1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
123 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
124 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
125 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
126 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
127 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
129 int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)140 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
141 {
142 return ok;
143 }
144
145 #if 0
146 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
147 {
148 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
149 }
150 #endif
151
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)152 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
153 {
154 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
155 int bad_chain = 0;
156 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
157 int depth, i, ok = 0;
158 int num, j, retry;
159 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
160 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
161 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
162 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
163 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
164 return -1;
165 }
166 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
167 /*
168 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
169 * cannot do another one.
170 */
171 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
172 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
173 return -1;
174 }
175
176 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
177
178 /*
179 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
180 * the first entry is in place
181 */
182 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
183 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
184 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
185 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
186 ok = -1;
187 goto end;
188 }
189 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
190 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
191
192 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
193 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
194 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
195 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
196 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
197 ok = -1;
198 goto end;
199 }
200
201 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
202 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
203 depth = param->depth;
204
205 for (;;) {
206 /* If we have enough, we break */
207 if (depth < num)
208 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
209 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
210 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
211 * later. */
212
213 /* If we are self signed, we break */
214 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
215 break;
216
217 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
218 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
219 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
220 if (xtmp != NULL) {
221 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
222 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
223 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
224 ok = -1;
225 goto end;
226 }
227 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
228 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
229 ctx->last_untrusted++;
230 x = xtmp;
231 num++;
232 /*
233 * reparse the full chain for the next one
234 */
235 continue;
236 }
237 }
238 break;
239 }
240
241 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
242 j = num;
243 /*
244 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
245 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
246 * complain.
247 */
248
249 do {
250 /*
251 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
252 */
253 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
254 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
255 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
256 /* we have a self signed certificate */
257 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
258 /*
259 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
260 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
261 * possible impersonation.
262 */
263 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
264 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
265 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
266 ctx->current_cert = x;
267 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
268 if (ok == 1)
269 X509_free(xtmp);
270 bad_chain = 1;
271 ok = cb(0, ctx);
272 if (!ok)
273 goto end;
274 } else {
275 /*
276 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
277 * version so we get any trust settings.
278 */
279 X509_free(x);
280 x = xtmp;
281 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
282 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
283 }
284 } else {
285 /*
286 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
287 */
288 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
289 ctx->last_untrusted--;
290 num--;
291 j--;
292 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
293 }
294 }
295 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
296 for (;;) {
297 /* If we have enough, we break */
298 if (depth < num)
299 break;
300 /* If we are self signed, we break */
301 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
302 break;
303 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
304 if (ok < 0) {
305 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
306 goto end;
307 }
308 if (ok == 0)
309 break;
310 x = xtmp;
311 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
312 X509_free(xtmp);
313 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
314 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
315 ok = -1;
316 goto end;
317 }
318 num++;
319 }
320
321 /*
322 * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
323 * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this
324 * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
325 */
326 retry = 0;
327 if (num == ctx->last_untrusted &&
328 !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
329 while (j-- > 1) {
330 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
331 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
332 if (ok < 0) {
333 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
334 goto end;
335 }
336 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
337 if (ok > 0) {
338 /*
339 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
340 */
341 X509_free(xtmp);
342
343 /*
344 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
345 * alternate chain
346 */
347 while (num > j) {
348 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
349 X509_free(xtmp);
350 num--;
351 }
352 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
353 retry = 1;
354 break;
355 }
356 }
357 }
358 } while (retry);
359
360 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
361 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
362 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
363 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
364 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
365 else
366 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
367 ctx->current_cert = x;
368 } else {
369
370 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
371 num++;
372 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
373 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
374 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
375 chain_ss = NULL;
376 }
377
378 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
379 bad_chain = 1;
380 ok = cb(0, ctx);
381 if (!ok)
382 goto end;
383 }
384
385 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
386 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
387
388 if (!ok)
389 goto end;
390
391 /* Check name constraints */
392
393 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
394
395 if (!ok)
396 goto end;
397
398 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
399
400 if (param->trust > 0)
401 ok = check_trust(ctx);
402
403 if (!ok)
404 goto end;
405
406 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
407 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
408
409 /*
410 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
411 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
412 */
413
414 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
415 if (!ok)
416 goto end;
417
418 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
419 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
420 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
421 else
422 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
423 if (!ok)
424 goto end;
425
426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
427 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
428 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
429 if (!ok)
430 goto end;
431 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
432 if (!ok)
433 goto end;
434 #endif
435
436 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
437 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
438 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
439 if (!ok)
440 goto end;
441 if (0) {
442 end:
443 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
444 }
445 if (sktmp != NULL)
446 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
447 if (chain_ss != NULL)
448 X509_free(chain_ss);
449
450 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
451 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
452 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
453 return ok;
454 }
455
456 /*
457 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
458 */
459
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)460 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
461 {
462 int i;
463 X509 *issuer;
464 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
465 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
466 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
467 return issuer;
468 }
469 return NULL;
470 }
471
472 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
473
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)474 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
475 {
476 int ret;
477 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
478 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
479 return 1;
480 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
481 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
482 return 0;
483
484 ctx->error = ret;
485 ctx->current_cert = x;
486 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
487 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
488 return 0;
489 }
490
491 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
492
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)493 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
494 {
495 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
496 if (*issuer) {
497 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
498 return 1;
499 } else
500 return 0;
501 }
502
503 /*
504 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
505 * purpose
506 */
507
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)508 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
509 {
510 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
511 return 1;
512 #else
513 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
514 X509 *x;
515 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
516 int proxy_path_length = 0;
517 int purpose;
518 int allow_proxy_certs;
519 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
520
521 /*-
522 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
523 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
524 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
525 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
526 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
527 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
528 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
529 */
530 must_be_ca = -1;
531
532 /* CRL path validation */
533 if (ctx->parent) {
534 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
535 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
536 } else {
537 allow_proxy_certs =
538 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
539 /*
540 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
541 * happy
542 */
543 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
544 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
545 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
546 }
547
548 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
549 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
550 int ret;
551 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
552 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
553 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
555 ctx->error_depth = i;
556 ctx->current_cert = x;
557 ok = cb(0, ctx);
558 if (!ok)
559 goto end;
560 }
561 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
562 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
563 ctx->error_depth = i;
564 ctx->current_cert = x;
565 ok = cb(0, ctx);
566 if (!ok)
567 goto end;
568 }
569 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
570 switch (must_be_ca) {
571 case -1:
572 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
573 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
574 ret = 0;
575 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
576 } else
577 ret = 1;
578 break;
579 case 0:
580 if (ret != 0) {
581 ret = 0;
582 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
583 } else
584 ret = 1;
585 break;
586 default:
587 if ((ret == 0)
588 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
589 && (ret != 1))) {
590 ret = 0;
591 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
592 } else
593 ret = 1;
594 break;
595 }
596 if (ret == 0) {
597 ctx->error_depth = i;
598 ctx->current_cert = x;
599 ok = cb(0, ctx);
600 if (!ok)
601 goto end;
602 }
603 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
604 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
605 if ((ret == 0)
606 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
607 && (ret != 1))) {
608 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
609 ctx->error_depth = i;
610 ctx->current_cert = x;
611 ok = cb(0, ctx);
612 if (!ok)
613 goto end;
614 }
615 }
616 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
617 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
618 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
619 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
620 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
621 ctx->error_depth = i;
622 ctx->current_cert = x;
623 ok = cb(0, ctx);
624 if (!ok)
625 goto end;
626 }
627 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
628 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
629 plen++;
630 /*
631 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
632 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
633 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
634 */
635 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
636 /*
637 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
638 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
639 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
640 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
641 *
642 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
643 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
644 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
645 * increment proxy_path_length.
646 */
647 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
648 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
649 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
650 ctx->error_depth = i;
651 ctx->current_cert = x;
652 ok = cb(0, ctx);
653 if (!ok)
654 goto end;
655 }
656 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
657 }
658 proxy_path_length++;
659 must_be_ca = 0;
660 } else
661 must_be_ca = 1;
662 }
663 ok = 1;
664 end:
665 return ok;
666 #endif
667 }
668
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)669 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
670 {
671 X509 *x;
672 int i, j, rv;
673 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
674 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
675 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
676 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
677 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
678 continue;
679
680 /*
681 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
682 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
683 * added.
684 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
685 */
686 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
687 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
688 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
689 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
690 int last_object_nid = 0;
691 int err = X509_V_OK;
692 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
693
694 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
695 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
696 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
697 goto proxy_name_done;
698 }
699
700 /*
701 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
702 * there is in issuer.
703 */
704 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
705 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
706 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
707 goto proxy_name_done;
708 }
709
710 /*
711 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
712 * multivalued RDN
713 */
714 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
715 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
716 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
717 goto proxy_name_done;
718 }
719
720 /*
721 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
722 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
723 */
724 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
725 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
726 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
727 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
728 return 0;
729 }
730
731 tmpentry =
732 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
733 last_object_nid =
734 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
735
736 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
737 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
738 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
739 }
740
741 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
742 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
743
744 proxy_name_done:
745 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
746 ctx->error = err;
747 ctx->error_depth = i;
748 ctx->current_cert = x;
749 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
750 return 0;
751 }
752 }
753
754 /*
755 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
756 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
757 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
758 * to be obeyed.
759 */
760 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
761 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
762 if (nc) {
763 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
764 switch (rv) {
765 case X509_V_OK:
766 continue;
767 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
768 ctx->error = rv;
769 return 0;
770 default:
771 ctx->error = rv;
772 ctx->error_depth = i;
773 ctx->current_cert = x;
774 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
775 return 0;
776 break;
777 }
778 }
779 }
780 }
781 return 1;
782 }
783
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)784 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
785 {
786 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
787 return 1;
788 #else
789 int i, ok;
790 X509 *x;
791 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
792 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
793 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
794 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
795 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
796 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
797 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
798 return 1;
799 ctx->error_depth = i;
800 ctx->current_cert = x;
801 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
802 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
803 else
804 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
805 ok = cb(0, ctx);
806 return ok;
807 #endif
808 }
809
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)810 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
811 {
812 int i, last, ok;
813 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
814 return 1;
815 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
816 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
817 else {
818 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
819 if (ctx->parent)
820 return 1;
821 last = 0;
822 }
823 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
824 ctx->error_depth = i;
825 ok = check_cert(ctx);
826 if (!ok)
827 return ok;
828 }
829 return 1;
830 }
831
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)832 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
833 {
834 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
835 X509 *x;
836 int ok, cnum;
837 unsigned int last_reasons;
838 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
839 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
840 ctx->current_cert = x;
841 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
842 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
843 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
844 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
845 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
846 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
847 if (ctx->get_crl)
848 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
849 else
850 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
851 /*
852 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
853 */
854 if (!ok) {
855 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
856 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
857 goto err;
858 }
859 ctx->current_crl = crl;
860 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
861 if (!ok)
862 goto err;
863
864 if (dcrl) {
865 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
866 if (!ok)
867 goto err;
868 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
869 if (!ok)
870 goto err;
871 } else
872 ok = 1;
873
874 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
875 if (ok != 2) {
876 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
877 if (!ok)
878 goto err;
879 }
880
881 X509_CRL_free(crl);
882 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
883 crl = NULL;
884 dcrl = NULL;
885 /*
886 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
887 * so exit loop.
888 */
889 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
890 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
891 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
892 goto err;
893 }
894 }
895 err:
896 X509_CRL_free(crl);
897 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
898
899 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
900 return ok;
901
902 }
903
904 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
905
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)906 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
907 {
908 time_t *ptime;
909 int i;
910 if (notify)
911 ctx->current_crl = crl;
912 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
913 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
914 else
915 ptime = NULL;
916
917 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
918 if (i == 0) {
919 if (!notify)
920 return 0;
921 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
922 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
923 return 0;
924 }
925
926 if (i > 0) {
927 if (!notify)
928 return 0;
929 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
930 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
931 return 0;
932 }
933
934 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
935 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
936
937 if (i == 0) {
938 if (!notify)
939 return 0;
940 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
941 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
942 return 0;
943 }
944 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
945 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
946 if (!notify)
947 return 0;
948 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
949 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
950 return 0;
951 }
952 }
953
954 if (notify)
955 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
956
957 return 1;
958 }
959
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)960 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
961 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
962 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
963 {
964 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
965 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
966 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
967 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
968 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
969
970 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
971 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
972 reasons = *preasons;
973 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
974
975 if (crl_score > best_score) {
976 best_crl = crl;
977 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
978 best_score = crl_score;
979 best_reasons = reasons;
980 }
981 }
982
983 if (best_crl) {
984 if (*pcrl)
985 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
986 *pcrl = best_crl;
987 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
988 *pscore = best_score;
989 *preasons = best_reasons;
990 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
991 if (*pdcrl) {
992 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
993 *pdcrl = NULL;
994 }
995 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
996 }
997
998 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
999 return 1;
1000
1001 return 0;
1002 }
1003
1004 /*
1005 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1006 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1007 */
1008
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)1009 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1010 {
1011 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1012 int i;
1013 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1014 if (i >= 0) {
1015 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1016 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1017 return 0;
1018 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1019 } else
1020 exta = NULL;
1021
1022 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1023
1024 if (i >= 0) {
1025
1026 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1027 return 0;
1028 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1029 } else
1030 extb = NULL;
1031
1032 if (!exta && !extb)
1033 return 1;
1034
1035 if (!exta || !extb)
1036 return 0;
1037
1038 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1039 return 0;
1040
1041 return 1;
1042 }
1043
1044 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1045
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)1046 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1047 {
1048 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1049 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1050 return 0;
1051 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1052 if (!base->crl_number)
1053 return 0;
1054 /* Issuer names must match */
1055 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1056 return 0;
1057 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1058 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1059 return 0;
1060 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1061 return 0;
1062 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1063 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1064 return 0;
1065 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1066 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1067 return 1;
1068 return 0;
1069 }
1070
1071 /*
1072 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1073 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1074 */
1075
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1076 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1077 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1078 {
1079 X509_CRL *delta;
1080 int i;
1081 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1082 return;
1083 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1084 return;
1085 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1086 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1087 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1088 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1089 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1090 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1091 *dcrl = delta;
1092 return;
1093 }
1094 }
1095 *dcrl = NULL;
1096 }
1097
1098 /*
1099 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1100 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1101 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1102 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1103 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1104 */
1105
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1106 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1107 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1108 {
1109
1110 int crl_score = 0;
1111 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1112
1113 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1114
1115 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1116 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1117 return 0;
1118 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1119 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1120 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1121 return 0;
1122 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1123 /* If no new reasons reject */
1124 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1125 return 0;
1126 }
1127 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1128 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1129 return 0;
1130 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1131 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1132 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1133 return 0;
1134 } else
1135 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1136
1137 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1138 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1139
1140 /* Check expiry */
1141 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1142 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1143
1144 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1145 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1146
1147 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1148
1149 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1150 return 0;
1151
1152 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1153
1154 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1155 /* If no new reasons reject */
1156 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1157 return 0;
1158 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1159 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1160 }
1161
1162 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1163
1164 return crl_score;
1165
1166 }
1167
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1168 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1169 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1170 {
1171 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1172 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1173 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1174 int i;
1175
1176 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1177 cidx++;
1178
1179 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1180
1181 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1182 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1183 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1184 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1185 return;
1186 }
1187 }
1188
1189 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1190 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1191 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1192 continue;
1193 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1194 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1195 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1196 return;
1197 }
1198 }
1199
1200 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1201
1202 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1203 return;
1204
1205 /*
1206 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1207 * untrusted certificates.
1208 */
1209 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1210 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1211 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1212 continue;
1213 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1214 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1215 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1216 return;
1217 }
1218 }
1219 }
1220
1221 /*
1222 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1223 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1224 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1225 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1226 */
1227
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1228 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1229 {
1230 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1231 int ret;
1232 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1233 if (ctx->parent)
1234 return 0;
1235 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1236 return -1;
1237
1238 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1239 /* Copy verify params across */
1240 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1241
1242 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1243 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1244
1245 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1246 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1247
1248 if (ret <= 0)
1249 goto err;
1250
1251 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1252
1253 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1254 err:
1255 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1256 return ret;
1257 }
1258
1259 /*
1260 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1261 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1262 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1263 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1264 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1265 * RFC5280 version
1266 */
1267
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1268 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1269 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1270 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1271 {
1272 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1273 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1274 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1275 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1276 return 1;
1277 return 0;
1278 }
1279
1280 /*-
1281 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1282 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1283 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1284 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1285 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1286 */
1287
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1288 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1289 {
1290 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1291 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1292 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1293 int i, j;
1294 if (!a || !b)
1295 return 1;
1296 if (a->type == 1) {
1297 if (!a->dpname)
1298 return 0;
1299 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1300 if (b->type == 1) {
1301 if (!b->dpname)
1302 return 0;
1303 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1304 return 1;
1305 else
1306 return 0;
1307 }
1308 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1309 nm = a->dpname;
1310 gens = b->name.fullname;
1311 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1312 if (!b->dpname)
1313 return 0;
1314 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1315 gens = a->name.fullname;
1316 nm = b->dpname;
1317 }
1318
1319 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1320 if (nm) {
1321 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1322 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1323 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1324 continue;
1325 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1326 return 1;
1327 }
1328 return 0;
1329 }
1330
1331 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1332
1333 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1334 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1335 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1336 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1337 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1338 return 1;
1339 }
1340 }
1341
1342 return 0;
1343
1344 }
1345
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1346 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1347 {
1348 int i;
1349 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1350 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1351 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1352 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1353 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1354 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1355 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1356 continue;
1357 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1358 return 1;
1359 }
1360 return 0;
1361 }
1362
1363 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1364
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1365 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1366 unsigned int *preasons)
1367 {
1368 int i;
1369 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1370 return 0;
1371 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1372 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1373 return 0;
1374 } else {
1375 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1376 return 0;
1377 }
1378 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1379 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1380 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1381 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1382 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1383 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1384 return 1;
1385 }
1386 }
1387 }
1388 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1389 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1390 return 1;
1391 return 0;
1392 }
1393
1394 /*
1395 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1396 * to find a delta CRL too
1397 */
1398
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1399 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1400 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1401 {
1402 int ok;
1403 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1404 int crl_score = 0;
1405 unsigned int reasons;
1406 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1407 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1408 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1409 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1410 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1411 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1412
1413 if (ok)
1414 goto done;
1415
1416 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1417
1418 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1419
1420 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1421 if (!skcrl && crl)
1422 goto done;
1423
1424 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1425
1426 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1427
1428 done:
1429
1430 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1431 if (crl) {
1432 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1433 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1434 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1435 *pcrl = crl;
1436 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1437 return 1;
1438 }
1439
1440 return 0;
1441 }
1442
1443 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1444 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1445 {
1446 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1447 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1448 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1449 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1450 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1451 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1452 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1453 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1454
1455 /*
1456 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1457 * certificate in chain.
1458 */
1459 else if (cnum < chnum)
1460 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1461 else {
1462 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1463 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1464 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1465 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1466 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1467 if (!ok)
1468 goto err;
1469 }
1470 }
1471
1472 if (issuer) {
1473 /*
1474 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1475 */
1476 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1477 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1478 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1479 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1480 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1481 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1482 if (!ok)
1483 goto err;
1484 }
1485
1486 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1487 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1488 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1489 if (!ok)
1490 goto err;
1491 }
1492
1493 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1494 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1495 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1496 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1497 if (!ok)
1498 goto err;
1499 }
1500 }
1501
1502 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1503 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1504 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1505 if (!ok)
1506 goto err;
1507 }
1508
1509 }
1510
1511 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1512 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1513 if (!ok)
1514 goto err;
1515 }
1516
1517 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1518 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1519
1520 if (!ikey) {
1521 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1522 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1523 if (!ok)
1524 goto err;
1525 } else {
1526 /* Verify CRL signature */
1527 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1529 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1530 if (!ok)
1531 goto err;
1532 }
1533 }
1534 }
1535
1536 ok = 1;
1537
1538 err:
1539 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1540 return ok;
1541 }
1542
1543 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1544 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1545 {
1546 int ok;
1547 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1548 /*
1549 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1550 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1551 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1552 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1553 */
1554 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1555 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1556 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1557 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1558 if (!ok)
1559 return 0;
1560 }
1561 /*
1562 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1563 * is not removeFromCRL.
1564 */
1565 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1566 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1567 return 2;
1568 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1569 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1570 if (!ok)
1571 return 0;
1572 }
1573
1574 return 1;
1575 }
1576
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1577 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1578 {
1579 int ret;
1580 if (ctx->parent)
1581 return 1;
1582 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1583 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1584 if (ret == 0) {
1585 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1586 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1587 return 0;
1588 }
1589 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1590 if (ret == -1) {
1591 /*
1592 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1593 */
1594 X509 *x;
1595 int i;
1596 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1597 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1598 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1599 continue;
1600 ctx->current_cert = x;
1601 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1602 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1603 return 0;
1604 }
1605 return 1;
1606 }
1607 if (ret == -2) {
1608 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1609 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1610 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1611 }
1612
1613 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1614 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1615 /*
1616 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1617 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1618 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1619 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1620 */
1621 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1622 return 0;
1623 }
1624
1625 return 1;
1626 }
1627
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1628 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1629 {
1630 time_t *ptime;
1631 int i;
1632
1633 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1634 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1635 else
1636 ptime = NULL;
1637
1638 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1639 if (i == 0) {
1640 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1641 ctx->current_cert = x;
1642 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1643 return 0;
1644 }
1645
1646 if (i > 0) {
1647 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1648 ctx->current_cert = x;
1649 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1650 return 0;
1651 }
1652
1653 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1654 if (i == 0) {
1655 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1656 ctx->current_cert = x;
1657 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1658 return 0;
1659 }
1660
1661 if (i < 0) {
1662 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1663 ctx->current_cert = x;
1664 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1665 return 0;
1666 }
1667
1668 return 1;
1669 }
1670
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1671 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1672 {
1673 int ok = 0, n;
1674 X509 *xs, *xi;
1675 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1676 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1677
1678 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1679
1680 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1681 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1682 n--;
1683 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1684
1685 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1686 xs = xi;
1687 else {
1688 if (n <= 0) {
1689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1690 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1691 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1692 goto end;
1693 } else {
1694 n--;
1695 ctx->error_depth = n;
1696 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1697 }
1698 }
1699
1700 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1701 while (n >= 0) {
1702 ctx->error_depth = n;
1703
1704 /*
1705 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1706 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1707 * time.
1708 */
1709 if (!xs->valid
1710 && (xs != xi
1711 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1712 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1713 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1714 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1715 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1716 if (!ok)
1717 goto end;
1718 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1719 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1720 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1721 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1722 if (!ok) {
1723 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1724 goto end;
1725 }
1726 }
1727 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1728 pkey = NULL;
1729 }
1730
1731 xs->valid = 1;
1732
1733 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1734 if (!ok)
1735 goto end;
1736
1737 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1738 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1739 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1740 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1741 if (!ok)
1742 goto end;
1743
1744 n--;
1745 if (n >= 0) {
1746 xi = xs;
1747 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1748 }
1749 }
1750 ok = 1;
1751 end:
1752 return ok;
1753 }
1754
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)1755 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1756 {
1757 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1758 }
1759
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1760 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1761 {
1762 char *str;
1763 ASN1_TIME atm;
1764 long offset;
1765 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1766 int i, j, remaining;
1767
1768 p = buff1;
1769 remaining = ctm->length;
1770 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1771 /*
1772 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1773 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1774 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1775 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1776 */
1777 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1778 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1779 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1780 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1781 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1782 return 0;
1783 memcpy(p, str, 10);
1784 p += 10;
1785 str += 10;
1786 remaining -= 10;
1787 } else {
1788 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1789 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1790 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1791 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1792 return 0;
1793 memcpy(p, str, 12);
1794 p += 12;
1795 str += 12;
1796 remaining -= 12;
1797 }
1798
1799 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1800 *(p++) = '0';
1801 *(p++) = '0';
1802 } else {
1803 /* SS (seconds) */
1804 if (remaining < 2)
1805 return 0;
1806 *(p++) = *(str++);
1807 *(p++) = *(str++);
1808 remaining -= 2;
1809 /*
1810 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1811 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1812 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1813 */
1814 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1815 str++;
1816 remaining--;
1817 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1818 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1819 break;
1820 }
1821 }
1822
1823 }
1824 *(p++) = 'Z';
1825 *(p++) = '\0';
1826
1827 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1828 if (!remaining)
1829 return 0;
1830 if (*str == 'Z') {
1831 if (remaining != 1)
1832 return 0;
1833 offset = 0;
1834 } else {
1835 /* (+-)HHMM */
1836 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1837 return 0;
1838 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1839 if (remaining != 5)
1840 return 0;
1841 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1842 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1843 return 0;
1844 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1845 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1846 if (*str == '-')
1847 offset = -offset;
1848 }
1849 atm.type = ctm->type;
1850 atm.flags = 0;
1851 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1852 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1853
1854 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1855 return 0;
1856
1857 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1858 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1859 if (i < 50)
1860 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1861 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1862 if (j < 50)
1863 j += 100;
1864
1865 if (i < j)
1866 return -1;
1867 if (i > j)
1868 return 1;
1869 }
1870 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1871 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1872 return -1;
1873 else
1874 return i;
1875 }
1876
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)1877 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1878 {
1879 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1880 }
1881
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1882 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1883 {
1884 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1885 }
1886
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1887 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1888 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1889 {
1890 time_t t;
1891
1892 if (in_tm)
1893 t = *in_tm;
1894 else
1895 time(&t);
1896
1897 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1898 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1899 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1900 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1901 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1902 }
1903 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1904 }
1905
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY * pkey,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)1906 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1907 {
1908 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1909 int i, j;
1910
1911 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1912 return 1;
1913
1914 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1915 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1916 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1917 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1918 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1919 return 0;
1920 }
1921 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1922 break;
1923 else {
1924 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1925 ktmp = NULL;
1926 }
1927 }
1928 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1929 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1930 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1931 return 0;
1932 }
1933
1934 /* first, populate the other certs */
1935 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1936 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1937 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1938 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1939 }
1940
1941 if (pkey != NULL)
1942 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1943 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1944 return 1;
1945 }
1946
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_new * new_func,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)1947 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
1948 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1949 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
1950 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1951 {
1952 /*
1953 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
1954 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
1955 */
1956 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1957 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1958 }
1959
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)1960 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1961 {
1962 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
1963 }
1964
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)1965 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1966 {
1967 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
1968 }
1969
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1970 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1971 {
1972 return ctx->error;
1973 }
1974
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)1975 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1976 {
1977 ctx->error = err;
1978 }
1979
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1980 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1981 {
1982 return ctx->error_depth;
1983 }
1984
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1985 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1986 {
1987 return ctx->current_cert;
1988 }
1989
STACK_OF(X509)1990 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1991 {
1992 return ctx->chain;
1993 }
1994
STACK_OF(X509)1995 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1996 {
1997 int i;
1998 X509 *x;
1999 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
2000 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
2001 return NULL;
2002 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2003 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2004 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
2005 }
2006 return chain;
2007 }
2008
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2009 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2010 {
2011 return ctx->current_issuer;
2012 }
2013
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2014 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2015 {
2016 return ctx->current_crl;
2017 }
2018
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2019 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2020 {
2021 return ctx->parent;
2022 }
2023
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2024 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2025 {
2026 ctx->cert = x;
2027 }
2028
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2029 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2030 {
2031 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2032 }
2033
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)2034 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2035 {
2036 ctx->crls = sk;
2037 }
2038
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)2039 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2040 {
2041 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2042 }
2043
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)2044 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2045 {
2046 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2047 }
2048
2049 /*
2050 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2051 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2052 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2053 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2054 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2055 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2056 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2057 * client/server.
2058 */
2059
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)2060 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2061 int purpose, int trust)
2062 {
2063 int idx;
2064 /* If purpose not set use default */
2065 if (!purpose)
2066 purpose = def_purpose;
2067 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2068 if (purpose) {
2069 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2070 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2071 if (idx == -1) {
2072 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2073 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2074 return 0;
2075 }
2076 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2077 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2078 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2079 if (idx == -1) {
2080 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2081 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2082 return 0;
2083 }
2084 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2085 }
2086 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2087 if (!trust)
2088 trust = ptmp->trust;
2089 }
2090 if (trust) {
2091 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2092 if (idx == -1) {
2093 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2094 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2095 return 0;
2096 }
2097 }
2098
2099 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2100 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2101 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2102 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2103 return 1;
2104 }
2105
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)2106 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2107 {
2108 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2109 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2110 if (!ctx) {
2111 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2112 return NULL;
2113 }
2114 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2115 return ctx;
2116 }
2117
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2118 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2119 {
2120 if (!ctx)
2121 return;
2122 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2123 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2124 }
2125
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2126 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2127 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2128 {
2129 int ret = 1;
2130 ctx->ctx = store;
2131 ctx->current_method = 0;
2132 ctx->cert = x509;
2133 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2134 ctx->crls = NULL;
2135 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2136 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2137 ctx->valid = 0;
2138 ctx->chain = NULL;
2139 ctx->error = 0;
2140 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2141 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2142 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2143 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2144 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2145 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2146 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2147 ctx->tree = NULL;
2148 ctx->parent = NULL;
2149 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2150 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2151
2152 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2153 if (!ctx->param) {
2154 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2155 return 0;
2156 }
2157
2158 /*
2159 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2160 */
2161 if (store)
2162 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2163 else
2164 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2165
2166 if (store) {
2167 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2168 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2169 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2170 } else
2171 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2172
2173 if (ret)
2174 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2175 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2176
2177 if (ret == 0) {
2178 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2179 goto err;
2180 }
2181
2182 if (store && store->check_issued)
2183 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2184 else
2185 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2186
2187 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2188 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2189 else
2190 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2191
2192 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2193 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2194 else
2195 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2196
2197 if (store && store->verify)
2198 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2199 else
2200 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2201
2202 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2203 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2204 else
2205 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2206
2207 if (store && store->get_crl)
2208 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2209 else
2210 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2211
2212 if (store && store->check_crl)
2213 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2214 else
2215 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2216
2217 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2218 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2219 else
2220 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2221
2222 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2223 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2224 else
2225 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2226
2227 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2228 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2229 else
2230 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2231
2232 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2233
2234 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2235 &ctx->ex_data))
2236 return 1;
2237 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2238
2239 err:
2240 /*
2241 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2242 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2243 */
2244 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2245 return 0;
2246 }
2247
2248 /*
2249 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2250 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2251 */
2252
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2253 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2254 {
2255 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2256 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2257 }
2258
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2259 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2260 {
2261 /*
2262 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2263 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2264 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2265 * pointers below after they're freed!
2266 */
2267 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2268 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2269 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2270 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2271 }
2272 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2273 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2274 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2275 ctx->param = NULL;
2276 }
2277 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2278 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2279 ctx->tree = NULL;
2280 }
2281 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2282 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2283 ctx->chain = NULL;
2284 }
2285 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2286 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2287 }
2288
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2289 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2290 {
2291 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2292 }
2293
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2294 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2295 {
2296 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2297 }
2298
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2299 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2300 time_t t)
2301 {
2302 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2303 }
2304
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2305 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2306 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2307 {
2308 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2309 }
2310
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2311 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2312 {
2313 return ctx->tree;
2314 }
2315
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2316 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2317 {
2318 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2319 }
2320
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2321 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2322 {
2323 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2324 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2325 if (!param)
2326 return 0;
2327 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2328 }
2329
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2330 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2331 {
2332 return ctx->param;
2333 }
2334
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2335 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2336 {
2337 if (ctx->param)
2338 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2339 ctx->param = param;
2340 }
2341
2342 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2343
2344 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2345
2346 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2347
2348 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2349
2350 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2351