1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
123 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
124 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
125 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
126 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
127 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
129 int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)140 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
141 {
142 return ok;
143 }
144
145 #if 0
146 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
147 {
148 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
149 }
150 #endif
151
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)152 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
153 {
154 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
155 int bad_chain = 0;
156 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
157 int depth, i, ok = 0;
158 int num, j, retry;
159 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
160 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
161 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
162 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
163 return -1;
164 }
165
166 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
167
168 /*
169 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
170 * the first entry is in place
171 */
172 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
173 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
174 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
175 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
176 goto end;
177 }
178 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
179 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
180 }
181
182 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
183 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
184 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
185 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
186 goto end;
187 }
188
189 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
190 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
191 depth = param->depth;
192
193 for (;;) {
194 /* If we have enough, we break */
195 if (depth < num)
196 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
197 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
198 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
199 * later. */
200
201 /* If we are self signed, we break */
202 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
203 break;
204
205 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
206 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
207 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
208 if (xtmp != NULL) {
209 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
210 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
211 goto end;
212 }
213 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
214 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
215 ctx->last_untrusted++;
216 x = xtmp;
217 num++;
218 /*
219 * reparse the full chain for the next one
220 */
221 continue;
222 }
223 }
224 break;
225 }
226
227 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
228 j = num;
229 /*
230 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
231 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
232 * complain.
233 */
234
235 do {
236 /*
237 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
238 */
239 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
240 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
241 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
242 /* we have a self signed certificate */
243 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
244 /*
245 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
246 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
247 * possible impersonation.
248 */
249 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
250 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
251 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
252 ctx->current_cert = x;
253 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
254 if (ok == 1)
255 X509_free(xtmp);
256 bad_chain = 1;
257 ok = cb(0, ctx);
258 if (!ok)
259 goto end;
260 } else {
261 /*
262 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
263 * version so we get any trust settings.
264 */
265 X509_free(x);
266 x = xtmp;
267 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
268 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
269 }
270 } else {
271 /*
272 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
273 */
274 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
275 ctx->last_untrusted--;
276 num--;
277 j--;
278 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
279 }
280 }
281 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
282 for (;;) {
283 /* If we have enough, we break */
284 if (depth < num)
285 break;
286 /* If we are self signed, we break */
287 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
288 break;
289 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
290 if (ok < 0)
291 return ok;
292 if (ok == 0)
293 break;
294 x = xtmp;
295 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
296 X509_free(xtmp);
297 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
298 return 0;
299 }
300 num++;
301 }
302
303 /*
304 * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
305 * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this
306 * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
307 */
308 retry = 0;
309 if (j == ctx->last_untrusted &&
310 !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
311 while (j-- > 1) {
312 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
313 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
314 if (ok < 0)
315 goto end;
316 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
317 if (ok > 0) {
318 /*
319 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
320 */
321 X509_free(xtmp);
322
323 /*
324 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
325 * alternate chain
326 */
327 while (num > j) {
328 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
329 X509_free(xtmp);
330 num--;
331 ctx->last_untrusted--;
332 }
333 retry = 1;
334 break;
335 }
336 }
337 }
338 } while (retry);
339
340 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
341 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
342 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
343 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
344 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
345 else
346 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
347 ctx->current_cert = x;
348 } else {
349
350 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
351 num++;
352 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
353 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
354 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
355 chain_ss = NULL;
356 }
357
358 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
359 bad_chain = 1;
360 ok = cb(0, ctx);
361 if (!ok)
362 goto end;
363 }
364
365 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
366 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
367
368 if (!ok)
369 goto end;
370
371 /* Check name constraints */
372
373 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
374
375 if (!ok)
376 goto end;
377
378 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
379
380 if (param->trust > 0)
381 ok = check_trust(ctx);
382
383 if (!ok)
384 goto end;
385
386 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
388
389 /*
390 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
391 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
392 */
393
394 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
395 if (!ok)
396 goto end;
397
398 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
399 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
400 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
401 else
402 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
403 if (!ok)
404 goto end;
405
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
407 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
408 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
409 if (!ok)
410 goto end;
411 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
412 if (!ok)
413 goto end;
414 #endif
415
416 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
417 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
418 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
419 if (!ok)
420 goto end;
421 if (0) {
422 end:
423 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
424 }
425 if (sktmp != NULL)
426 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
427 if (chain_ss != NULL)
428 X509_free(chain_ss);
429 return ok;
430 }
431
432 /*
433 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
434 */
435
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)436 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
437 {
438 int i;
439 X509 *issuer;
440 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
441 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
442 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
443 return issuer;
444 }
445 return NULL;
446 }
447
448 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
449
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)450 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
451 {
452 int ret;
453 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
454 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
455 return 1;
456 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
457 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
458 return 0;
459
460 ctx->error = ret;
461 ctx->current_cert = x;
462 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
463 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
464 return 0;
465 }
466
467 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
468
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)469 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
470 {
471 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
472 if (*issuer) {
473 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
474 return 1;
475 } else
476 return 0;
477 }
478
479 /*
480 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
481 * purpose
482 */
483
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)484 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
485 {
486 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
487 return 1;
488 #else
489 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
490 X509 *x;
491 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
492 int proxy_path_length = 0;
493 int purpose;
494 int allow_proxy_certs;
495 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
496
497 /*-
498 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
499 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
500 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
501 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
502 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
503 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
504 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
505 */
506 must_be_ca = -1;
507
508 /* CRL path validation */
509 if (ctx->parent) {
510 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
511 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
512 } else {
513 allow_proxy_certs =
514 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
515 /*
516 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
517 * happy
518 */
519 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
520 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
521 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
522 }
523
524 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
525 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
526 int ret;
527 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
528 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
529 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
530 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
531 ctx->error_depth = i;
532 ctx->current_cert = x;
533 ok = cb(0, ctx);
534 if (!ok)
535 goto end;
536 }
537 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
538 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
539 ctx->error_depth = i;
540 ctx->current_cert = x;
541 ok = cb(0, ctx);
542 if (!ok)
543 goto end;
544 }
545 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
546 switch (must_be_ca) {
547 case -1:
548 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
549 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
550 ret = 0;
551 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
552 } else
553 ret = 1;
554 break;
555 case 0:
556 if (ret != 0) {
557 ret = 0;
558 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
559 } else
560 ret = 1;
561 break;
562 default:
563 if ((ret == 0)
564 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
565 && (ret != 1))) {
566 ret = 0;
567 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
568 } else
569 ret = 1;
570 break;
571 }
572 if (ret == 0) {
573 ctx->error_depth = i;
574 ctx->current_cert = x;
575 ok = cb(0, ctx);
576 if (!ok)
577 goto end;
578 }
579 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
580 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
581 if ((ret == 0)
582 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
583 && (ret != 1))) {
584 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
585 ctx->error_depth = i;
586 ctx->current_cert = x;
587 ok = cb(0, ctx);
588 if (!ok)
589 goto end;
590 }
591 }
592 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
593 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
594 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
595 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
596 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
597 ctx->error_depth = i;
598 ctx->current_cert = x;
599 ok = cb(0, ctx);
600 if (!ok)
601 goto end;
602 }
603 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
604 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
605 plen++;
606 /*
607 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
608 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
609 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
610 */
611 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
612 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
613 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
614 ctx->error_depth = i;
615 ctx->current_cert = x;
616 ok = cb(0, ctx);
617 if (!ok)
618 goto end;
619 }
620 proxy_path_length++;
621 must_be_ca = 0;
622 } else
623 must_be_ca = 1;
624 }
625 ok = 1;
626 end:
627 return ok;
628 #endif
629 }
630
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)631 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
632 {
633 X509 *x;
634 int i, j, rv;
635 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
636 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
637 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
638 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
639 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
640 continue;
641 /*
642 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
643 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
644 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
645 * to be obeyed.
646 */
647 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
648 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
649 if (nc) {
650 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
651 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
652 ctx->error = rv;
653 ctx->error_depth = i;
654 ctx->current_cert = x;
655 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
656 return 0;
657 }
658 }
659 }
660 }
661 return 1;
662 }
663
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)664 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
665 {
666 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
667 return 1;
668 #else
669 int i, ok;
670 X509 *x;
671 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
672 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
673 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
674 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
675 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
676 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
677 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
678 return 1;
679 ctx->error_depth = i;
680 ctx->current_cert = x;
681 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
682 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
683 else
684 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
685 ok = cb(0, ctx);
686 return ok;
687 #endif
688 }
689
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)690 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
691 {
692 int i, last, ok;
693 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
694 return 1;
695 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
696 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
697 else {
698 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
699 if (ctx->parent)
700 return 1;
701 last = 0;
702 }
703 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
704 ctx->error_depth = i;
705 ok = check_cert(ctx);
706 if (!ok)
707 return ok;
708 }
709 return 1;
710 }
711
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)712 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
713 {
714 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
715 X509 *x;
716 int ok, cnum;
717 unsigned int last_reasons;
718 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
719 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
720 ctx->current_cert = x;
721 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
722 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
723 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
724 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
725 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
726 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
727 if (ctx->get_crl)
728 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
729 else
730 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
731 /*
732 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
733 */
734 if (!ok) {
735 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
736 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
737 goto err;
738 }
739 ctx->current_crl = crl;
740 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
741 if (!ok)
742 goto err;
743
744 if (dcrl) {
745 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
746 if (!ok)
747 goto err;
748 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
749 if (!ok)
750 goto err;
751 } else
752 ok = 1;
753
754 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
755 if (ok != 2) {
756 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
757 if (!ok)
758 goto err;
759 }
760
761 X509_CRL_free(crl);
762 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
763 crl = NULL;
764 dcrl = NULL;
765 /*
766 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
767 * so exit loop.
768 */
769 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
770 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
771 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
772 goto err;
773 }
774 }
775 err:
776 X509_CRL_free(crl);
777 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
778
779 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
780 return ok;
781
782 }
783
784 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
785
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)786 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
787 {
788 time_t *ptime;
789 int i;
790 if (notify)
791 ctx->current_crl = crl;
792 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
793 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
794 else
795 ptime = NULL;
796
797 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
798 if (i == 0) {
799 if (!notify)
800 return 0;
801 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
802 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
803 return 0;
804 }
805
806 if (i > 0) {
807 if (!notify)
808 return 0;
809 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
810 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
811 return 0;
812 }
813
814 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
815 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
816
817 if (i == 0) {
818 if (!notify)
819 return 0;
820 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
821 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
822 return 0;
823 }
824 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
825 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
826 if (!notify)
827 return 0;
828 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
829 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
830 return 0;
831 }
832 }
833
834 if (notify)
835 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
836
837 return 1;
838 }
839
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)840 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
841 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
842 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
843 {
844 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
845 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
846 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
847 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
848 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
849
850 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
851 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
852 reasons = *preasons;
853 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
854
855 if (crl_score > best_score) {
856 best_crl = crl;
857 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
858 best_score = crl_score;
859 best_reasons = reasons;
860 }
861 }
862
863 if (best_crl) {
864 if (*pcrl)
865 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
866 *pcrl = best_crl;
867 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
868 *pscore = best_score;
869 *preasons = best_reasons;
870 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
871 if (*pdcrl) {
872 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
873 *pdcrl = NULL;
874 }
875 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
876 }
877
878 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
879 return 1;
880
881 return 0;
882 }
883
884 /*
885 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
886 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
887 */
888
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)889 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
890 {
891 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
892 int i;
893 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
894 if (i >= 0) {
895 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
896 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
897 return 0;
898 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
899 } else
900 exta = NULL;
901
902 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
903
904 if (i >= 0) {
905
906 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
907 return 0;
908 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
909 } else
910 extb = NULL;
911
912 if (!exta && !extb)
913 return 1;
914
915 if (!exta || !extb)
916 return 0;
917
918 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
919 return 0;
920
921 return 1;
922 }
923
924 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
925
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)926 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
927 {
928 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
929 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
930 return 0;
931 /* Base must have a CRL number */
932 if (!base->crl_number)
933 return 0;
934 /* Issuer names must match */
935 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
936 return 0;
937 /* AKID and IDP must match */
938 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
939 return 0;
940 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
941 return 0;
942 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
943 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
944 return 0;
945 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
946 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
947 return 1;
948 return 0;
949 }
950
951 /*
952 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
953 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
954 */
955
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)956 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
957 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
958 {
959 X509_CRL *delta;
960 int i;
961 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
962 return;
963 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
964 return;
965 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
966 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
967 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
968 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
969 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
970 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
971 *dcrl = delta;
972 return;
973 }
974 }
975 *dcrl = NULL;
976 }
977
978 /*
979 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
980 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
981 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
982 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
983 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
984 */
985
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)986 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
987 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
988 {
989
990 int crl_score = 0;
991 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
992
993 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
994
995 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
996 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
997 return 0;
998 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
999 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1000 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1001 return 0;
1002 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1003 /* If no new reasons reject */
1004 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1005 return 0;
1006 }
1007 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1008 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1009 return 0;
1010 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1011 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1012 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1013 return 0;
1014 } else
1015 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1016
1017 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1018 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1019
1020 /* Check expiry */
1021 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1022 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1023
1024 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1025 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1026
1027 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1028
1029 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1030 return 0;
1031
1032 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1033
1034 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1035 /* If no new reasons reject */
1036 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1037 return 0;
1038 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1039 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1040 }
1041
1042 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1043
1044 return crl_score;
1045
1046 }
1047
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1048 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1049 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1050 {
1051 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1052 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1053 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1054 int i;
1055
1056 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1057 cidx++;
1058
1059 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1060
1061 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1062 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1063 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1064 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1065 return;
1066 }
1067 }
1068
1069 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1070 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1071 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1072 continue;
1073 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1074 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1075 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1076 return;
1077 }
1078 }
1079
1080 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1081
1082 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1083 return;
1084
1085 /*
1086 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1087 * untrusted certificates.
1088 */
1089 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1090 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1091 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1092 continue;
1093 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1094 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1095 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1096 return;
1097 }
1098 }
1099 }
1100
1101 /*
1102 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1103 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1104 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1105 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1106 */
1107
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1108 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1109 {
1110 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1111 int ret;
1112 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1113 if (ctx->parent)
1114 return 0;
1115 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1116 return -1;
1117
1118 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1119 /* Copy verify params across */
1120 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1121
1122 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1123 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1124
1125 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1126 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1127
1128 if (ret <= 0)
1129 goto err;
1130
1131 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1132
1133 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1134 err:
1135 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1136 return ret;
1137 }
1138
1139 /*
1140 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1141 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1142 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1143 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1144 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1145 * RFC5280 version
1146 */
1147
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1148 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1149 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1150 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1151 {
1152 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1153 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1154 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1155 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1156 return 1;
1157 return 0;
1158 }
1159
1160 /*-
1161 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1162 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1163 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1164 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1165 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1166 */
1167
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1168 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1169 {
1170 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1171 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1172 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1173 int i, j;
1174 if (!a || !b)
1175 return 1;
1176 if (a->type == 1) {
1177 if (!a->dpname)
1178 return 0;
1179 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1180 if (b->type == 1) {
1181 if (!b->dpname)
1182 return 0;
1183 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1184 return 1;
1185 else
1186 return 0;
1187 }
1188 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1189 nm = a->dpname;
1190 gens = b->name.fullname;
1191 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1192 if (!b->dpname)
1193 return 0;
1194 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1195 gens = a->name.fullname;
1196 nm = b->dpname;
1197 }
1198
1199 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1200 if (nm) {
1201 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1202 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1203 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1204 continue;
1205 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1206 return 1;
1207 }
1208 return 0;
1209 }
1210
1211 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1212
1213 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1214 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1215 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1216 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1217 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1218 return 1;
1219 }
1220 }
1221
1222 return 0;
1223
1224 }
1225
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1226 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1227 {
1228 int i;
1229 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1230 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1231 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1232 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1234 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1235 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1236 continue;
1237 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1238 return 1;
1239 }
1240 return 0;
1241 }
1242
1243 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1244
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1245 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1246 unsigned int *preasons)
1247 {
1248 int i;
1249 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1250 return 0;
1251 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1252 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1253 return 0;
1254 } else {
1255 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1256 return 0;
1257 }
1258 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1259 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1260 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1261 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1262 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1263 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1264 return 1;
1265 }
1266 }
1267 }
1268 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1269 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1270 return 1;
1271 return 0;
1272 }
1273
1274 /*
1275 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1276 * to find a delta CRL too
1277 */
1278
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1279 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1280 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1281 {
1282 int ok;
1283 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1284 int crl_score = 0;
1285 unsigned int reasons;
1286 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1287 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1288 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1289 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1290 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1291 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1292
1293 if (ok)
1294 goto done;
1295
1296 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1297
1298 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1299
1300 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1301 if (!skcrl && crl)
1302 goto done;
1303
1304 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1305
1306 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1307
1308 done:
1309
1310 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1311 if (crl) {
1312 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1313 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1314 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1315 *pcrl = crl;
1316 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1317 return 1;
1318 }
1319
1320 return 0;
1321 }
1322
1323 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1324 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1325 {
1326 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1327 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1328 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1329 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1330 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1331 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1332 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1333 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1334
1335 /*
1336 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1337 * certificate in chain.
1338 */
1339 else if (cnum < chnum)
1340 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1341 else {
1342 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1343 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1344 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1345 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1346 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1347 if (!ok)
1348 goto err;
1349 }
1350 }
1351
1352 if (issuer) {
1353 /*
1354 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1355 */
1356 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1357 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1358 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1359 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1360 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1361 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1362 if (!ok)
1363 goto err;
1364 }
1365
1366 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1367 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1368 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1369 if (!ok)
1370 goto err;
1371 }
1372
1373 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1374 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1375 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1376 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1377 if (!ok)
1378 goto err;
1379 }
1380 }
1381
1382 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1383 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1384 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1385 if (!ok)
1386 goto err;
1387 }
1388
1389 }
1390
1391 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1392 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1393 if (!ok)
1394 goto err;
1395 }
1396
1397 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1398 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1399
1400 if (!ikey) {
1401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1402 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1403 if (!ok)
1404 goto err;
1405 } else {
1406 /* Verify CRL signature */
1407 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1408 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1409 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1410 if (!ok)
1411 goto err;
1412 }
1413 }
1414 }
1415
1416 ok = 1;
1417
1418 err:
1419 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1420 return ok;
1421 }
1422
1423 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1424 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1425 {
1426 int ok;
1427 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1428 /*
1429 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1430 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1431 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1432 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1433 */
1434 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1435 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1437 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1438 if (!ok)
1439 return 0;
1440 }
1441 /*
1442 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1443 * is not removeFromCRL.
1444 */
1445 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1446 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1447 return 2;
1448 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1449 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1450 if (!ok)
1451 return 0;
1452 }
1453
1454 return 1;
1455 }
1456
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1457 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1458 {
1459 int ret;
1460 if (ctx->parent)
1461 return 1;
1462 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1463 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1464 if (ret == 0) {
1465 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1466 return 0;
1467 }
1468 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1469 if (ret == -1) {
1470 /*
1471 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1472 */
1473 X509 *x;
1474 int i;
1475 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1476 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1477 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1478 continue;
1479 ctx->current_cert = x;
1480 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1481 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1482 return 0;
1483 }
1484 return 1;
1485 }
1486 if (ret == -2) {
1487 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1488 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1489 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1490 }
1491
1492 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1493 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1494 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1495 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1496 return 0;
1497 }
1498
1499 return 1;
1500 }
1501
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1502 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1503 {
1504 time_t *ptime;
1505 int i;
1506
1507 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1508 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1509 else
1510 ptime = NULL;
1511
1512 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1513 if (i == 0) {
1514 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1515 ctx->current_cert = x;
1516 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1517 return 0;
1518 }
1519
1520 if (i > 0) {
1521 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1522 ctx->current_cert = x;
1523 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1524 return 0;
1525 }
1526
1527 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1528 if (i == 0) {
1529 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1530 ctx->current_cert = x;
1531 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1532 return 0;
1533 }
1534
1535 if (i < 0) {
1536 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1537 ctx->current_cert = x;
1538 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1539 return 0;
1540 }
1541
1542 return 1;
1543 }
1544
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1545 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1546 {
1547 int ok = 0, n;
1548 X509 *xs, *xi;
1549 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1550 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1551
1552 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1553
1554 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1555 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1556 n--;
1557 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1558
1559 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1560 xs = xi;
1561 else {
1562 if (n <= 0) {
1563 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1564 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1565 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1566 goto end;
1567 } else {
1568 n--;
1569 ctx->error_depth = n;
1570 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1571 }
1572 }
1573
1574 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1575 while (n >= 0) {
1576 ctx->error_depth = n;
1577
1578 /*
1579 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1580 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1581 * time.
1582 */
1583 if (!xs->valid
1584 && (xs != xi
1585 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1586 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1587 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1588 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1589 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1590 if (!ok)
1591 goto end;
1592 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1593 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1594 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1595 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1596 if (!ok) {
1597 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1598 goto end;
1599 }
1600 }
1601 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1602 pkey = NULL;
1603 }
1604
1605 xs->valid = 1;
1606
1607 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1608 if (!ok)
1609 goto end;
1610
1611 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1612 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1613 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1614 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1615 if (!ok)
1616 goto end;
1617
1618 n--;
1619 if (n >= 0) {
1620 xi = xs;
1621 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1622 }
1623 }
1624 ok = 1;
1625 end:
1626 return ok;
1627 }
1628
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)1629 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1630 {
1631 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1632 }
1633
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1634 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1635 {
1636 char *str;
1637 ASN1_TIME atm;
1638 long offset;
1639 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1640 int i, j, remaining;
1641
1642 p = buff1;
1643 remaining = ctm->length;
1644 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1645 /*
1646 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1647 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1648 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1649 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1650 */
1651 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1652 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1653 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1654 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1655 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1656 return 0;
1657 memcpy(p, str, 10);
1658 p += 10;
1659 str += 10;
1660 remaining -= 10;
1661 } else {
1662 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1663 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1664 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1665 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1666 return 0;
1667 memcpy(p, str, 12);
1668 p += 12;
1669 str += 12;
1670 remaining -= 12;
1671 }
1672
1673 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1674 *(p++) = '0';
1675 *(p++) = '0';
1676 } else {
1677 /* SS (seconds) */
1678 if (remaining < 2)
1679 return 0;
1680 *(p++) = *(str++);
1681 *(p++) = *(str++);
1682 remaining -= 2;
1683 /*
1684 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1685 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1686 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1687 */
1688 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1689 str++;
1690 remaining--;
1691 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1692 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1693 break;
1694 }
1695 }
1696
1697 }
1698 *(p++) = 'Z';
1699 *(p++) = '\0';
1700
1701 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1702 if (!remaining)
1703 return 0;
1704 if (*str == 'Z') {
1705 if (remaining != 1)
1706 return 0;
1707 offset = 0;
1708 } else {
1709 /* (+-)HHMM */
1710 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1711 return 0;
1712 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1713 if (remaining != 5)
1714 return 0;
1715 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1716 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1717 return 0;
1718 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1719 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1720 if (*str == '-')
1721 offset = -offset;
1722 }
1723 atm.type = ctm->type;
1724 atm.flags = 0;
1725 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1726 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1727
1728 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1729 return 0;
1730
1731 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1732 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1733 if (i < 50)
1734 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1735 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1736 if (j < 50)
1737 j += 100;
1738
1739 if (i < j)
1740 return -1;
1741 if (i > j)
1742 return 1;
1743 }
1744 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1745 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1746 return -1;
1747 else
1748 return i;
1749 }
1750
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)1751 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1752 {
1753 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1754 }
1755
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1756 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1757 {
1758 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1759 }
1760
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1761 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1762 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1763 {
1764 time_t t;
1765
1766 if (in_tm)
1767 t = *in_tm;
1768 else
1769 time(&t);
1770
1771 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1772 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1773 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1774 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1775 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1776 }
1777 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1778 }
1779
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY * pkey,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)1780 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1781 {
1782 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1783 int i, j;
1784
1785 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1786 return 1;
1787
1788 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1789 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1790 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1791 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1792 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1793 return 0;
1794 }
1795 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1796 break;
1797 else {
1798 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1799 ktmp = NULL;
1800 }
1801 }
1802 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1803 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1804 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1805 return 0;
1806 }
1807
1808 /* first, populate the other certs */
1809 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1810 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1811 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1812 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1813 }
1814
1815 if (pkey != NULL)
1816 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1817 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1818 return 1;
1819 }
1820
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_new * new_func,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)1821 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
1822 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1823 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
1824 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1825 {
1826 /*
1827 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
1828 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
1829 */
1830 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1831 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1832 }
1833
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)1834 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1835 {
1836 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
1837 }
1838
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)1839 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1840 {
1841 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
1842 }
1843
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1844 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1845 {
1846 return ctx->error;
1847 }
1848
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)1849 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1850 {
1851 ctx->error = err;
1852 }
1853
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1854 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1855 {
1856 return ctx->error_depth;
1857 }
1858
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1859 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1860 {
1861 return ctx->current_cert;
1862 }
1863
STACK_OF(X509)1864 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1865 {
1866 return ctx->chain;
1867 }
1868
STACK_OF(X509)1869 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1870 {
1871 int i;
1872 X509 *x;
1873 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1874 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
1875 return NULL;
1876 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1877 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1878 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1879 }
1880 return chain;
1881 }
1882
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1883 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1884 {
1885 return ctx->current_issuer;
1886 }
1887
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1888 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1889 {
1890 return ctx->current_crl;
1891 }
1892
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1893 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1894 {
1895 return ctx->parent;
1896 }
1897
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1898 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1899 {
1900 ctx->cert = x;
1901 }
1902
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)1903 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1904 {
1905 ctx->untrusted = sk;
1906 }
1907
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)1908 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1909 {
1910 ctx->crls = sk;
1911 }
1912
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)1913 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1914 {
1915 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1916 }
1917
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)1918 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1919 {
1920 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1921 }
1922
1923 /*
1924 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
1925 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
1926 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
1927 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
1928 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
1929 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
1930 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
1931 * client/server.
1932 */
1933
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)1934 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1935 int purpose, int trust)
1936 {
1937 int idx;
1938 /* If purpose not set use default */
1939 if (!purpose)
1940 purpose = def_purpose;
1941 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1942 if (purpose) {
1943 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1944 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1945 if (idx == -1) {
1946 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1947 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1948 return 0;
1949 }
1950 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1951 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
1952 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1953 if (idx == -1) {
1954 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1955 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1956 return 0;
1957 }
1958 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1959 }
1960 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1961 if (!trust)
1962 trust = ptmp->trust;
1963 }
1964 if (trust) {
1965 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1966 if (idx == -1) {
1967 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1968 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1969 return 0;
1970 }
1971 }
1972
1973 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
1974 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1975 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
1976 ctx->param->trust = trust;
1977 return 1;
1978 }
1979
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)1980 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1981 {
1982 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1983 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1984 if (!ctx) {
1985 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1986 return NULL;
1987 }
1988 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1989 return ctx;
1990 }
1991
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1992 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1993 {
1994 if (!ctx)
1995 return;
1996 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1997 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1998 }
1999
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2000 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2001 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2002 {
2003 int ret = 1;
2004 ctx->ctx = store;
2005 ctx->current_method = 0;
2006 ctx->cert = x509;
2007 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2008 ctx->crls = NULL;
2009 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2010 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2011 ctx->valid = 0;
2012 ctx->chain = NULL;
2013 ctx->error = 0;
2014 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2015 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2016 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2017 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2018 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2019 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2020 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2021 ctx->tree = NULL;
2022 ctx->parent = NULL;
2023
2024 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2025
2026 if (!ctx->param) {
2027 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2028 return 0;
2029 }
2030
2031 /*
2032 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2033 */
2034
2035 if (store)
2036 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2037 else
2038 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2039
2040 if (store) {
2041 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2042 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2043 } else
2044 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2045
2046 if (ret)
2047 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2048 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2049
2050 if (ret == 0) {
2051 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2052 return 0;
2053 }
2054
2055 if (store && store->check_issued)
2056 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2057 else
2058 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2059
2060 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2061 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2062 else
2063 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2064
2065 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2066 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2067 else
2068 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2069
2070 if (store && store->verify)
2071 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2072 else
2073 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2074
2075 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2076 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2077 else
2078 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2079
2080 if (store && store->get_crl)
2081 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2082 else
2083 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2084
2085 if (store && store->check_crl)
2086 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2087 else
2088 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2089
2090 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2091 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2092 else
2093 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2094
2095 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2096 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2097 else
2098 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2099
2100 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2101 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2102 else
2103 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2104
2105 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2106
2107 /*
2108 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2109 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2110 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2111 */
2112 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2113 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2114 &(ctx->ex_data))) {
2115 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2116 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2117 return 0;
2118 }
2119 return 1;
2120 }
2121
2122 /*
2123 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2124 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2125 */
2126
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2127 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2128 {
2129 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2130 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2131 }
2132
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2134 {
2135 if (ctx->cleanup)
2136 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2137 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2138 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2139 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2140 ctx->param = NULL;
2141 }
2142 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2143 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2144 ctx->tree = NULL;
2145 }
2146 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2147 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2148 ctx->chain = NULL;
2149 }
2150 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2151 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2152 }
2153
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2154 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2155 {
2156 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2157 }
2158
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2159 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2160 {
2161 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2162 }
2163
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2164 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2165 time_t t)
2166 {
2167 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2168 }
2169
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2170 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2171 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2172 {
2173 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2174 }
2175
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2176 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2177 {
2178 return ctx->tree;
2179 }
2180
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2181 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2182 {
2183 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2184 }
2185
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2186 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2187 {
2188 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2189 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2190 if (!param)
2191 return 0;
2192 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2193 }
2194
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2195 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2196 {
2197 return ctx->param;
2198 }
2199
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2200 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2201 {
2202 if (ctx->param)
2203 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2204 ctx->param = param;
2205 }
2206
2207 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2208
2209 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2210
2211 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2212
2213 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2214
2215 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2216