1 /*-
2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
3 *
4 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson
5 * All rights reserved.
6 *
7 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 *
18 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
19 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
21 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
22 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
23 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
24 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
25 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
26 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
27 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
28 * SUCH DAMAGE.
29 */
30 /*
31 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
32 *
33 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are
34 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e
35 * ACLs.
36 */
37
38 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
39 #include <sys/param.h>
40 #include <sys/kernel.h>
41 #include <sys/module.h>
42 #include <sys/systm.h>
43 #include <sys/mount.h>
44 #include <sys/priv.h>
45 #include <sys/vnode.h>
46 #include <sys/errno.h>
47 #include <sys/stat.h>
48 #include <sys/acl.h>
49
50 /*
51 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics;
52 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system
53 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an
54 * errno value.
55 */
56 int
vaccess_acl_posix1e(__enum_uint8 (vtype)type,uid_t file_uid,gid_t file_gid,struct acl * acl,accmode_t accmode,struct ucred * cred)57 vaccess_acl_posix1e(__enum_uint8(vtype) type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
58 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred)
59 {
60 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
61 accmode_t dac_granted;
62 accmode_t priv_granted;
63 accmode_t acl_mask_granted;
64 int group_matched, i;
65
66 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0,
67 ("invalid bit in accmode"));
68 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE),
69 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE"));
70
71 /*
72 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
73 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to
74 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which
75 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which
76 * case fall back on first match for the time being.
77 */
78
79 /*
80 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC
81 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
82 *
83 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before
84 * asking for them.
85 */
86 priv_granted = 0;
87
88 if (type == VDIR) {
89 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP))
90 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
91 } else {
92 /*
93 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise,
94 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want
95 * this to happen unless the file really is executable.
96 */
97 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) &
98 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 &&
99 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC))
100 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
101 }
102
103 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ))
104 priv_granted |= VREAD;
105
106 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) &&
107 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE))
108 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
109
110 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN))
111 priv_granted |= VADMIN;
112
113 /*
114 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
115 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
116 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and
117 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
118 */
119 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
120 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
121 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
122 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
123 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
124 break;
125 dac_granted = 0;
126 dac_granted |= VADMIN;
127 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
128 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
129 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
130 dac_granted |= VREAD;
131 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
132 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
133 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
134 return (0);
135
136 /*
137 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
138 */
139 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) ==
140 accmode) {
141 return (0);
142 }
143 goto error;
144
145 case ACL_MASK:
146 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
147 break;
148
149 case ACL_OTHER:
150 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
151 break;
152
153 default:
154 break;
155 }
156 }
157
158 /*
159 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If
160 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means
161 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably
162 * be a panic.
163 */
164 if (acl_other == NULL) {
165 /*
166 * XXX This should never happen
167 */
168 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
169 return (EPERM);
170 }
171
172 /*
173 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are
174 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the
175 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user
176 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that
177 * the mask allows all requests to succeed.
178 */
179 if (acl_mask != NULL) {
180 acl_mask_granted = 0;
181 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
182 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
183 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
184 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
185 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
186 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
187 } else
188 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;
189
190 /*
191 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no
192 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the
193 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups.
194 */
195 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
196 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
197 case ACL_USER:
198 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
199 break;
200 dac_granted = 0;
201 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
202 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
203 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
204 dac_granted |= VREAD;
205 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
206 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
207 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
208 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
209 return (0);
210 /*
211 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
212 */
213 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) !=
214 accmode)
215 goto error;
216
217 return (0);
218 }
219 }
220
221 /*
222 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best"
223 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make
224 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we
225 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we
226 * should move on to ACL_OTHER.
227 */
228 group_matched = 0;
229 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
230 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
231 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
232 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
233 break;
234 dac_granted = 0;
235 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
236 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
237 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
238 dac_granted |= VREAD;
239 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
240 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
241 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
242
243 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
244 return (0);
245
246 group_matched = 1;
247 break;
248
249 case ACL_GROUP:
250 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
251 break;
252 dac_granted = 0;
253 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
254 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
255 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
256 dac_granted |= VREAD;
257 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
258 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
259 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
260
261 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
262 return (0);
263
264 group_matched = 1;
265 break;
266
267 default:
268 break;
269 }
270 }
271
272 if (group_matched == 1) {
273 /*
274 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure
275 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
276 */
277 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
278 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
279 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
280 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
281 break;
282 dac_granted = 0;
283 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
284 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
285 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
286 dac_granted |= VREAD;
287 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
288 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
289 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
290
291 /*
292 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
293 */
294 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
295 != accmode)
296 break;
297
298 return (0);
299
300 case ACL_GROUP:
301 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
302 cred))
303 break;
304 dac_granted = 0;
305 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
306 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
307 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
308 dac_granted |= VREAD;
309 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
310 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
311 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
312
313 /*
314 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
315 */
316 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
317 != accmode)
318 break;
319
320 return (0);
321
322 default:
323 break;
324 }
325 }
326 /*
327 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
328 * Return failure.
329 */
330 goto error;
331 }
332
333 /*
334 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
335 */
336 dac_granted = 0;
337 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
338 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
339 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
340 dac_granted |= VREAD;
341 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
342 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
343
344 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
345 return (0);
346 /*
347 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
348 */
349 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) {
350 return (0);
351 }
352
353 error:
354 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
355 }
356
357 /*
358 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode
359 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an
360 * acl_perm_t.
361 */
362 acl_perm_t
acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag,mode_t mode)363 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
364 {
365 acl_perm_t perm = 0;
366
367 switch(tag) {
368 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
369 if (mode & S_IXUSR)
370 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
371 if (mode & S_IRUSR)
372 perm |= ACL_READ;
373 if (mode & S_IWUSR)
374 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
375 return (perm);
376
377 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
378 if (mode & S_IXGRP)
379 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
380 if (mode & S_IRGRP)
381 perm |= ACL_READ;
382 if (mode & S_IWGRP)
383 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
384 return (perm);
385
386 case ACL_OTHER:
387 if (mode & S_IXOTH)
388 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
389 if (mode & S_IROTH)
390 perm |= ACL_READ;
391 if (mode & S_IWOTH)
392 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
393 return (perm);
394
395 default:
396 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
397 return (0);
398 }
399 }
400
401 /*
402 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
403 * appropriate type.
404 */
405 struct acl_entry
acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag,uid_t uid,gid_t gid,mode_t mode)406 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
407 {
408 struct acl_entry acl_entry;
409
410 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
411 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
412 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0;
413 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0;
414 switch(tag) {
415 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
416 acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
417 break;
418
419 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
420 acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
421 break;
422
423 case ACL_OTHER:
424 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
425 break;
426
427 default:
428 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
429 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
430 }
431
432 return (acl_entry);
433 }
434
435 /*
436 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
437 */
438 mode_t
acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry * acl_user_obj_entry,struct acl_entry * acl_group_obj_entry,struct acl_entry * acl_other_entry)439 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
440 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
441 {
442 mode_t mode;
443
444 mode = 0;
445 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
446 mode |= S_IXUSR;
447 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
448 mode |= S_IRUSR;
449 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
450 mode |= S_IWUSR;
451 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
452 mode |= S_IXGRP;
453 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
454 mode |= S_IRGRP;
455 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
456 mode |= S_IWGRP;
457 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
458 mode |= S_IXOTH;
459 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
460 mode |= S_IROTH;
461 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
462 mode |= S_IWOTH;
463
464 return (mode);
465 }
466
467 /*
468 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access
469 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a
470 * panic.
471 */
472 mode_t
acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl * acl)473 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl)
474 {
475 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other;
476 int i;
477
478 /*
479 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode.
480 */
481 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL;
482 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
483 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
484 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
485 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
486 break;
487
488 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
489 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
490 break;
491
492 case ACL_OTHER:
493 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
494 break;
495
496 case ACL_MASK:
497 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
498 break;
499
500 case ACL_USER:
501 case ACL_GROUP:
502 break;
503
504 default:
505 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag");
506 }
507 }
508
509 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL)
510 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags");
511
512 /*
513 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace
514 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we
515 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions.
516 */
517 if (acl_mask != NULL)
518 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask,
519 acl_other));
520 else
521 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj,
522 acl_other));
523 }
524
525 /*
526 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing
527 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e
528 * ACL properties.
529 */
530 int
acl_posix1e_check(struct acl * acl)531 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
532 {
533 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
534 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
535
536 /*
537 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
538 * defined for acl_t.
539 *
540 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
541 * present:
542 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
543 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
544 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER
545 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
546 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
547 *
548 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
549 *
550 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
551 *
552 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
553 */
554 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
555 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
556 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
557 return (EINVAL);
558 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
559 /*
560 * Check for a valid tag.
561 */
562 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
563 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
564 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
565 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
566 return (EINVAL);
567 num_acl_user_obj++;
568 break;
569 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
570 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
571 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
572 return (EINVAL);
573 num_acl_group_obj++;
574 break;
575 case ACL_USER:
576 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
577 return (EINVAL);
578 num_acl_user++;
579 break;
580 case ACL_GROUP:
581 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
582 return (EINVAL);
583 num_acl_group++;
584 break;
585 case ACL_OTHER:
586 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
587 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
588 return (EINVAL);
589 num_acl_other++;
590 break;
591 case ACL_MASK:
592 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
593 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
594 return (EINVAL);
595 num_acl_mask++;
596 break;
597 default:
598 return (EINVAL);
599 }
600 /*
601 * Check for valid perm entries.
602 */
603 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
604 ACL_PERM_BITS)
605 return (EINVAL);
606 }
607 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
608 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
609 return (EINVAL);
610 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
611 (num_acl_mask != 1))
612 return (EINVAL);
613 return (0);
614 }
615
616 /*
617 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the
618 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't
619 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also
620 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into
621 * per-filesystem-code.
622 */
623 mode_t
acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode,struct acl * dacl)624 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl)
625 {
626 mode_t mode;
627
628 mode = cmode;
629 /*
630 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be
631 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to
632 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly
633 * effected bits, then reconstruct.
634 */
635 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK;
636 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl));
637
638 return (mode);
639 }
640
641 static int
acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod,int what,void * arg)642 acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg)
643 {
644 int ret;
645
646 ret = 0;
647
648 switch (what) {
649 case MOD_LOAD:
650 case MOD_SHUTDOWN:
651 break;
652
653 case MOD_QUIESCE:
654 /* XXX TODO */
655 ret = 0;
656 break;
657
658 case MOD_UNLOAD:
659 /* XXX TODO */
660 ret = 0;
661 break;
662 default:
663 ret = EINVAL;
664 break;
665 }
666
667 return (ret);
668 }
669
670 static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = {
671 "acl_posix1e",
672 acl_posix1e_modload,
673 NULL
674 };
675
676 DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST);
677 MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1);
678