1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #endif
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #endif
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 {
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
180 else
181 return (NULL);
182 }
183
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
185 ssl3_accept,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
187 #endif
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
190 {
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
192
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
194
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
198 /*
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
200 * login name
201 */
202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
204 } else {
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
206 }
207 }
208 return ret;
209 }
210 #endif
211
ssl3_accept(SSL * s)212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 {
214 BUF_MEM *buf;
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
217 int ret = -1;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
219
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
221 ERR_clear_error();
222 clear_sys_error();
223
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
228
229 /* init things to blank */
230 s->in_handshake++;
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
232 SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236 return (-1);
237 }
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
239 /*
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
242 * handshakes anyway.
243 */
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
247 }
248 #endif
249
250 for (;;) {
251 state = s->state;
252
253 switch (s->state) {
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
255 s->renegotiate = 1;
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
257
258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
262
263 s->server = 1;
264 if (cb != NULL)
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
266
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
270 return -1;
271 }
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
276 ret = -1;
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 goto end;
279 }
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
281 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
282 ret = -1;
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 s->init_buf = buf;
287 }
288
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
290 ret = -1;
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
292 goto end;
293 }
294
295 s->init_num = 0;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
298 /*
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
300 */
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
302
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
304 /*
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 */
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ret = -1;
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
311 goto end;
312 }
313
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
318 !(s->options &
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
320 /*
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
323 */
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 ret = -1;
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
329 goto end;
330 } else {
331 /*
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
333 * HelloRequest
334 */
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
337 }
338 break;
339
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
342
343 s->shutdown = 0;
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 if (ret <= 0)
346 goto end;
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
349 s->init_num = 0;
350
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
352 break;
353
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
356 break;
357
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
361
362 s->shutdown = 0;
363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
365 if (ret <= 0)
366 goto end;
367 }
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
369 {
370 int al;
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
372 /*
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
374 */
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 goto end;
377 }
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
380 /*
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
383 */
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
386 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
387 ret = -1;
388 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
389 goto end;
390 }
391 }
392 #endif
393
394 s->renegotiate = 2;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
396 s->init_num = 0;
397 break;
398
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
401 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
402 if (ret <= 0)
403 goto end;
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 if (s->hit) {
406 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
408 else
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
410 }
411 #else
412 if (s->hit)
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
414 #endif
415 else
416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
417 s->init_num = 0;
418 break;
419
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
424 if (!
425 (s->s3->tmp.
426 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
427 SSL_aSRP))
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
429 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 if (ret <= 0)
431 goto end;
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 else
436 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
437 } else {
438 skip = 1;
439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 }
441 #else
442 } else
443 skip = 1;
444
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 #endif
447 s->init_num = 0;
448 break;
449
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
453
454 /*
455 * clear this, it may get reset by
456 * send_server_key_exchange
457 */
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
459
460 /*
461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
466 * key exchange.
467 */
468 if (0
469 /*
470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
471 * provided
472 */
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
475 #endif
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
479 #endif
480 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
488 )
489 )
490 )
491 ) {
492 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
493 if (ret <= 0)
494 goto end;
495 } else
496 skip = 1;
497
498 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
499 s->init_num = 0;
500 break;
501
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 /*
507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 * during re-negotiation:
509 */
510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
512 /*
513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
515 * RFC 2246):
516 */
517 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
518 /*
519 * ... except when the application insists on
520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
521 * this for SSL 3)
522 */
523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 /*
525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 */
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
530 /*
531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
532 * are omitted
533 */
534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
535 /* no cert request */
536 skip = 1;
537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
542 return -1;
543 }
544 }
545 } else {
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
547 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
548 if (ret <= 0)
549 goto end;
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
552 #else
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
555 #endif
556 s->init_num = 0;
557 }
558 break;
559
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
563 if (ret <= 0)
564 goto end;
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
567 s->init_num = 0;
568 break;
569
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
571
572 /*
573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
578 * unconditionally.
579 */
580
581 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
583 ret = -1;
584 goto end;
585 }
586 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
587
588 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
589 break;
590
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
593 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
594 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
595 if (ret <= 0)
596 goto end;
597 if (ret == 2)
598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
599 else {
600 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
601 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
602 if (ret <= 0)
603 goto end;
604 }
605 s->init_num = 0;
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
607 }
608 break;
609
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
612 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
613 if (ret <= 0)
614 goto end;
615 if (ret == 2) {
616 /*
617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
621 */
622 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
624 #else
625 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
626 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
627 else
628 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
629 #endif
630 s->init_num = 0;
631 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
633 s->init_num = 0;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
635 break;
636 /*
637 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
638 * digest cached records.
639 */
640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
643 return -1;
644 }
645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
648 return -1;
649 }
650 } else {
651 int offset = 0;
652 int dgst_num;
653
654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
655 s->init_num = 0;
656
657 /*
658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
661 * step
662 */
663 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
666 return -1;
667 }
668 }
669 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
670 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
671 int dgst_size;
672
673 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
674 EVP_MD_CTX_type
675 (s->
676 s3->handshake_dgst
677 [dgst_num]),
678 &(s->s3->
679 tmp.cert_verify_md
680 [offset]));
681 dgst_size =
682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
683 if (dgst_size < 0) {
684 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
685 ret = -1;
686 goto end;
687 }
688 offset += dgst_size;
689 }
690 }
691 break;
692
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
695 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
696 if (ret <= 0)
697 goto end;
698
699 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 #else
702 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
703 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
704 else
705 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
706 #endif
707 s->init_num = 0;
708 break;
709
710 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
713 /*
714 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
715 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
716 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
717 * cautious.
718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
720 * the client's Finished message is read.
721 */
722 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
723 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
724
725 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
726 if (ret <= 0)
727 goto end;
728 s->init_num = 0;
729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
730 break;
731 #endif
732
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
735 /*
736 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
737 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
738 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
739 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
740 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
741 * the client's Finished message is read.
742 */
743 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
744 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
745 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
746 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
747 if (ret <= 0)
748 goto end;
749 if (s->hit)
750 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
754 #endif
755 else
756 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 s->init_num = 0;
758 break;
759
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
763 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
764 if (ret <= 0)
765 goto end;
766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
767 s->init_num = 0;
768 break;
769
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
772 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
773 if (ret <= 0)
774 goto end;
775 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
776 s->init_num = 0;
777 break;
778
779 #endif
780
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
783
784 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
785 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
786 ret = -1;
787 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
788 goto end;
789 }
790
791 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
793 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
794
795 if (ret <= 0)
796 goto end;
797 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
798 s->init_num = 0;
799
800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
802 {
803 ret = -1;
804 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
805 goto end;
806 }
807
808 break;
809
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
811 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
812 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
814 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
815 s->method->
816 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
817 s->method->
818 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
819 if (ret <= 0)
820 goto end;
821 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
822 if (s->hit) {
823 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
825 #else
826 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
827 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
828 } else
829 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
830 #endif
831 } else
832 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
833 s->init_num = 0;
834 break;
835
836 case SSL_ST_OK:
837 /* clean a few things up */
838 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
839
840 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
841 s->init_buf = NULL;
842
843 /* remove buffering on output */
844 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
845
846 s->init_num = 0;
847
848 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
849 * HelloRequest */
850 s->renegotiate = 0;
851 s->new_session = 0;
852
853 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
854
855 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
856 /* s->server=1; */
857 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
858
859 if (cb != NULL)
860 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
861 }
862
863 ret = 1;
864 goto end;
865 /* break; */
866
867 case SSL_ST_ERR:
868 default:
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
870 ret = -1;
871 goto end;
872 /* break; */
873 }
874
875 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
876 if (s->debug) {
877 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
878 goto end;
879 }
880
881 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
882 new_state = s->state;
883 s->state = state;
884 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
885 s->state = new_state;
886 }
887 }
888 skip = 0;
889 }
890 end:
891 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
892
893 s->in_handshake--;
894 if (cb != NULL)
895 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
896 return (ret);
897 }
898
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)899 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
900 {
901 unsigned char *p;
902
903 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
904 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
905 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
906 *(p++) = 0;
907 *(p++) = 0;
908 *(p++) = 0;
909
910 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
911 /* number of bytes to write */
912 s->init_num = 4;
913 s->init_off = 0;
914 }
915
916 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
917 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
918 }
919
ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL * s)920 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
921 {
922 int ok;
923 long n;
924
925 /*
926 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
927 * so permit appropriate message length
928 */
929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
930 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
932 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
933 if (!ok)
934 return ((int)n);
935 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
936 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
937 /*
938 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
939 * negotiation.
940 */
941 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
943 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
944 return -1;
945 }
946 /*
947 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
948 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
949 */
950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
951 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
952 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
953 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
954 }
955 #endif
956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
957 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
958 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
959 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
960 }
961 #endif
962 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
963 return 2;
964 }
965 return 1;
966 }
967
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)968 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
969 {
970 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
971 unsigned int cookie_len;
972 long n;
973 unsigned long id;
974 unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
975 SSL_CIPHER *c;
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
977 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
978 #endif
979 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
980
981 /*
982 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
983 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
984 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
985 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
986 */
987 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
988 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
989 }
990 s->first_packet = 1;
991 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
993 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
994 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
995 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
996
997 if (!ok)
998 return ((int)n);
999 s->first_packet = 0;
1000 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1001
1002 /*
1003 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1004 * for session id length
1005 */
1006 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
1007 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1009 goto f_err;
1010 }
1011
1012 /*
1013 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1014 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1015 */
1016 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
1017 p += 2;
1018
1019 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1020 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1022 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1023 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
1024 /*
1025 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1026 * number
1027 */
1028 s->version = s->client_version;
1029 }
1030 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1031 goto f_err;
1032 }
1033
1034 /*
1035 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1036 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1037 * cookie length...
1038 */
1039 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1040 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1041
1042 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1043
1044 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1047 goto f_err;
1048 }
1049 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1050
1051 if (cookie_length == 0)
1052 return 1;
1053 }
1054
1055 /* load the client random */
1056 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1057 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1058
1059 /* get the session-id */
1060 j = *(p++);
1061
1062 if (p + j > d + n) {
1063 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1065 goto f_err;
1066 }
1067
1068 s->hit = 0;
1069 /*
1070 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1071 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1072 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1073 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1074 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1075 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1076 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1077 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1078 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1079 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1080 */
1081 if ((s->new_session
1082 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1083 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1084 goto err;
1085 } else {
1086 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1087 /*
1088 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1089 * version.
1090 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1091 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1092 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1093 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1094 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1095 */
1096 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1097 * session */
1098 s->hit = 1;
1099 } else if (i == -1)
1100 goto err;
1101 else { /* i == 0 */
1102
1103 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1104 goto err;
1105 }
1106 }
1107
1108 p += j;
1109
1110 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1111 /* cookie stuff */
1112 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1113 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1115 goto f_err;
1116 }
1117 cookie_len = *(p++);
1118
1119 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1120 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1122 goto f_err;
1123 }
1124
1125 /*
1126 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1127 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1128 * does not cause an overflow.
1129 */
1130 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1131 /* too much data */
1132 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1134 goto f_err;
1135 }
1136
1137 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1138 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1139 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1140
1141 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1142 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1143 cookie_len) == 0) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1146 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1147 goto f_err;
1148 }
1149 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1150 }
1151 /* default verification */
1152 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1153 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1154 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1156 goto f_err;
1157 }
1158
1159 ret = 2;
1160 }
1161
1162 p += cookie_len;
1163 }
1164
1165 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1166 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1168 goto f_err;
1169 }
1170 n2s(p, i);
1171
1172 if (i == 0) {
1173 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1175 goto f_err;
1176 }
1177
1178 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1179 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1180 /* not enough data */
1181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1183 goto f_err;
1184 }
1185 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1186 goto err;
1187 }
1188 p += i;
1189
1190 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1191 if (s->hit) {
1192 j = 0;
1193 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1194
1195 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1196 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1197 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1198 #endif
1199 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1200 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1201 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1202 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1203 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1204 #endif
1205 if (c->id == id) {
1206 j = 1;
1207 break;
1208 }
1209 }
1210 /*
1211 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1212 * CVE-2010-4180.
1213 */
1214 #if 0
1215 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1216 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1217 /*
1218 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1219 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1220 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1221 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1222 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1223 */
1224 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1225 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1226 s->session->cipher = c;
1227 j = 1;
1228 }
1229 }
1230 #endif
1231 if (j == 0) {
1232 /*
1233 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1234 * to reuse it
1235 */
1236 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1238 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1239 goto f_err;
1240 }
1241 }
1242
1243 /* compression */
1244 i = *(p++);
1245 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1246 /* not enough data */
1247 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1249 goto f_err;
1250 }
1251 q = p;
1252 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1253 if (p[j] == 0)
1254 break;
1255 }
1256
1257 p += i;
1258 if (j >= i) {
1259 /* no compress */
1260 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1262 goto f_err;
1263 }
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1265 /* TLS extensions */
1266 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1267 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
1268 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1270 goto f_err;
1271 }
1272 }
1273 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1275 goto err;
1276 }
1277
1278 /*
1279 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1280 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1281 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1282 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1283 */
1284 {
1285 unsigned char *pos;
1286 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1287 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1289 goto f_err;
1290 }
1291 }
1292
1293 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1294 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1295
1296 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1297 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1298 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1299 &pref_cipher,
1300 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1301 s->hit = 1;
1302 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1303 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1304
1305 ciphers = NULL;
1306
1307 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1308 pref_cipher =
1309 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1310 s->
1311 session->ciphers,
1312 SSL_get_ciphers
1313 (s));
1314 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1315 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1317 goto f_err;
1318 }
1319
1320 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1321
1322 if (s->cipher_list)
1323 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1324
1325 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1326 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1327
1328 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1329 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1330 }
1331 }
1332 #endif
1333
1334 /*
1335 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1336 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1337 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1338 */
1339 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1341 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1342 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1343 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1344 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1345 /* Can't disable compression */
1346 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1347 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1349 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1350 goto f_err;
1351 }
1352 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1353 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1354 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1355 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1357 break;
1358 }
1359 }
1360 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1361 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1363 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1364 goto f_err;
1365 }
1366 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1367 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1368 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1369 break;
1370 }
1371 if (m >= i) {
1372 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1374 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1375 goto f_err;
1376 }
1377 } else if (s->hit)
1378 comp = NULL;
1379 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1380 /* See if we have a match */
1381 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1382
1383 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1384 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1385 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1386 v = comp->id;
1387 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1388 if (v == q[o]) {
1389 done = 1;
1390 break;
1391 }
1392 }
1393 if (done)
1394 break;
1395 }
1396 if (done)
1397 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1398 else
1399 comp = NULL;
1400 }
1401 #else
1402 /*
1403 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1404 * using compression.
1405 */
1406 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1407 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1409 goto f_err;
1410 }
1411 #endif
1412
1413 /*
1414 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1415 */
1416
1417 if (!s->hit) {
1418 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1419 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1420 #else
1421 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1422 #endif
1423 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1424 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1425 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1426 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1427 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1429 goto f_err;
1430 }
1431 ciphers = NULL;
1432 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1433
1434 if (c == NULL) {
1435 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1437 goto f_err;
1438 }
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1440 } else {
1441 /* Session-id reuse */
1442 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1443 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1444 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1445 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1446
1447 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1448 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1449 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1450 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1451 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1452 nc = c;
1453 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1454 ec = c;
1455 }
1456 if (nc != NULL)
1457 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1458 else if (ec != NULL)
1459 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1460 else
1461 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1462 } else
1463 #endif
1464 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1465 }
1466
1467 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1468 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1469 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1470 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1471 goto f_err;
1472 }
1473 }
1474
1475 /*-
1476 * we now have the following setup.
1477 * client_random
1478 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1479 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1480 * compression - basically ignored right now
1481 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1482 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1483 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1484 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1485 */
1486
1487 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1488 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1489 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1491 goto err;
1492 }
1493 }
1494
1495 if (ret < 0)
1496 ret = 1;
1497 if (0) {
1498 f_err:
1499 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1500 err:
1501 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1502 }
1503
1504 if (ciphers != NULL)
1505 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1506 return (ret);
1507 }
1508
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1509 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1510 {
1511 unsigned char *buf;
1512 unsigned char *p, *d;
1513 int i, sl;
1514 unsigned long l;
1515
1516 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1517 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1518 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1519 p = s->s3->server_random;
1520 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1521 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1522 return -1;
1523 }
1524 #endif
1525 /* Do the message type and length last */
1526 d = p = &(buf[4]);
1527
1528 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1529 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1530
1531 /* Random stuff */
1532 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1533 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1534
1535 /*-
1536 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1537 * back in the server hello:
1538 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1539 * we send back the old session ID.
1540 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1541 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1542 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1543 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1544 * session ID.
1545 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1546 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1547 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1548 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1549 * to send back.
1550 */
1551 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1552 && !s->hit)
1553 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1554
1555 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1556 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1559 return -1;
1560 }
1561 *(p++) = sl;
1562 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1563 p += sl;
1564
1565 /* put the cipher */
1566 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1567 p += i;
1568
1569 /* put the compression method */
1570 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1571 *(p++) = 0;
1572 #else
1573 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1574 *(p++) = 0;
1575 else
1576 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1577 #endif
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1579 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1581 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1582 return -1;
1583 }
1584 if ((p =
1585 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
1586 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
1587 NULL) {
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1590 return -1;
1591 }
1592 #endif
1593 /* do the header */
1594 l = (p - d);
1595 d = buf;
1596 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1597 l2n3(l, d);
1598
1599 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1600 /* number of bytes to write */
1601 s->init_num = p - buf;
1602 s->init_off = 0;
1603 }
1604
1605 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1606 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1607 }
1608
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1609 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1610 {
1611 unsigned char *p;
1612
1613 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1614 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1615
1616 /* do the header */
1617 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1618 *(p++) = 0;
1619 *(p++) = 0;
1620 *(p++) = 0;
1621
1622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1623 /* number of bytes to write */
1624 s->init_num = 4;
1625 s->init_off = 0;
1626 }
1627
1628 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1629 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1630 }
1631
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1632 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1633 {
1634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1635 unsigned char *q;
1636 int j, num;
1637 RSA *rsa;
1638 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1639 unsigned int u;
1640 #endif
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1642 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1643 #endif
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1645 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1646 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1647 int encodedlen = 0;
1648 int curve_id = 0;
1649 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1650 #endif
1651 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1652 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1653 unsigned char *p, *d;
1654 int al, i;
1655 unsigned long type;
1656 int n;
1657 CERT *cert;
1658 BIGNUM *r[4];
1659 int nr[4], kn;
1660 BUF_MEM *buf;
1661 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1662
1663 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1664 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1665 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1666 cert = s->cert;
1667
1668 buf = s->init_buf;
1669
1670 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1671 n = 0;
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1673 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1674 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1675 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1676 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1677 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1678 tmp.new_cipher),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1680 tmp.new_cipher));
1681 if (rsa == NULL) {
1682 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1684 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1685 goto f_err;
1686 }
1687 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1688 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1689 }
1690 if (rsa == NULL) {
1691 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1693 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1694 goto f_err;
1695 }
1696 r[0] = rsa->n;
1697 r[1] = rsa->e;
1698 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1699 } else
1700 #endif
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1702 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1703 dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1704 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1705 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1706 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1707 tmp.new_cipher),
1708 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1709 tmp.new_cipher));
1710 if (dhp == NULL) {
1711 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1713 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1714 goto f_err;
1715 }
1716
1717 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1720 goto err;
1721 }
1722
1723 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1725 goto err;
1726 }
1727
1728 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
1729 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1730 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1731 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1732 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1734 goto err;
1735 }
1736 } else {
1737 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1738 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1739 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1741 goto err;
1742 }
1743 }
1744 r[0] = dh->p;
1745 r[1] = dh->g;
1746 r[2] = dh->pub_key;
1747 } else
1748 #endif
1749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1750 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1751 const EC_GROUP *group;
1752
1753 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1754 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1755 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1756 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1757 tmp.new_cipher),
1758 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1759 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1760 }
1761 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1762 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1764 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1765 goto f_err;
1766 }
1767
1768 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1771 goto err;
1772 }
1773
1774 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1775 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1777 goto err;
1778 }
1779 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1781 goto err;
1782 }
1783
1784 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1785 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1786 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1787 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1788 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1790 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793 }
1794
1795 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1796 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1797 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801
1802 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1803 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1805 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1806 goto err;
1807 }
1808
1809 /*
1810 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1811 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1812 * non-zero.
1813 */
1814 if ((curve_id =
1815 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1816 == 0) {
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1818 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1819 goto err;
1820 }
1821
1822 /*
1823 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1824 * allocate memory accordingly.
1825 */
1826 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1827 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1828 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1829 NULL, 0, NULL);
1830
1831 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1832 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1833 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1834 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1836 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1837 goto err;
1838 }
1839
1840 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1841 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1842 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1843 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1844
1845 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1847 goto err;
1848 }
1849
1850 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1851 bn_ctx = NULL;
1852
1853 /*
1854 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1855 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1856 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1857 * structure.
1858 */
1859 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1860
1861 /*
1862 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1863 * can set these to NULLs
1864 */
1865 r[0] = NULL;
1866 r[1] = NULL;
1867 r[2] = NULL;
1868 r[3] = NULL;
1869 } else
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1872 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1873 /*
1874 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1875 */
1876 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1877 } else
1878 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1881 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1883 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1885 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1886 goto err;
1887 }
1888 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1889 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1890 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1891 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1892 } else
1893 #endif
1894 {
1895 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1897 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1898 goto f_err;
1899 }
1900 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1901 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1903 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1904 n += 1 + nr[i];
1905 else
1906 #endif
1907 n += 2 + nr[i];
1908 }
1909
1910 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1911 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1912 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1913 == NULL) {
1914 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1915 goto f_err;
1916 }
1917 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1918 } else {
1919 pkey = NULL;
1920 kn = 0;
1921 }
1922
1923 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1925 goto err;
1926 }
1927 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1928 p = &(d[4]);
1929
1930 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1932 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1933 *p = nr[i];
1934 p++;
1935 } else
1936 #endif
1937 s2n(nr[i], p);
1938 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
1939 p += nr[i];
1940 }
1941
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1943 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1944 /*
1945 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1946 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1947 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1948 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1949 */
1950 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1951 p += 1;
1952 *p = 0;
1953 p += 1;
1954 *p = curve_id;
1955 p += 1;
1956 *p = encodedlen;
1957 p += 1;
1958 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1959 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1960 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1961 encodedPoint = NULL;
1962 p += encodedlen;
1963 }
1964 #endif
1965
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1967 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1968 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1969 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1970 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1971 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1972 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1973 }
1974 #endif
1975
1976 /* not anonymous */
1977 if (pkey != NULL) {
1978 /*
1979 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1980 * points to the space at the end.
1981 */
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1983 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1984 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1985 q = md_buf;
1986 j = 0;
1987 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1988 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1989 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1990 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1991 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1992 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1993 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1994 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1995 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1996 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
1997 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1998 q += i;
1999 j += i;
2000 }
2001 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2002 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2004 goto err;
2005 }
2006 s2n(u, p);
2007 n += u + 2;
2008 } else
2009 #endif
2010 if (md) {
2011 /*
2012 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2013 */
2014 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2015 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2016 /* Should never happen */
2017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2020 goto f_err;
2021 }
2022 p += 2;
2023 }
2024 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2025 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2026 #endif
2027 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2028 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2029 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2030 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2031 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2032 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
2033 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2034 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2036 goto err;
2037 }
2038 s2n(i, p);
2039 n += i + 2;
2040 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2041 n += 2;
2042 } else {
2043 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2044 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2046 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2047 goto f_err;
2048 }
2049 }
2050
2051 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2052 l2n3(n, d);
2053
2054 /*
2055 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2056 */
2057 s->init_num = n + 4;
2058 s->init_off = 0;
2059 }
2060
2061 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2062 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2063 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2064 f_err:
2065 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2066 err:
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2068 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2069 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2070 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2071 #endif
2072 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2073 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2074 return (-1);
2075 }
2076
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)2077 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2078 {
2079 unsigned char *p, *d;
2080 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2081 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2082 X509_NAME *name;
2083 BUF_MEM *buf;
2084
2085 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2086 buf = s->init_buf;
2087
2088 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2089
2090 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2091 p++;
2092 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2093 d[0] = n;
2094 p += n;
2095 n++;
2096
2097 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2098 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2099 s2n(nl, p);
2100 p += nl + 2;
2101 n += nl + 2;
2102 }
2103
2104 off = n;
2105 p += 2;
2106 n += 2;
2107
2108 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2109 nl = 0;
2110 if (sk != NULL) {
2111 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2112 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2113 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2114 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2116 ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2117 goto err;
2118 }
2119 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
2120 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2121 s2n(j, p);
2122 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2123 n += 2 + j;
2124 nl += 2 + j;
2125 } else {
2126 d = p;
2127 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2128 j -= 2;
2129 s2n(j, d);
2130 j += 2;
2131 n += j;
2132 nl += j;
2133 }
2134 }
2135 }
2136 /* else no CA names */
2137 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
2138 s2n(nl, p);
2139
2140 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
2141 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2142 l2n3(n, d);
2143
2144 /*
2145 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2146 */
2147
2148 s->init_num = n + 4;
2149 s->init_off = 0;
2150 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2151 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2153 goto err;
2154 }
2155 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2156
2157 /* do the header */
2158 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2159 *(p++) = 0;
2160 *(p++) = 0;
2161 *(p++) = 0;
2162 s->init_num += 4;
2163 #endif
2164
2165 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2166 }
2167
2168 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2169 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2170 err:
2171 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2172 return (-1);
2173 }
2174
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)2175 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2176 {
2177 int i, al, ok;
2178 long n;
2179 unsigned long alg_k;
2180 unsigned char *p;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2182 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2183 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2184 #endif
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2186 BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
2187 DH *dh_srvr;
2188 #endif
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2190 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2191 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2192
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2194 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2195 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2196 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2197 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2198 #endif
2199
2200 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2201 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2203 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2204
2205 if (!ok)
2206 return ((int)n);
2207 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2208
2209 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2210
2211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2212 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2213 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2214 int decrypt_len;
2215 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2216 size_t j;
2217
2218 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2219 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2220 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2221 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2222 /*
2223 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2224 */
2225 if (rsa == NULL) {
2226 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2228 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2229 goto f_err;
2230
2231 }
2232 } else {
2233 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2234 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2235 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2236 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2238 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2239 goto f_err;
2240 }
2241 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2242 }
2243
2244 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2245 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2246 n2s(p, i);
2247 if (n != i + 2) {
2248 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2251 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2252 goto f_err;
2253 } else
2254 p -= 2;
2255 } else
2256 n = i;
2257 }
2258
2259 /*
2260 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2261 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2262 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2263 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2264 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2265 */
2266 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2267 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2269 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2270 goto f_err;
2271 }
2272
2273 /*
2274 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2275 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2276 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2277 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2278 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2279 */
2280
2281 /*
2282 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2283 */
2284 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2285 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2286 goto err;
2287 decrypt_len =
2288 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2289 ERR_clear_error();
2290
2291 /*
2292 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2293 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2294 */
2295 decrypt_good =
2296 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2297
2298 /*
2299 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2300 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2301 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2302 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2303 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2304 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2305 */
2306 version_good =
2307 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2308 version_good &=
2309 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2310
2311 /*
2312 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2313 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2314 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2315 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2316 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2317 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2318 * clients.
2319 */
2320 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2321 unsigned char workaround_good;
2322 workaround_good =
2323 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2324 workaround_good &=
2325 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2326 version_good |= workaround_good;
2327 }
2328
2329 /*
2330 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2331 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2332 */
2333 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2334
2335 /*
2336 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2337 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2338 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2339 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2340 */
2341 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2342 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2343 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2344 }
2345
2346 s->session->master_key_length =
2347 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2348 s->
2349 session->master_key,
2350 p,
2351 sizeof
2352 (rand_premaster_secret));
2353 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2354 } else
2355 #endif
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2357 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2358 n2s(p, i);
2359 if (n != i + 2) {
2360 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2363 goto err;
2364 } else {
2365 p -= 2;
2366 i = (int)n;
2367 }
2368 }
2369
2370 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2371 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2373 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2374 goto f_err;
2375 } else {
2376 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2377 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2379 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2380 goto f_err;
2381 } else
2382 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2383 }
2384
2385 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2386 if (pub == NULL) {
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2388 goto err;
2389 }
2390
2391 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2392
2393 if (i <= 0) {
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2395 BN_clear_free(pub);
2396 goto err;
2397 }
2398
2399 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2400 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2401
2402 BN_clear_free(pub);
2403 pub = NULL;
2404 s->session->master_key_length =
2405 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2406 s->
2407 session->master_key,
2408 p, i);
2409 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2410 } else
2411 #endif
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2413 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2414 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2415 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2416 krb5_data authenticator;
2417 krb5_data enc_pms;
2418 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2420 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2421 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2422 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2423 int padl, outl;
2424 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2425 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2426 int kerr = 0;
2427
2428 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2429
2430 if (!kssl_ctx)
2431 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2432
2433 n2s(p, i);
2434 enc_ticket.length = i;
2435
2436 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2439 goto err;
2440 }
2441
2442 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2443 p += enc_ticket.length;
2444
2445 n2s(p, i);
2446 authenticator.length = i;
2447
2448 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2451 goto err;
2452 }
2453
2454 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2455 p += authenticator.length;
2456
2457 n2s(p, i);
2458 enc_pms.length = i;
2459 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2460 p += enc_pms.length;
2461
2462 /*
2463 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2464 */
2465 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2468 goto err;
2469 }
2470
2471 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2472 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2475 goto err;
2476 }
2477
2478 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2479 &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2480 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2481 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2482 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2483 if (kssl_err.text)
2484 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2485 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2487 goto err;
2488 }
2489
2490 /*
2491 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2492 * return authtime == 0.
2493 */
2494 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2495 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2496 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2497 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2498 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2499 if (kssl_err.text)
2500 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2501 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2503 goto err;
2504 }
2505
2506 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2508 goto err;
2509 }
2510 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2511 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2512 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2513
2514 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2515 if (enc == NULL)
2516 goto err;
2517
2518 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2519
2520 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2523 goto err;
2524 }
2525 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2526 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2527 {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2530 kerr = 1;
2531 goto kclean;
2532 }
2533 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2536 kerr = 1;
2537 goto kclean;
2538 }
2539 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2542 kerr = 1;
2543 goto kclean;
2544 }
2545 outl += padl;
2546 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2549 kerr = 1;
2550 goto kclean;
2551 }
2552 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2553 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2554 /*
2555 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2556 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2557 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2558 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2559 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2560 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2561 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2562 * cipher)
2563 */
2564 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2567 kerr = 1;
2568 goto kclean;
2569 }
2570 }
2571
2572 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2573
2574 s->session->master_key_length =
2575 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2576 s->
2577 session->master_key,
2578 pms, outl);
2579
2580 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2581 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2582 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2583 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2584 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2585 len);
2586 }
2587 }
2588
2589 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2590 * but it caused problems for apache.
2591 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2592 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2593 */
2594
2595 kclean:
2596 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2597 if (kerr)
2598 goto err;
2599 } else
2600 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2601
2602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2603 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2604 int ret = 1;
2605 int field_size = 0;
2606 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2607 const EC_GROUP *group;
2608 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2609
2610 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2611 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2613 goto err;
2614 }
2615
2616 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2617 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2618 /* use the certificate */
2619 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2620 } else {
2621 /*
2622 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2623 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2624 */
2625 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2626 }
2627
2628 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2629 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2630
2631 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2632 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2634 goto err;
2635 }
2636
2637 /* Let's get client's public key */
2638 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2640 goto err;
2641 }
2642
2643 if (n == 0L) {
2644 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2645
2646 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2647 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2650 goto f_err;
2651 }
2652 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2653 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2654 /*
2655 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2656 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2657 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2658 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2659 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2660 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2661 */
2662 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2664 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2665 goto f_err;
2666 }
2667
2668 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2669 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2670 pkey.ec)) == 0) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2672 goto err;
2673 }
2674 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2675 } else {
2676 /*
2677 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2678 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2679 */
2680 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2683 goto err;
2684 }
2685
2686 /* Get encoded point length */
2687 i = *p;
2688 p += 1;
2689 if (n != 1 + i) {
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2691 goto err;
2692 }
2693 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2695 goto err;
2696 }
2697 /*
2698 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2699 * to the start
2700 */
2701 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2702 }
2703
2704 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2705 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2706 if (field_size <= 0) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2708 goto err;
2709 }
2710 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2711 NULL);
2712 if (i <= 0) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2714 goto err;
2715 }
2716
2717 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2718 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2719 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2720 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2721 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2722 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2723
2724 /* Compute the master secret */
2725 s->session->master_key_length =
2726 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2727 s->
2728 session->master_key,
2729 p, i);
2730
2731 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2732 return (ret);
2733 } else
2734 #endif
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2736 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2737 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2738 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2739 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2740 int psk_err = 1;
2741 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2742
2743 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2744
2745 n2s(p, i);
2746 if (n != i + 2) {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2748 goto psk_err;
2749 }
2750 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2753 goto psk_err;
2754 }
2755 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2758 goto psk_err;
2759 }
2760
2761 /*
2762 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2763 */
2764 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2765 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2766 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2767 psk_or_pre_ms,
2768 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2769 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2770
2771 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 goto psk_err;
2774 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2775 /*
2776 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2777 */
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2780 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2781 goto psk_err;
2782 }
2783
2784 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2785 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2786 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2787 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2788 s2n(psk_len, t);
2789 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2790 t += psk_len;
2791 s2n(psk_len, t);
2792
2793 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2794 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2795 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2796 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2798 goto psk_err;
2799 }
2800
2801 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2803 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2804 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2805 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2807 goto psk_err;
2808 }
2809
2810 s->session->master_key_length =
2811 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2812 s->
2813 session->master_key,
2814 psk_or_pre_ms,
2815 pre_ms_len);
2816 psk_err = 0;
2817 psk_err:
2818 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2819 if (psk_err != 0)
2820 goto f_err;
2821 } else
2822 #endif
2823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2824 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2825 int param_len;
2826
2827 n2s(p, i);
2828 param_len = i + 2;
2829 if (param_len > n) {
2830 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2832 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2833 goto f_err;
2834 }
2835 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2837 goto err;
2838 }
2839 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2840 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2841 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2843 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2844 goto f_err;
2845 }
2846 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2847 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2848 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2849 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2851 goto err;
2852 }
2853
2854 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2855 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2856 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 goto err;
2859 }
2860
2861 p += i;
2862 } else
2863 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2864 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2865 int ret = 0;
2866 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2867 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2868 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2869 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2870 unsigned long alg_a;
2871 int Ttag, Tclass;
2872 long Tlen;
2873
2874 /* Get our certificate private key */
2875 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2876 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2877 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2878 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2879 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2880
2881 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2882 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2883 /*
2884 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2885 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2886 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2887 * client certificate for authorization only.
2888 */
2889 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2890 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2891 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2892 ERR_clear_error();
2893 }
2894 /* Decrypt session key */
2895 if (ASN1_get_object
2896 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2897 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2898 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2900 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2901 goto gerr;
2902 }
2903 start = p;
2904 inlen = Tlen;
2905 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2906 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2908 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2909 goto gerr;
2910 }
2911 /* Generate master secret */
2912 s->session->master_key_length =
2913 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2914 s->
2915 session->master_key,
2916 premaster_secret, 32);
2917 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2918 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2919 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2920 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2921 ret = 2;
2922 else
2923 ret = 1;
2924 gerr:
2925 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2926 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2927 if (ret)
2928 return ret;
2929 else
2930 goto err;
2931 } else {
2932 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2934 goto f_err;
2935 }
2936
2937 return (1);
2938 f_err:
2939 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2940 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2941 err:
2942 #endif
2943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2944 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2945 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2946 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2947 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2948 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2949 #endif
2950 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2951 return (-1);
2952 }
2953
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)2954 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2955 {
2956 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2957 unsigned char *p;
2958 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2959 long n;
2960 int type = 0, i, j;
2961 X509 *peer;
2962 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2963 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2964 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2965
2966 /*
2967 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2968 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2969 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2970 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2971 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2972 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2973 */
2974 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2975 ret = 1;
2976 goto end;
2977 }
2978
2979 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2980 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2981 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2982 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2983 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2984
2985 if (!ok)
2986 return ((int)n);
2987
2988 peer = s->session->peer;
2989 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2990 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2991
2992 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2994 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2995 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2996 goto f_err;
2997 }
2998
2999 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3000 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3001 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3002 /*
3003 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3004 * length field
3005 */
3006 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3007 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3008 i = 64;
3009 } else {
3010 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3011 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3012 /* Should never happen */
3013 if (sigalg == -1) {
3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3015 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3016 goto f_err;
3017 }
3018 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3019 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3021 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3022 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3023 goto f_err;
3024 }
3025 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3026 if (md == NULL) {
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3028 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3029 goto f_err;
3030 }
3031 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3032 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3033 #endif
3034 p += 2;
3035 n -= 2;
3036 }
3037 n2s(p, i);
3038 n -= 2;
3039 if (i > n) {
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3041 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3042 goto f_err;
3043 }
3044 }
3045 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3046 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3048 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3049 goto f_err;
3050 }
3051
3052 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3053 long hdatalen = 0;
3054 void *hdata;
3055 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3056 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3059 goto f_err;
3060 }
3061 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3062 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3063 EVP_MD_name(md));
3064 #endif
3065 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3066 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3068 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3069 goto f_err;
3070 }
3071
3072 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3073 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3075 goto f_err;
3076 }
3077 } else
3078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3079 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3080 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3081 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3082 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3083 if (i < 0) {
3084 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3086 goto f_err;
3087 }
3088 if (i == 0) {
3089 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3091 goto f_err;
3092 }
3093 } else
3094 #endif
3095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3096 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3097 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3098 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3099 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3100 if (j <= 0) {
3101 /* bad signature */
3102 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3104 goto f_err;
3105 }
3106 } else
3107 #endif
3108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3109 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3110 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3111 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3112 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3113 if (j <= 0) {
3114 /* bad signature */
3115 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3117 goto f_err;
3118 }
3119 } else
3120 #endif
3121 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3122 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3123 unsigned char signature[64];
3124 int idx;
3125 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3126 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3127 if (i != 64) {
3128 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3129 }
3130 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3131 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3132 }
3133 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3134 32);
3135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3136 if (j <= 0) {
3137 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3139 goto f_err;
3140 }
3141 } else {
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3143 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3144 goto f_err;
3145 }
3146
3147 ret = 1;
3148 if (0) {
3149 f_err:
3150 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3151 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3152 }
3153 end:
3154 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3155 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3156 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3157 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3158 }
3159 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3160 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3161 return (ret);
3162 }
3163
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)3164 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3165 {
3166 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3167 X509 *x = NULL;
3168 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3169 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3170 unsigned char *d;
3171 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3172
3173 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3174 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3175 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3176 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3177
3178 if (!ok)
3179 return ((int)n);
3180
3181 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3182 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3183 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3187 goto f_err;
3188 }
3189 /*
3190 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3191 */
3192 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3194 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3195 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3196 goto f_err;
3197 }
3198 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3199 return (1);
3200 }
3201
3202 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3203 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3205 goto f_err;
3206 }
3207 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3208
3209 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3211 goto err;
3212 }
3213
3214 n2l3(p, llen);
3215 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3218 goto f_err;
3219 }
3220 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3221 n2l3(p, l);
3222 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3223 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3225 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3226 goto f_err;
3227 }
3228
3229 q = p;
3230 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3231 if (x == NULL) {
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3233 goto err;
3234 }
3235 if (p != (q + l)) {
3236 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3238 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3239 goto f_err;
3240 }
3241 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3243 goto err;
3244 }
3245 x = NULL;
3246 nc += l + 3;
3247 }
3248
3249 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3250 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3251 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3252 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3254 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3255 goto f_err;
3256 }
3257 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3258 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3259 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3261 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3262 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3263 goto f_err;
3264 }
3265 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3266 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3268 goto f_err;
3269 }
3270 } else {
3271 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3272 if (i <= 0) {
3273 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3275 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3276 goto f_err;
3277 }
3278 }
3279
3280 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3281 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3282 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3283 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3284
3285 /*
3286 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3287 * arrive here.
3288 */
3289 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3290 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3291 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3293 goto err;
3294 }
3295 }
3296 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3297 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3298 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3299 /*
3300 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3301 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3302 */
3303
3304 sk = NULL;
3305
3306 ret = 1;
3307 if (0) {
3308 f_err:
3309 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3310 err:
3311 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3312 }
3313
3314 if (x != NULL)
3315 X509_free(x);
3316 if (sk != NULL)
3317 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3318 return (ret);
3319 }
3320
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)3321 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3322 {
3323 unsigned long l;
3324 X509 *x;
3325
3326 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3327 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3328 if (x == NULL) {
3329 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3330 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3331 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3334 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3335 return (0);
3336 }
3337 }
3338
3339 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
3340 if (!l) {
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3342 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3343 return (0);
3344 }
3345 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3346 s->init_num = (int)l;
3347 s->init_off = 0;
3348 }
3349
3350 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3351 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3352 }
3353
3354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3355 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL * s)3356 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3357 {
3358 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3360 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3361
3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3363 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3364 const unsigned char *const_p;
3365 int len, slen_full, slen;
3366 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3367 unsigned int hlen;
3368 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3369 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3370 unsigned char key_name[16];
3371
3372 /* get session encoding length */
3373 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3374 /*
3375 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3376 * long
3377 */
3378 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3379 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3380 return -1;
3381 }
3382 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3383 if (!senc) {
3384 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3385 return -1;
3386 }
3387
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3389 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3390
3391 p = senc;
3392 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3393 goto err;
3394
3395 /*
3396 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3397 */
3398 const_p = senc;
3399 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3400 if (sess == NULL)
3401 goto err;
3402 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3403
3404 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3405 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3407 goto err;
3408 }
3409 p = senc;
3410 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3411 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3412 goto err;
3413 }
3414 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3415
3416 /*-
3417 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3418 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3419 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3420 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3421 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3422 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3423 */
3424 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3425 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3426 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3427 goto err;
3428
3429 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3430 /* do the header */
3431 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3432 /* Skip message length for now */
3433 p += 3;
3434 /*
3435 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3436 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3437 */
3438 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3439 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3440 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3441 goto err;
3442 } else {
3443 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3444 goto err;
3445 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3446 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3447 goto err;
3448 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3449 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3450 goto err;
3451 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3452 }
3453
3454 /*
3455 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3456 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3457 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3458 */
3459 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3460
3461 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3462 p += 2;
3463 /* Output key name */
3464 macstart = p;
3465 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3466 p += 16;
3467 /* output IV */
3468 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3469 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3470 /* Encrypt session data */
3471 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3472 goto err;
3473 p += len;
3474 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3475 goto err;
3476 p += len;
3477
3478 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3479 goto err;
3480 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3481 goto err;
3482
3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3484 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3485
3486 p += hlen;
3487 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3488 /* Total length */
3489 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3490 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3491 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3492 p += 4;
3493 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3494
3495 /* number of bytes to write */
3496 s->init_num = len;
3497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3498 s->init_off = 0;
3499 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3500 }
3501
3502 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3503 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3504 err:
3505 if (senc)
3506 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3507 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3508 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3509 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3510 return -1;
3511 }
3512
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL * s)3513 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3514 {
3515 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3516 unsigned char *p;
3517 /*-
3518 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3519 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3520 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3521 * + (ocsp response)
3522 */
3523 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3524 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3525 return -1;
3526 }
3527
3528 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3529
3530 /* do the header */
3531 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3532 /* message length */
3533 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3534 /* status type */
3535 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3536 /* length of OCSP response */
3537 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3538 /* actual response */
3539 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3540 /* number of bytes to write */
3541 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3542 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3543 s->init_off = 0;
3544 }
3545
3546 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3547 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3548 }
3549
3550 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3551 /*
3552 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3553 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3554 */
ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL * s)3555 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3556 {
3557 int ok;
3558 int proto_len, padding_len;
3559 long n;
3560 const unsigned char *p;
3561
3562 /*
3563 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3564 * extension in their ClientHello
3565 */
3566 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3568 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3569 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3570 return -1;
3571 }
3572
3573 /* See the payload format below */
3574 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3575 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3576 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3577 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3578
3579 if (!ok)
3580 return ((int)n);
3581
3582 /*
3583 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3584 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3585 * ssl3_get_finished).
3586 */
3587 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3589 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3590 return -1;
3591 }
3592
3593 if (n < 2) {
3594 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3595 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3596 }
3597
3598 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3599
3600 /*-
3601 * The payload looks like:
3602 * uint8 proto_len;
3603 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3604 * uint8 padding_len;
3605 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3606 */
3607 proto_len = p[0];
3608 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3609 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3610 return 0;
3611 }
3612 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3613 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3614 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3615 return 0;
3616 }
3617
3618 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3619 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3621 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3622 return 0;
3623 }
3624 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3625 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3626
3627 return 1;
3628 }
3629 # endif
3630 #endif
3631