bs - 1);
2076 m->m_epg_trllen -= delta;
2077 }
2078 m->m_len += m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen;
2079
2080 /* Populate the TLS header. */
2081 tlshdr = (void *)m->m_epg_hdr;
2082 tlshdr->tls_vmajor = tls->params.tls_vmajor;
2083
2084 /*
2085 * TLS 1.3 masquarades as TLS 1.2 with a record type
2086 * of TLS_RLTYPE_APP.
2087 */
2088 if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE &&
2089 tls->params.tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) {
2090 tlshdr->tls_vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
2091 tlshdr->tls_type = TLS_RLTYPE_APP;
2092 /* save the real record type for later */
2093 m->m_epg_record_type = record_type;
2094 m->m_epg_trail[0] = record_type;
2095 } else {
2096 tlshdr->tls_vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
2097 tlshdr->tls_type = record_type;
2098 }
2099 tlshdr->tls_length = htons(m->m_len - sizeof(*tlshdr));
2100
2101 /*
2102 * Store nonces / explicit IVs after the end of the
2103 * TLS header.
2104 *
2105 * For GCM with TLS 1.2, an 8 byte nonce is copied
2106 * from the end of the IV. The nonce is then
2107 * incremented for use by the next record.
2108 *
2109 * For CBC, a random nonce is inserted for TLS 1.1+.
2110 */
2111 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
2112 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) {
2113 noncep = (uint64_t *)(tls->params.iv + 8);
2114 be64enc(tlshdr + 1, *noncep);
2115 (*noncep)++;
2116 } else if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2117 tls->params.tls_vminor >= TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE)
2118 arc4rand(tlshdr + 1, AES_BLOCK_LEN, 0);
2119
2120 /*
2121 * When using SW encryption, mark the mbuf not ready.
2122 * It will be marked ready via sbready() after the
2123 * record has been encrypted.
2124 *
2125 * When using ifnet TLS, unencrypted TLS records are
2126 * sent down the stack to the NIC.
2127 */
2128 if (tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
2129 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
2130 if (__predict_false(tls_len == 0)) {
2131 /* TLS 1.0 empty fragment. */
2132 m->m_epg_nrdy = 1;
2133 } else
2134 m->m_epg_nrdy = m->m_epg_npgs;
2135 *enq_cnt += m->m_epg_nrdy;
2136 }
2137 }
2138 }
2139
2140 bool
ktls_permit_empty_frames(struct ktls_session * tls)2141 ktls_permit_empty_frames(struct ktls_session *tls)
2142 {
2143 return (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2144 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO);
2145 }
2146
2147 void
ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf * sb)2148 ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf *sb)
2149 {
2150 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
2151 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2152 struct socket *so;
2153 bool running;
2154
2155 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2156 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
2157 __func__, sb));
2158 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
2159
2160 if (sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING)
2161 return;
2162
2163 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2164 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr)) {
2165 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc != 0)
2166 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2167 return;
2168 }
2169
2170 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
2171
2172 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2173 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length)) {
2174 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0)
2175 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2176 return;
2177 }
2178
2179 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2180
2181 soref(so);
2182 wq = &ktls_wq[so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->wq_index];
2183 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2184 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->so_head, so, so_ktls_rx_list);
2185 running = wq->running;
2186 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2187 if (!running)
2188 wakeup(wq);
2189 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 1);
2190 }
2191
2192 static struct mbuf *
ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf * sb,int len)2193 ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf *sb, int len)
2194 {
2195 struct mbuf *m, *n, *top;
2196 int remain;
2197
2198 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2199 MPASS(len <= sb->sb_tlscc);
2200
2201 /*
2202 * If TLS chain is the exact size of the record,
2203 * just grab the whole record.
2204 */
2205 top = sb->sb_mtls;
2206 if (sb->sb_tlscc == len) {
2207 sb->sb_mtls = NULL;
2208 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2209 goto out;
2210 }
2211
2212 /*
2213 * While it would be nice to use m_split() here, we need
2214 * to know exactly what m_split() allocates to update the
2215 * accounting, so do it inline instead.
2216 */
2217 remain = len;
2218 for (m = top; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next)
2219 remain -= m->m_len;
2220
2221 /* Easy case: don't have to split 'm'. */
2222 if (remain == m->m_len) {
2223 sb->sb_mtls = m->m_next;
2224 if (sb->sb_mtls == NULL)
2225 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2226 m->m_next = NULL;
2227 goto out;
2228 }
2229
2230 /*
2231 * Need to allocate an mbuf to hold the remainder of 'm'. Try
2232 * with M_NOWAIT first.
2233 */
2234 n = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
2235 if (n == NULL) {
2236 /*
2237 * Use M_WAITOK with socket buffer unlocked. If
2238 * 'sb_mtls' changes while the lock is dropped, return
2239 * NULL to force the caller to retry.
2240 */
2241 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2242
2243 n = m_get(M_WAITOK, MT_DATA);
2244
2245 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2246 if (sb->sb_mtls != top) {
2247 m_free(n);
2248 return (NULL);
2249 }
2250 }
2251 n->m_flags |= (m->m_flags & (M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED));
2252
2253 /* Store remainder in 'n'. */
2254 n->m_len = m->m_len - remain;
2255 if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) {
2256 n->m_data = m->m_data + remain;
2257 mb_dupcl(n, m);
2258 } else {
2259 bcopy(mtod(m, caddr_t) + remain, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len);
2260 }
2261
2262 /* Trim 'm' and update accounting. */
2263 m->m_len -= n->m_len;
2264 sb->sb_tlscc -= n->m_len;
2265 sb->sb_ccc -= n->m_len;
2266
2267 /* Account for 'n'. */
2268 sballoc_ktls_rx(sb, n);
2269
2270 /* Insert 'n' into the TLS chain. */
2271 sb->sb_mtls = n;
2272 n->m_next = m->m_next;
2273 if (sb->sb_mtlstail == m)
2274 sb->sb_mtlstail = n;
2275
2276 /* Detach the record from the TLS chain. */
2277 m->m_next = NULL;
2278
2279 out:
2280 MPASS(m_length(top, NULL) == len);
2281 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next)
2282 sbfree_ktls_rx(sb, m);
2283 sb->sb_tlsdcc = len;
2284 sb->sb_ccc += len;
2285 SBCHECK(sb);
2286 return (top);
2287 }
2288
2289 /*
2290 * Determine the length of the trailing zero padding and find the real
2291 * record type in the byte before the padding.
2292 *
2293 * Walking the mbuf chain backwards is clumsy, so another option would
2294 * be to scan forwards remembering the last non-zero byte before the
2295 * trailer. However, it would be expensive to scan the entire record.
2296 * Instead, find the last non-zero byte of each mbuf in the chain
2297 * keeping track of the relative offset of that nonzero byte.
2298 *
2299 * trail_len is the size of the MAC/tag on input and is set to the
2300 * size of the full trailer including padding and the record type on
2301 * return.
2302 */
2303 static int
tls13_find_record_type(struct ktls_session * tls,struct mbuf * m,int tls_len,int * trailer_len,uint8_t * record_typep)2304 tls13_find_record_type(struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, int tls_len,
2305 int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_typep)
2306 {
2307 char *cp;
2308 u_int digest_start, last_offset, m_len, offset;
2309 uint8_t record_type;
2310
2311 digest_start = tls_len - *trailer_len;
2312 last_offset = 0;
2313 offset = 0;
2314 for (; m != NULL && offset < digest_start;
2315 offset += m->m_len, m = m->m_next) {
2316 /* Don't look for padding in the tag. */
2317 m_len = min(digest_start - offset, m->m_len);
2318 cp = mtod(m, char *);
2319
2320 /* Find last non-zero byte in this mbuf. */
2321 while (m_len > 0 && cp[m_len - 1] == 0)
2322 m_len--;
2323 if (m_len > 0) {
2324 record_type = cp[m_len - 1];
2325 last_offset = offset + m_len;
2326 }
2327 }
2328 if (last_offset < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2329 return (EBADMSG);
2330
2331 *record_typep = record_type;
2332 *trailer_len = tls_len - last_offset + 1;
2333 return (0);
2334 }
2335
2336 /*
2337 * Check if a mbuf chain is fully decrypted at the given offset and
2338 * length. Returns KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED if all data is
2339 * decrypted. KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED if there is a mix of encrypted
2340 * and decrypted data. Else KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED if all data
2341 * is encrypted.
2342 */
2343 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t
ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(struct mbuf * mb,int offset,int len)2344 ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(struct mbuf *mb, int offset, int len)
2345 {
2346 int m_flags_ored = 0;
2347 int m_flags_anded = -1;
2348
2349 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2350 if (offset < mb->m_len)
2351 break;
2352 offset -= mb->m_len;
2353 }
2354 offset += len;
2355
2356 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2357 m_flags_ored |= mb->m_flags;
2358 m_flags_anded &= mb->m_flags;
2359
2360 if (offset <= mb->m_len)
2361 break;
2362 offset -= mb->m_len;
2363 }
2364 MPASS(mb != NULL || offset == 0);
2365
2366 if ((m_flags_ored ^ m_flags_anded) & M_DECRYPTED)
2367 return (KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED);
2368 else
2369 return ((m_flags_ored & M_DECRYPTED) ?
2370 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED :
2371 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED);
2372 }
2373
2374 /*
2375 * ktls_resync_ifnet - get HW TLS RX back on track after packet loss
2376 */
2377 static int
ktls_resync_ifnet(struct socket * so,uint32_t tls_len,uint64_t tls_rcd_num)2378 ktls_resync_ifnet(struct socket *so, uint32_t tls_len, uint64_t tls_rcd_num)
2379 {
2380 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params;
2381 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
2382 struct inpcb *inp;
2383 struct tcpcb *tp;
2384
2385 mst = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->snd_tag;
2386 if (__predict_false(mst == NULL))
2387 return (EINVAL);
2388
2389 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2390 if (__predict_false(inp == NULL))
2391 return (EINVAL);
2392
2393 INP_RLOCK(inp);
2394 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
2395 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
2396 return (ECONNRESET);
2397 }
2398
2399 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2400 MPASS(tp != NULL);
2401
2402 /* Get the TCP sequence number of the next valid TLS header. */
2403 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2404 params.tls_rx.tls_hdr_tcp_sn =
2405 tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc - tls_len;
2406 params.tls_rx.tls_rec_length = tls_len;
2407 params.tls_rx.tls_seq_number = tls_rcd_num;
2408 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2409
2410 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
2411
2412 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX);
2413 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
2414 }
2415
2416 static void
ktls_drop(struct socket * so,int error)2417 ktls_drop(struct socket *so, int error)
2418 {
2419 struct epoch_tracker et;
2420 struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2421 struct tcpcb *tp;
2422
2423 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
2424 INP_WLOCK(inp);
2425 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
2426 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2427 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
2428 tp = tcp_drop(tp, error);
2429 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2430 if (tp != NULL)
2431 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
2432 } else {
2433 so->so_error = error;
2434 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
2435 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2436 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
2437 }
2438 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et);
2439 }
2440
2441 static void
ktls_decrypt(struct socket * so)2442 ktls_decrypt(struct socket *so)
2443 {
2444 char tls_header[MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN];
2445 struct ktls_session *tls;
2446 struct sockbuf *sb;
2447 struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
2448 struct tls_get_record tgr;
2449 struct mbuf *control, *data, *m;
2450 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t state;
2451 uint64_t seqno;
2452 int error, remain, tls_len, trail_len;
2453 bool tls13;
2454 uint8_t vminor, record_type;
2455
2456 hdr = (struct tls_record_layer *)tls_header;
2457 sb = &so->so_rcv;
2458 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2459 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING,
2460 ("%s: socket %p not running", __func__, so));
2461
2462 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
2463 MPASS(tls != NULL);
2464
2465 tls13 = (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE);
2466 if (tls13)
2467 vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
2468 else
2469 vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
2470 for (;;) {
2471 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2472 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2473 break;
2474
2475 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, tls->params.tls_hlen, tls_header);
2476 tls_len = sizeof(*hdr) + ntohs(hdr->tls_length);
2477
2478 if (hdr->tls_vmajor != tls->params.tls_vmajor ||
2479 hdr->tls_vminor != vminor)
2480 error = EINVAL;
2481 else if (tls13 && hdr->tls_type != TLS_RLTYPE_APP)
2482 error = EINVAL;
2483 else if (tls_len < tls->params.tls_hlen || tls_len >
2484 tls->params.tls_hlen + TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 +
2485 tls->params.tls_tlen)
2486 error = EMSGSIZE;
2487 else
2488 error = 0;
2489 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2490 /*
2491 * We have a corrupted record and are likely
2492 * out of sync. The connection isn't
2493 * recoverable at this point, so abort it.
2494 */
2495 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2496 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_corrupted_records, 1);
2497
2498 ktls_drop(so, error);
2499 goto deref;
2500 }
2501
2502 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2503 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls_len)
2504 break;
2505
2506 /*
2507 * Split out the portion of the mbuf chain containing
2508 * this TLS record.
2509 */
2510 data = ktls_detach_record(sb, tls_len);
2511 if (data == NULL)
2512 continue;
2513 MPASS(sb->sb_tlsdcc == tls_len);
2514
2515 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
2516 sb->sb_tls_seqno++;
2517 SBCHECK(sb);
2518 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2519
2520 /* get crypto state for this TLS record */
2521 state = ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(data, 0, tls_len);
2522
2523 switch (state) {
2524 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED:
2525 error = ktls_ocf_recrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno);
2526 if (error)
2527 break;
2528 /* FALLTHROUGH */
2529 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED:
2530 error = ktls_ocf_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno,
2531 &trail_len);
2532 if (__predict_true(error == 0)) {
2533 if (tls13) {
2534 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2535 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2536 } else {
2537 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2538 }
2539 }
2540 break;
2541 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED:
2542 /*
2543 * NIC TLS is only supported for AEAD
2544 * ciphersuites which used a fixed sized
2545 * trailer.
2546 */
2547 if (tls13) {
2548 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen - 1;
2549 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2550 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2551 } else {
2552 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen;
2553 error = 0;
2554 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2555 }
2556 break;
2557 default:
2558 error = EINVAL;
2559 break;
2560 }
2561 if (error) {
2562 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2563
2564 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2565 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2566 /*
2567 * sbcut/drop/flush discarded these
2568 * mbufs.
2569 */
2570 m_freem(data);
2571 break;
2572 }
2573
2574 /*
2575 * Drop this TLS record's data, but keep
2576 * decrypting subsequent records.
2577 */
2578 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2579 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0;
2580
2581 if (error != EMSGSIZE)
2582 error = EBADMSG;
2583 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2584 so->so_error = error;
2585 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2586 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2587
2588 m_freem(data);
2589
2590 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2591 continue;
2592 }
2593
2594 /* Allocate the control mbuf. */
2595 memset(&tgr, 0, sizeof(tgr));
2596 tgr.tls_type = record_type;
2597 tgr.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
2598 tgr.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
2599 tgr.tls_length = htobe16(tls_len - tls->params.tls_hlen -
2600 trail_len);
2601 control = sbcreatecontrol(&tgr, sizeof(tgr),
2602 TLS_GET_RECORD, IPPROTO_TCP, M_WAITOK);
2603
2604 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2605 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2606 /* sbcut/drop/flush discarded these mbufs. */
2607 MPASS(sb->sb_tlscc == 0);
2608 m_freem(data);
2609 m_freem(control);
2610 break;
2611 }
2612
2613 /*
2614 * Clear the 'dcc' accounting in preparation for
2615 * adding the decrypted record.
2616 */
2617 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2618 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0;
2619 SBCHECK(sb);
2620
2621 /* If there is no payload, drop all of the data. */
2622 if (tgr.tls_length == htobe16(0)) {
2623 m_freem(data);
2624 data = NULL;
2625 } else {
2626 /* Trim header. */
2627 remain = tls->params.tls_hlen;
2628 while (remain > 0) {
2629 if (data->m_len > remain) {
2630 data->m_data += remain;
2631 data->m_len -= remain;
2632 break;
2633 }
2634 remain -= data->m_len;
2635 data = m_free(data);
2636 }
2637
2638 /* Trim trailer and clear M_NOTREADY. */
2639 remain = be16toh(tgr.tls_length);
2640 m = data;
2641 for (m = data; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) {
2642 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2643 remain -= m->m_len;
2644 }
2645 m->m_len = remain;
2646 m_freem(m->m_next);
2647 m->m_next = NULL;
2648 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2649
2650 /* Set EOR on the final mbuf. */
2651 m->m_flags |= M_EOR;
2652 }
2653
2654 sbappendcontrol_locked(sb, data, control, 0);
2655
2656 if (__predict_false(state != KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED)) {
2657 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2658 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2659 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, tls_len, seqno);
2660 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2661 } else if (__predict_false(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC)) {
2662 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2663 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2664 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, 0, seqno);
2665 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2666 }
2667 }
2668
2669 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2670
2671 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc > 0)
2672 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2673
2674 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2675
2676 deref:
2677 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2678
2679 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2680 sorele(so);
2681 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2682 }
2683
2684 void
ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf * m)2685 ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf *m)
2686 {
2687 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2688 bool running;
2689
2690 /* Mark it for freeing. */
2691 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_2FREE;
2692 wq = &ktls_wq[m->m_epg_tls->wq_index];
2693 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2694 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2695 running = wq->running;
2696 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2697 if (!running)
2698 wakeup(wq);
2699 }
2700
2701 static void *
ktls_buffer_alloc(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * m)2702 ktls_buffer_alloc(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m)
2703 {
2704 void *buf;
2705 int domain, running;
2706
2707 if (m->m_epg_npgs <= 2)
2708 return (NULL);
2709 if (ktls_buffer_zone == NULL)
2710 return (NULL);
2711 if ((u_int)(ticks - wq->lastallocfail) < hz) {
2712 /*
2713 * Rate-limit allocation attempts after a failure.
2714 * ktls_buffer_import() will acquire a per-domain mutex to check
2715 * the free page queues and may fail consistently if memory is
2716 * fragmented.
2717 */
2718 return (NULL);
2719 }
2720 buf = uma_zalloc(ktls_buffer_zone, M_NOWAIT | M_NORECLAIM);
2721 if (buf == NULL) {
2722 domain = PCPU_GET(domain);
2723 wq->lastallocfail = ticks;
2724
2725 /*
2726 * Note that this check is "racy", but the races are
2727 * harmless, and are either a spurious wakeup if
2728 * multiple threads fail allocations before the alloc
2729 * thread wakes, or waiting an extra second in case we
2730 * see an old value of running == true.
2731 */
2732 if (!VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain)) {
2733 running = atomic_load_int(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.running);
2734 if (!running)
2735 wakeup(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td);
2736 }
2737 }
2738 return (buf);
2739 }
2740
2741 static int
ktls_encrypt_record(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * m,struct ktls_session * tls,struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state * state)2742 ktls_encrypt_record(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m,
2743 struct ktls_session *tls, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2744 {
2745 vm_page_t pg;
2746 int error, i, len, off;
2747
2748 KASSERT((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY),
2749 ("%p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2750 KASSERT(ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs) <= ktls_maxlen,
2751 ("page count %d larger than maximum frame length %d", m->m_epg_npgs,
2752 ktls_maxlen));
2753
2754 /* Anonymous mbufs are encrypted in place. */
2755 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) != 0)
2756 return (ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, NULL, 0));
2757
2758 /*
2759 * For file-backed mbufs (from sendfile), anonymous wired
2760 * pages are allocated and used as the encryption destination.
2761 */
2762 if ((state->cbuf = ktls_buffer_alloc(wq, m)) != NULL) {
2763 len = ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs - 1) + m->m_epg_last_len -
2764 m->m_epg_1st_off;
2765 state->dst_iov[0].iov_base = (char *)state->cbuf +
2766 m->m_epg_1st_off;
2767 state->dst_iov[0].iov_len = len;
2768 state->parray[0] = DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)state->cbuf);
2769 i = 1;
2770 } else {
2771 off = m->m_epg_1st_off;
2772 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++, off = 0) {
2773 pg = vm_page_alloc_noobj(VM_ALLOC_NODUMP |
2774 VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_WAITOK);
2775 len = m_epg_pagelen(m, i, off);
2776 state->parray[i] = VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg);
2777 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base =
2778 (char *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(state->parray[i]) + off;
2779 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = len;
2780 }
2781 }
2782 KASSERT(i + 1 <= nitems(state->dst_iov), ("dst_iov is too small"));
2783 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base = m->m_epg_trail;
2784 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = m->m_epg_trllen;
2785
2786 error = ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, state->dst_iov, i + 1);
2787
2788 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2789 /* Free the anonymous pages. */
2790 if (state->cbuf != NULL)
2791 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, state->cbuf);
2792 else {
2793 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) {
2794 pg = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(state->parray[i]);
2795 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(pg);
2796 vm_page_free(pg);
2797 }
2798 }
2799 }
2800 return (error);
2801 }
2802
2803 /* Number of TLS records in a batch passed to ktls_enqueue(). */
2804 static u_int
ktls_batched_records(struct mbuf * m)2805 ktls_batched_records(struct mbuf *m)
2806 {
2807 int page_count, records;
2808
2809 records = 0;
2810 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2811 while (page_count > 0) {
2812 records++;
2813 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
2814 m = m->m_next;
2815 }
2816 KASSERT(page_count == 0, ("%s: mismatched page count", __func__));
2817 return (records);
2818 }
2819
2820 void
ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf * m,struct socket * so,int page_count)2821 ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, int page_count)
2822 {
2823 struct ktls_session *tls;
2824 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2825 int queued;
2826 bool running;
2827
2828 KASSERT(((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) ==
2829 (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)),
2830 ("ktls_enqueue: %p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2831 KASSERT(page_count != 0, ("enqueueing TLS mbuf with zero page count"));
2832
2833 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW, ("!SW TLS mbuf"));
2834
2835 m->m_epg_enc_cnt = page_count;
2836
2837 /*
2838 * Save a pointer to the socket. The caller is responsible
2839 * for taking an additional reference via soref().
2840 */
2841 m->m_epg_so = so;
2842
2843 queued = 1;
2844 tls = m->m_epg_tls;
2845 wq = &ktls_wq[tls->wq_index];
2846 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2847 if (__predict_false(tls->sequential_records)) {
2848 /*
2849 * For TLS 1.0, records must be encrypted
2850 * sequentially. For a given connection, all records
2851 * queued to the associated work queue are processed
2852 * sequentially. However, sendfile(2) might complete
2853 * I/O requests spanning multiple TLS records out of
2854 * order. Here we ensure TLS records are enqueued to
2855 * the work queue in FIFO order.
2856 *
2857 * tls->next_seqno holds the sequence number of the
2858 * next TLS record that should be enqueued to the work
2859 * queue. If this next record is not tls->next_seqno,
2860 * it must be a future record, so insert it, sorted by
2861 * TLS sequence number, into tls->pending_records and
2862 * return.
2863 *
2864 * If this TLS record matches tls->next_seqno, place
2865 * it in the work queue and then check
2866 * tls->pending_records to see if any
2867 * previously-queued records are now ready for
2868 * encryption.
2869 */
2870 if (m->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno) {
2871 struct mbuf *n, *p;
2872
2873 p = NULL;
2874 STAILQ_FOREACH(n, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq) {
2875 if (n->m_epg_seqno > m->m_epg_seqno)
2876 break;
2877 p = n;
2878 }
2879 if (n == NULL)
2880 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tls->pending_records, m,
2881 m_epg_stailq);
2882 else if (p == NULL)
2883 STAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m,
2884 m_epg_stailq);
2885 else
2886 STAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(&tls->pending_records, p, m,
2887 m_epg_stailq);
2888 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2889 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, 1);
2890 return;
2891 }
2892
2893 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(m);
2894 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2895
2896 while (!STAILQ_EMPTY(&tls->pending_records)) {
2897 struct mbuf *n;
2898
2899 n = STAILQ_FIRST(&tls->pending_records);
2900 if (n->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno)
2901 break;
2902
2903 queued++;
2904 STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq);
2905 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(n);
2906 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, n, m_epg_stailq);
2907 }
2908 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, -(queued - 1));
2909 } else
2910 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2911
2912 running = wq->running;
2913 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2914 if (!running)
2915 wakeup(wq);
2916 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, queued);
2917 }
2918
2919 /*
2920 * Once a file-backed mbuf (from sendfile) has been encrypted, free
2921 * the pages from the file and replace them with the anonymous pages
2922 * allocated in ktls_encrypt_record().
2923 */
2924 static void
ktls_finish_nonanon(struct mbuf * m,struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state * state)2925 ktls_finish_nonanon(struct mbuf *m, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2926 {
2927 int i;
2928
2929 MPASS((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0);
2930
2931 /* Free the old pages. */
2932 m->m_ext.ext_free(m);
2933
2934 /* Replace them with the new pages. */
2935 if (state->cbuf != NULL) {
2936 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2937 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[0] + ptoa(i);
2938
2939 /* Contig pages should go back to the cache. */
2940 m->m_ext.ext_free = ktls_free_mext_contig;
2941 } else {
2942 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2943 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[i];
2944
2945 /* Use the basic free routine. */
2946 m->m_ext.ext_free = mb_free_mext_pgs;
2947 }
2948
2949 /* Pages are now writable. */
2950 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_ANON;
2951 }
2952
2953 static __noinline void
ktls_encrypt(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * top)2954 ktls_encrypt(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
2955 {
2956 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state state;
2957 struct ktls_session *tls;
2958 struct socket *so;
2959 struct mbuf *m;
2960 int error, npages, total_pages;
2961
2962 so = top->m_epg_so;
2963 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
2964 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2965 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2966 #ifdef INVARIANTS
2967 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
2968 #endif
2969 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2970 npages = 0;
2971
2972 /*
2973 * Encrypt the TLS records in the chain of mbufs starting with
2974 * 'top'. 'total_pages' gives us a total count of pages and is
2975 * used to know when we have finished encrypting the TLS
2976 * records originally queued with 'top'.
2977 *
2978 * NB: These mbufs are queued in the socket buffer and
2979 * 'm_next' is traversing the mbufs in the socket buffer. The
2980 * socket buffer lock is not held while traversing this chain.
2981 * Since the mbufs are all marked M_NOTREADY their 'm_next'
2982 * pointers should be stable. However, the 'm_next' of the
2983 * last mbuf encrypted is not necessarily NULL. It can point
2984 * to other mbufs appended while 'top' was on the TLS work
2985 * queue.
2986 *
2987 * Each mbuf holds an entire TLS record.
2988 */
2989 error = 0;
2990 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = m->m_next) {
2991 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
2992 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
2993 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
2994 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
2995 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
2996 total_pages, m));
2997
2998 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, &state);
2999 if (error) {
3000 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3001 break;
3002 }
3003
3004 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
3005 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, &state);
3006
3007 npages += m->m_epg_nrdy;
3008
3009 /*
3010 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no
3011 * longer needed. Existing code depends on encrypted
3012 * records having no associated session vs
3013 * yet-to-be-encrypted records having an associated
3014 * session.
3015 */
3016 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
3017 ktls_free(tls);
3018 }
3019
3020 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3021 if (error == 0) {
3022 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, top, npages);
3023 } else {
3024 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
3025 mb_free_notready(top, total_pages);
3026 }
3027
3028 sorele(so);
3029 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3030 }
3031
3032 void
ktls_encrypt_cb(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state * state,int error)3033 ktls_encrypt_cb(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state, int error)
3034 {
3035 struct ktls_session *tls;
3036 struct socket *so;
3037 struct mbuf *m;
3038 int npages;
3039
3040 m = state->m;
3041
3042 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
3043 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, state);
3044
3045 so = state->so;
3046 free(state, M_KTLS);
3047
3048 /*
3049 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no longer
3050 * needed. Existing code depends on encrypted records having
3051 * no associated session vs yet-to-be-encrypted records having
3052 * an associated session.
3053 */
3054 tls = m->m_epg_tls;
3055 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
3056 ktls_free(tls);
3057
3058 if (error != 0)
3059 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3060
3061 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3062 npages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
3063
3064 if (error == 0) {
3065 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, m, npages);
3066 } else {
3067 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
3068 mb_free_notready(m, npages);
3069 }
3070
3071 sorele(so);
3072 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3073 }
3074
3075 /*
3076 * Similar to ktls_encrypt, but used with asynchronous OCF backends
3077 * (coprocessors) where encryption does not use host CPU resources and
3078 * it can be beneficial to queue more requests than CPUs.
3079 */
3080 static __noinline void
ktls_encrypt_async(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * top)3081 ktls_encrypt_async(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
3082 {
3083 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state;
3084 struct ktls_session *tls;
3085 struct socket *so;
3086 struct mbuf *m, *n;
3087 int error, mpages, npages, total_pages;
3088
3089 so = top->m_epg_so;
3090 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
3091 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
3092 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
3093 #ifdef INVARIANTS
3094 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
3095 #endif
3096 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
3097 npages = 0;
3098
3099 error = 0;
3100 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = n) {
3101 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
3102 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
3103 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
3104 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
3105 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
3106 total_pages, m));
3107
3108 state = malloc(sizeof(*state), M_KTLS, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
3109 soref(so);
3110 state->so = so;
3111 state->m = m;
3112
3113 mpages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
3114 n = m->m_next;
3115
3116 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, state);
3117 if (error) {
3118 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3119 free(state, M_KTLS);
3120 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3121 sorele(so);
3122 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3123 break;
3124 }
3125
3126 npages += mpages;
3127 }
3128
3129 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3130 if (error != 0) {
3131 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
3132 mb_free_notready(m, total_pages - npages);
3133 }
3134
3135 sorele(so);
3136 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3137 }
3138
3139 static int
ktls_bind_domain(int domain)3140 ktls_bind_domain(int domain)
3141 {
3142 int error;
3143
3144 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &cpuset_domain[domain]);
3145 if (error != 0)
3146 return (error);
3147 curthread->td_domain.dr_policy = DOMAINSET_PREF(domain);
3148 return (0);
3149 }
3150
3151 static void
ktls_reclaim_thread(void * ctx)3152 ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx)
3153 {
3154 struct ktls_domain_info *ktls_domain = ctx;
3155 struct ktls_reclaim_thread *sc = &ktls_domain->reclaim_td;
3156 struct sysctl_oid *oid;
3157 char name[80];
3158 int error, domain;
3159
3160 domain = ktls_domain - ktls_domains;
3161 if (bootverbose)
3162 printf("Starting KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d\n", domain);
3163 error = ktls_bind_domain(domain);
3164 if (error)
3165 printf("Unable to bind KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d: error %d\n",
3166 domain, error);
3167 snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "domain%d", domain);
3168 oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(NULL, SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_ipc_tls), OID_AUTO,
3169 name, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, "");
3170 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "reclaims",
3171 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->reclaims, 0, "buffers reclaimed");
3172 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "wakeups",
3173 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->wakeups, 0, "thread wakeups");
3174 SYSCTL_ADD_INT(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "running",
3175 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->running, 0, "thread running");
3176
3177 for (;;) {
3178 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 0);
3179 tsleep(sc, PZERO | PNOLOCK, "-", 0);
3180 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 1);
3181 sc->wakeups++;
3182 /*
3183 * Below we attempt to reclaim ktls_max_reclaim
3184 * buffers using vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext().
3185 * We do this here, as this function can take several
3186 * seconds to scan all of memory and it does not
3187 * matter if this thread pauses for a while. If we
3188 * block a ktls worker thread, we risk developing
3189 * backlogs of buffers to be encrypted, leading to
3190 * surges of traffic and potential NIC output drops.
3191 */
3192 if (!vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext(domain, VM_ALLOC_NORMAL,
3193 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0, ktls_max_reclaim)) {
3194 vm_wait_domain(domain);
3195 } else {
3196 sc->reclaims += ktls_max_reclaim;
3197 }
3198 }
3199 }
3200
3201 static void
ktls_work_thread(void * ctx)3202 ktls_work_thread(void *ctx)
3203 {
3204 struct ktls_wq *wq = ctx;
3205 struct mbuf *m, *n;
3206 struct socket *so, *son;
3207 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) local_m_head;
3208 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) local_so_head;
3209 int cpu;
3210
3211 cpu = wq - ktls_wq;
3212 if (bootverbose)
3213 printf("Starting KTLS worker thread for CPU %d\n", cpu);
3214
3215 /*
3216 * Bind to a core. If ktls_bind_threads is > 1, then
3217 * we bind to the NUMA domain instead.
3218 */
3219 if (ktls_bind_threads) {
3220 int error;
3221
3222 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
3223 struct pcpu *pc = pcpu_find(cpu);
3224
3225 error = ktls_bind_domain(pc->pc_domain);
3226 } else {
3227 cpuset_t mask;
3228
3229 CPU_SETOF(cpu, &mask);
3230 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &mask);
3231 }
3232 if (error)
3233 printf("Unable to bind KTLS worker thread for CPU %d: error %d\n",
3234 cpu, error);
3235 }
3236 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
3237 fpu_kern_thread(0);
3238 #endif
3239 for (;;) {
3240 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
3241 while (STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->m_head) &&
3242 STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->so_head)) {
3243 wq->running = false;
3244 mtx_sleep(wq, &wq->mtx, 0, "-", 0);
3245 wq->running = true;
3246 }
3247
3248 STAILQ_INIT(&local_m_head);
3249 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_m_head, &wq->m_head);
3250 STAILQ_INIT(&local_so_head);
3251 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_so_head, &wq->so_head);
3252 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
3253
3254 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &local_m_head, m_epg_stailq, n) {
3255 if (m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_2FREE) {
3256 ktls_free(m->m_epg_tls);
3257 m_free_raw(m);
3258 } else {
3259 if (m->m_epg_tls->sync_dispatch)
3260 ktls_encrypt(wq, m);
3261 else
3262 ktls_encrypt_async(wq, m);
3263 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, -1);
3264 }
3265 }
3266
3267 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(so, &local_so_head, so_ktls_rx_list, son) {
3268 ktls_decrypt(so);
3269 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, -1);
3270 }
3271 }
3272 }
3273
3274 static void
ktls_disable_ifnet_help(void * context,int pending __unused)3275 ktls_disable_ifnet_help(void *context, int pending __unused)
3276 {
3277 struct ktls_session *tls;
3278 struct inpcb *inp;
3279 struct tcpcb *tp;
3280 struct socket *so;
3281 int err;
3282
3283 tls = context;
3284 inp = tls->inp;
3285 if (inp == NULL)
3286 return;
3287 INP_WLOCK(inp);
3288 so = inp->inp_socket;
3289 MPASS(so != NULL);
3290 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
3291 goto out;
3292 }
3293
3294 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
3295 err = ktls_set_tx_mode(so, TCP_TLS_MODE_SW);
3296 else
3297 err = ENXIO;
3298 if (err == 0) {
3299 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, 1);
3300 /* ktls_set_tx_mode() drops inp wlock, so recheck flags */
3301 if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) == 0 &&
3302 (tp = intotcpcb(inp)) != NULL &&
3303 tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
3304 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 0);
3305 } else {
3306 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, 1);
3307 }
3308
3309 out:
3310 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3311 sorele(so);
3312 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3313 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
3314 ktls_free(tls);
3315 }
3316
3317 /*
3318 * Called when re-transmits are becoming a substantial portion of the
3319 * sends on this connection. When this happens, we transition the
3320 * connection to software TLS. This is needed because most inline TLS
3321 * NICs keep crypto state only for in-order transmits. This means
3322 * that to handle a TCP rexmit (which is out-of-order), the NIC must
3323 * re-DMA the entire TLS record up to and including the current
3324 * segment. This means that when re-transmitting the last ~1448 byte
3325 * segment of a 16KB TLS record, we could wind up re-DMA'ing an order
3326 * of magnitude more data than we are sending. This can cause the
3327 * PCIe link to saturate well before the network, which can cause
3328 * output drops, and a general loss of capacity.
3329 */
3330 void
ktls_disable_ifnet(void * arg)3331 ktls_disable_ifnet(void *arg)
3332 {
3333 struct tcpcb *tp;
3334 struct inpcb *inp;
3335 struct socket *so;
3336 struct ktls_session *tls;
3337
3338 tp = arg;
3339 inp = tptoinpcb(tp);
3340 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
3341 so = inp->inp_socket;
3342 SOCK_LOCK(so);
3343 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
3344 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis == 1) {
3345 SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
3346 return;
3347 }
3348
3349 /*
3350 * note that t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis is never cleared; disabling
3351 * ifnet can only be done once per connection, so we never want
3352 * to do it again
3353 */
3354
3355 (void)ktls_hold(tls);
3356 soref(so);
3357 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis = 1;
3358 SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
3359 TASK_INIT(&tls->disable_ifnet_task, 0, ktls_disable_ifnet_help, tls);
3360 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->disable_ifnet_task);
3361 }
3362