1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
119 #endif
120 #endif
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 #endif
134
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
136 tls1_enc,
137 tls1_mac,
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_alert_code,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 0,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
151 ssl3_handshake_write
152 };
153
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
155 tls1_enc,
156 tls1_mac,
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_alert_code,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
170 ssl3_handshake_write
171 };
172
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
174 tls1_enc,
175 tls1_mac,
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_alert_code,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
190 ssl3_handshake_write
191 };
192
tls1_default_timeout(void)193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 {
195 /*
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
198 */
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
200 }
201
tls1_new(SSL * s)202 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
203 {
204 if (!ssl3_new(s))
205 return (0);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
207 return (1);
208 }
209
tls1_free(SSL * s)210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 {
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 }
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 ssl3_free(s);
218 }
219
tls1_clear(SSL * s)220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
221 {
222 ssl3_clear(s);
223 s->version = s->method->version;
224 }
225
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
257 };
258
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
263 };
264
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 # endif
285 };
286
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
305 # endif
306 /*
307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
308 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
309 */
310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
326 # endif
327 };
328
329 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
332 };
333
334 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
335 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
336 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
337 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
340 # endif
341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
342 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
345 # endif
346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
350 # endif
351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
357 # endif
358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
360 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
363 # endif
364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
366 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
370 # endif
371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
374 };
375 # endif
376
tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)377 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
378 {
379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
382 return 0;
383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
384 }
385
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)386 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
387 {
388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
389 switch (nid) {
390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
391 return 1;
392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
393 return 2;
394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
395 return 3;
396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
397 return 4;
398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
399 return 5;
400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
401 return 6;
402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
403 return 7;
404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
405 return 8;
406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
407 return 9;
408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
409 return 10;
410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
411 return 11;
412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
413 return 12;
414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
415 return 13;
416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
417 return 14;
418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
419 return 15;
420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
421 return 16;
422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
423 return 17;
424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
425 return 18;
426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
427 return 19;
428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
429 return 20;
430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
431 return 21;
432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
433 return 22;
434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
435 return 23;
436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
437 return 24;
438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
439 return 25;
440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
441 return 26;
442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
443 return 27;
444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
445 return 28;
446 default:
447 return 0;
448 }
449 }
450
451 /*
452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
453 * preferred list.
454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
458 * lists in the first place.
459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
462 */
tls1_get_curvelist(SSL * s,int sess,const unsigned char ** pcurves,size_t * num_curves)463 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
464 const unsigned char **pcurves,
465 size_t *num_curves)
466 {
467 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
468 if (sess) {
469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
471 } else {
472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
477 break;
478
479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
481 pcurveslen = 2;
482 break;
483
484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
486 pcurveslen = 2;
487 break;
488 default:
489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
491 }
492 if (!*pcurves) {
493 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
494 if (FIPS_mode()) {
495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
497 } else
498 # endif
499 {
500 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
503 } else {
504 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
506 }
507 }
508 }
509 }
510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
511 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
513 *num_curves = 0;
514 return 0;
515 } else {
516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
517 return 1;
518 }
519 }
520
521 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
tls1_check_curve(SSL * s,const unsigned char * p,size_t len)522 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
523 {
524 const unsigned char *curves;
525 size_t num_curves, i;
526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
528 return 0;
529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
530 if (suiteb_flags) {
531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
532 if (p[1])
533 return 0;
534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
536 return 0;
537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
539 return 0;
540 } else /* Should never happen */
541 return 0;
542 }
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
544 return 0;
545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
547 return 1;
548 }
549 return 0;
550 }
551
552 /*-
553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
557 */
tls1_shared_curve(SSL * s,int nmatch)558 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
559 {
560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
562 int k;
563 /* Can't do anything on client side */
564 if (s->server == 0)
565 return -1;
566 if (nmatch == -2) {
567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
568 /*
569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
571 */
572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
577 /* Should never happen */
578 return NID_undef;
579 }
580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
581 nmatch = 0;
582 }
583 /*
584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
585 * but s->options is a long...
586 */
587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
589 &num_supp))
590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
594 &num_pref))
595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
596
597 /*
598 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
599 * are allowed.
600 */
601 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
602 supp = eccurves_all;
603 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
604 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
605 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
606 pref = eccurves_all;
607 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
608 }
609
610 k = 0;
611 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
612 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
613 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
614 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
615 if (nmatch == k) {
616 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
617 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
618 }
619 k++;
620 }
621 }
622 }
623 if (nmatch == -1)
624 return k;
625 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
626 return NID_undef;
627 }
628
tls1_set_curves(unsigned char ** pext,size_t * pextlen,int * curves,size_t ncurves)629 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
630 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
631 {
632 unsigned char *clist, *p;
633 size_t i;
634 /*
635 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
636 * ids < 32
637 */
638 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
639 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
640 EC_GROUP *curve;
641 # endif
642
643 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
644 if (!clist)
645 return 0;
646 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
647 unsigned long idmask;
648 int id;
649 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
650 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
651 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
652 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
653 OPENSSL_free(clist);
654 return 0;
655 }
656 # endif
657 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
658 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
659 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
660 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
661 if (curve)
662 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
663 OPENSSL_free(clist);
664 return 0;
665 } else
666 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
667 # endif
668 idmask = 1L << id;
669 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
670 OPENSSL_free(clist);
671 return 0;
672 }
673 dup_list |= idmask;
674 s2n(id, p);
675 }
676 if (*pext)
677 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
678 *pext = clist;
679 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
680 return 1;
681 }
682
683 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
684
685 typedef struct {
686 size_t nidcnt;
687 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
688 } nid_cb_st;
689
nid_cb(const char * elem,int len,void * arg)690 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
691 {
692 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
693 size_t i;
694 int nid;
695 char etmp[20];
696 if (elem == NULL)
697 return 0;
698 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
699 return 0;
700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
701 return 0;
702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
703 etmp[len] = 0;
704 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
705 if (nid == NID_undef)
706 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
707 if (nid == NID_undef)
708 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
709 if (nid == NID_undef)
710 return 0;
711 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
712 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
713 return 0;
714 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
715 return 1;
716 }
717
718 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char ** pext,size_t * pextlen,const char * str)719 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
720 const char *str)
721 {
722 nid_cb_st ncb;
723 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
725 return 0;
726 if (pext == NULL)
727 return 1;
728 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
729 }
730
731 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char * curve_id,unsigned char * comp_id,EC_KEY * ec)732 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
733 EC_KEY *ec)
734 {
735 int is_prime, id;
736 const EC_GROUP *grp;
737 const EC_METHOD *meth;
738 if (!ec)
739 return 0;
740 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
741 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
742 if (!grp)
743 return 0;
744 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
745 if (!meth)
746 return 0;
747 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
748 is_prime = 1;
749 else
750 is_prime = 0;
751 /* Determine curve ID */
752 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
753 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
754 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
755 if (id) {
756 curve_id[0] = 0;
757 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
758 } else {
759 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
760 if (is_prime)
761 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
762 else
763 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
764 }
765 if (comp_id) {
766 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
767 return 0;
768 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
769 if (is_prime)
770 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
771 else
772 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
773 } else
774 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
775 }
776 return 1;
777 }
778
779 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
tls1_check_ec_key(SSL * s,unsigned char * curve_id,unsigned char * comp_id)780 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
781 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
782 {
783 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
784 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
785 int j;
786 /*
787 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
788 * supported (see RFC4492).
789 */
790 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
791 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
792 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
793 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
794 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
795 break;
796 }
797 if (i == num_formats)
798 return 0;
799 }
800 if (!curve_id)
801 return 1;
802 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
803 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
804 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
805 return 0;
806 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
807 /*
808 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
809 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
810 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
811 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
812 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
813 */
814 break;
815 }
816 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
817 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
818 break;
819 }
820 if (i == num_curves)
821 return 0;
822 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
823 if (!s->server)
824 return 1;
825 }
826 return 1;
827 }
828
tls1_get_formatlist(SSL * s,const unsigned char ** pformats,size_t * num_formats)829 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
830 size_t *num_formats)
831 {
832 /*
833 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
834 */
835 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
836 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
837 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
838 } else {
839 *pformats = ecformats_default;
840 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
841 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
842 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
843 else
844 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
845 }
846 }
847
848 /*
849 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
850 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
851 */
tls1_check_cert_param(SSL * s,X509 * x,int set_ee_md)852 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
853 {
854 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
855 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
856 int rv;
857 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
858 if (!pkey)
859 return 0;
860 /* If not EC nothing to do */
861 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
862 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
863 return 1;
864 }
865 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
866 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
867 if (!rv)
868 return 0;
869 /*
870 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
871 * curves extension.
872 */
873 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
874 if (!rv)
875 return 0;
876 /*
877 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
878 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
879 */
880 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
881 int check_md;
882 size_t i;
883 CERT *c = s->cert;
884 if (curve_id[0])
885 return 0;
886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
887 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
889 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
891 else
892 return 0; /* Should never happen */
893 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
894 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
895 break;
896 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
897 return 0;
898 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
899 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
901 else
902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
903 }
904 }
905 return rv;
906 }
907
908 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL * s,unsigned long cid)910 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
911 {
912 unsigned char curve_id[2];
913 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
914 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
915 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
916 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
917 return 1;
918 # endif
919 /*
920 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
921 * curves permitted.
922 */
923 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
924 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
925 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
926 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
927 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
928 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
929 else
930 return 0;
931 curve_id[0] = 0;
932 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
933 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
934 return 0;
935 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
936 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
937 return 1;
938 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
939 else {
940 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
941 if (!ec)
942 return 0;
943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
944 return 0;
945 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
946 return 1;
947 return 0;
948 }
949
950 }
951 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
952 /* Need a shared curve */
953 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
954 return 1;
955 else
956 return 0;
957 }
958 if (!ec) {
959 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
960 return 1;
961 else
962 return 0;
963 }
964 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
965 return 0;
966 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
967 # if 0
968 return 1;
969 # else
970 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
971 # endif
972 }
973 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
974
975 #else
976
tls1_check_cert_param(SSL * s,X509 * x,int set_ee_md)977 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
978 {
979 return 1;
980 }
981
982 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
983
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
985
986 /*
987 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
988 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
989 */
990
991 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
993 # else
994 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
995 # endif
996
997 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
998 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
999 # else
1000 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
1001 # endif
1002
1003 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1005 /* */
1006 # else
1007 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
1008 # endif
1009
1010 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
1011 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
1012 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1014
1015 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1016 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1017 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1018 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1019 # endif
1020 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1022 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1023 # endif
1024 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1026 # endif
1027 };
1028
1029 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1030 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1031 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1032 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1033 };
1034 # endif
tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL * s,const unsigned char ** psigs)1035 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1036 {
1037 /*
1038 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1039 * preferences.
1040 */
1041 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1043 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1044 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1045 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1046
1047 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1048 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1049 return 2;
1050
1051 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1052 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1053 return 2;
1054 }
1055 # endif
1056 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1057 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1058 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1059 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1060 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1061 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1062 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1063 } else {
1064 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1065 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1066 }
1067 }
1068
1069 /*
1070 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1071 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1072 */
tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD ** pmd,SSL * s,const unsigned char * sig,EVP_PKEY * pkey)1073 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1074 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1075 {
1076 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1077 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1078 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1079 /* Should never happen */
1080 if (sigalg == -1)
1081 return -1;
1082 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1083 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1085 return 0;
1086 }
1087 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1089 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1090 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1091 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1092 return 0;
1093 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1095 return 0;
1096 }
1097 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1098 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1099 if (curve_id[0])
1100 return 0;
1101 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1102 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1104 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1105 return 0;
1106 }
1107 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1108 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1110 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1111 return 0;
1112 }
1113 } else
1114 return 0;
1115 }
1116 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1117 return 0;
1118 # endif
1119
1120 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1121 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1123 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1124 break;
1125 }
1126 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1127 if (i == sent_sigslen
1128 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1129 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1131 return 0;
1132 }
1133 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1134 if (*pmd == NULL) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1136 return 0;
1137 }
1138 /*
1139 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1140 */
1141 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1142 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1143 return 1;
1144 }
1145
1146 /*
1147 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1148 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1149 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1150 * settings.
1151 */
ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL * s)1152 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1153 {
1154 CERT *c = s->cert;
1155 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1156 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1157 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1158 c->mask_a = 0;
1159 c->mask_k = 0;
1160 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1161 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1162 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1163 else
1164 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1165 /*
1166 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1167 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1168 */
1169 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1170 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1171 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1172 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1173 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1174 have_rsa = 1;
1175 break;
1176 # endif
1177 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1178 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1179 have_dsa = 1;
1180 break;
1181 # endif
1182 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1183 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1184 have_ecdsa = 1;
1185 break;
1186 # endif
1187 }
1188 }
1189 /*
1190 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1191 * signature algorithms.
1192 */
1193 if (!have_rsa) {
1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1196 }
1197 if (!have_dsa) {
1198 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1199 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1200 }
1201 if (!have_ecdsa) {
1202 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1203 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1204 }
1205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1206 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1209 }
1210 # endif
1211 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1214 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1215 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1216 }
1217 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1218 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1219 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1222 }
1223 # endif
1224 c->valid = 1;
1225 }
1226
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL * s,unsigned char * buf,unsigned char * limit,int * al)1227 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1228 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1229 {
1230 int extdatalen = 0;
1231 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1232 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1233 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1235 int using_ecc = 0;
1236 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1237 int i;
1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1240
1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1242 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1243
1244 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1245 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1246 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1247 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1248 using_ecc = 1;
1249 break;
1250 }
1251 }
1252 }
1253 # endif
1254
1255 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1256 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1257 return orig;
1258
1259 ret += 2;
1260
1261 if (ret >= limit)
1262 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1263
1264 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1265 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1266 unsigned long size_str;
1267 long lenmax;
1268
1269 /*-
1270 * check for enough space.
1271 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1272 * 2 for servernamelist length
1273 * 1 for the hostname type
1274 * 2 for hostname length
1275 * + hostname length
1276 */
1277
1278 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1279 || (size_str =
1280 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1281 return NULL;
1282
1283 /* extension type and length */
1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1286
1287 /* length of servername list */
1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1289
1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1292 s2n(size_str, ret);
1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1294 ret += size_str;
1295 }
1296
1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1298 if (s->renegotiate) {
1299 int el;
1300
1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303 return NULL;
1304 }
1305
1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1307 return NULL;
1308
1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1310 s2n(el, ret);
1311
1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 return NULL;
1315 }
1316
1317 ret += el;
1318 }
1319 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1322 * Client Hello message */
1323
1324 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1327 return NULL;
1328 }
1329
1330 /*-
1331 * check for enough space.
1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1333 * 1 for the srp user identity
1334 * + srp user identity length
1335 */
1336 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1337 return NULL;
1338
1339 /* fill in the extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1344 ret += login_len;
1345 }
1346 # endif
1347
1348 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1349 if (using_ecc) {
1350 /*
1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1352 */
1353 long lenmax;
1354 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1355 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1356
1357 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1358
1359 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1360 return NULL;
1361 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1362 return NULL;
1363 if (num_formats > 255) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 return NULL;
1366 }
1367
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1369 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1370 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1372 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1373 ret += num_formats;
1374
1375 /*
1376 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1377 */
1378 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1380 return NULL;
1381
1382 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1383 return NULL;
1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1385 return NULL;
1386 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 return NULL;
1389 }
1390 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1395 ret += curves_list_len;
1396 }
1397 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1398
1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1400 int ticklen;
1401 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1402 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1403 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1404 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1405 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1406 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1407 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1408 return NULL;
1409 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1410 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1411 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1412 } else
1413 ticklen = 0;
1414 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1415 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1416 goto skip_ext;
1417 /*
1418 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1419 * ticket
1420 */
1421 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1422 return NULL;
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1424 s2n(ticklen, ret);
1425 if (ticklen) {
1426 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1427 ret += ticklen;
1428 }
1429 }
1430 skip_ext:
1431
1432 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1433 size_t salglen;
1434 const unsigned char *salg;
1435 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1436 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1437 return NULL;
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1439 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1440 s2n(salglen, ret);
1441 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1442 ret += salglen;
1443 }
1444 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1445 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1446 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1447
1448 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1449 return NULL;
1450 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1451 return NULL;
1452
1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1454 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1455 s2n(col, ret);
1456 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1457 ret += col;
1458 }
1459 # endif
1460
1461 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1462 int i;
1463 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1464 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1465
1466 idlen = 0;
1467 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1468 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1469 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1470 if (itmp <= 0)
1471 return NULL;
1472 idlen += itmp + 2;
1473 }
1474
1475 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1476 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1477 if (extlen < 0)
1478 return NULL;
1479 } else
1480 extlen = 0;
1481
1482 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1483 return NULL;
1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1485 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1486 return NULL;
1487 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1488 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1489 s2n(idlen, ret);
1490 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1491 /* save position of id len */
1492 unsigned char *q = ret;
1493 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1494 /* skip over id len */
1495 ret += 2;
1496 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1497 /* write id len */
1498 s2n(itmp, q);
1499 }
1500 s2n(extlen, ret);
1501 if (extlen > 0)
1502 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1503 }
1504 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1505 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1506 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1507 return NULL;
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1509 s2n(1, ret);
1510 /*-
1511 * Set mode:
1512 * 1: peer may send requests
1513 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1514 */
1515 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1516 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1517 else
1518 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1519 # endif
1520
1521 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1523 /*
1524 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1525 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1526 */
1527 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1528 return NULL;
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1530 s2n(0, ret);
1531 }
1532 # endif
1533
1534 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1535 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1536 return NULL;
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1538 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1539 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1540 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1541 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1542 }
1543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1545 int el;
1546
1547 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1548
1549 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1550 return NULL;
1551
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1553 s2n(el, ret);
1554
1555 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 return NULL;
1558 }
1559 ret += el;
1560 }
1561 # endif
1562 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1563 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1564 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1565 return NULL;
1566
1567 /*
1568 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1569 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1570 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1571 * appear last.
1572 */
1573 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1574 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1575 /*
1576 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1577 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1578 * does not.
1579 */
1580 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1581 hlen -= 5;
1582 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1583 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1584 if (hlen >= 4)
1585 hlen -= 4;
1586 else
1587 hlen = 0;
1588
1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1590 s2n(hlen, ret);
1591 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1592 ret += hlen;
1593 }
1594 }
1595
1596 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1597 return orig;
1598
1599 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1600 return ret;
1601 }
1602
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL * s,unsigned char * buf,unsigned char * limit,int * al)1603 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1604 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1605 {
1606 int extdatalen = 0;
1607 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1608 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1609 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1610 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1611 # endif
1612 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1613 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1614 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1615 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1616 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1617 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1618 # endif
1619 /*
1620 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1621 */
1622 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1623 return orig;
1624
1625 ret += 2;
1626 if (ret >= limit)
1627 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1628
1629 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1630 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1631 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1632 return NULL;
1633
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1635 s2n(0, ret);
1636 }
1637
1638 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1639 int el;
1640
1641 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1643 return NULL;
1644 }
1645
1646 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1647 return NULL;
1648
1649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1650 s2n(el, ret);
1651
1652 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1654 return NULL;
1655 }
1656
1657 ret += el;
1658 }
1659 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1660 if (using_ecc) {
1661 const unsigned char *plist;
1662 size_t plistlen;
1663 /*
1664 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1665 */
1666 long lenmax;
1667
1668 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1669
1670 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1671 return NULL;
1672 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1673 return NULL;
1674 if (plistlen > 255) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1676 return NULL;
1677 }
1678
1679 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1680 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1681 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1682 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1683 ret += plistlen;
1684
1685 }
1686 /*
1687 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1688 * extension
1689 */
1690 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1691
1692 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1694 return NULL;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1696 s2n(0, ret);
1697 }
1698
1699 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1700 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1701 return NULL;
1702 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1703 s2n(0, ret);
1704 }
1705 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1706 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1707 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1708
1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1710 return NULL;
1711 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1712 return NULL;
1713
1714 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1715 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1716 s2n(sol, ret);
1717 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1718 ret += sol;
1719 }
1720 # endif
1721
1722 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1723 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1724 int el;
1725
1726 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1727
1728 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1729 return NULL;
1730
1731 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1732 s2n(el, ret);
1733
1734 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1736 return NULL;
1737 }
1738 ret += el;
1739 }
1740 # endif
1741
1742 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1743 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1744 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1745 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1746 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1747 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1748 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1749 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1750 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1751 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1752 };
1753 if (limit - ret < 36)
1754 return NULL;
1755 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1756 ret += 36;
1757
1758 }
1759 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1760 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1761 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1762 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1763 return NULL;
1764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1765 s2n(1, ret);
1766 /*-
1767 * Set mode:
1768 * 1: peer may send requests
1769 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1770 */
1771 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1772 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1773 else
1774 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1775
1776 }
1777 # endif
1778
1779 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1780 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1781 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1782 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1783 const unsigned char *npa;
1784 unsigned int npalen;
1785 int r;
1786
1787 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1788 s->
1789 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1790 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1792 return NULL;
1793 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1794 s2n(npalen, ret);
1795 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1796 ret += npalen;
1797 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1798 }
1799 }
1800 # endif
1801 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1802 return NULL;
1803
1804 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1805 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1806 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1807
1808 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1809 return NULL;
1810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1811 s2n(3 + len, ret);
1812 s2n(1 + len, ret);
1813 *ret++ = len;
1814 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1815 ret += len;
1816 }
1817
1818 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1819 return orig;
1820
1821 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1822 return ret;
1823 }
1824
1825 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1826 /*-
1827 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1828 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1829 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1830 * SNI,
1831 * elliptic_curves
1832 * ec_point_formats
1833 *
1834 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1835 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1836 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1837 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1838 */
ssl_check_for_safari(SSL * s,const unsigned char * data,const unsigned char * limit)1839 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1840 const unsigned char *limit)
1841 {
1842 unsigned short type, size;
1843 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1844 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1845 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1846 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1847 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1848 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1849 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1850
1851 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1852 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1853 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1854 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1855 };
1856
1857 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1858 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1859 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1860 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1861 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1862 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1863 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1864 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1865 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1866 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1867 };
1868
1869 if (data >= (limit - 2))
1870 return;
1871 data += 2;
1872
1873 if (data > (limit - 4))
1874 return;
1875 n2s(data, type);
1876 n2s(data, size);
1877
1878 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1879 return;
1880
1881 if (data + size > limit)
1882 return;
1883 data += size;
1884
1885 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1888
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
1890 return;
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1892 return;
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1894 return;
1895 } else {
1896 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1897
1898 if (data + len != limit)
1899 return;
1900 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1901 return;
1902 }
1903
1904 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1905 }
1906 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1907
1908 /*
1909 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1910 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1911 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1912 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1913 * success.
1914 */
tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL * s,const unsigned char * data,unsigned data_len,int * al)1915 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1916 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1917 {
1918 unsigned i;
1919 unsigned proto_len;
1920 const unsigned char *selected;
1921 unsigned char selected_len;
1922 int r;
1923
1924 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1925 return 0;
1926
1927 if (data_len < 2)
1928 goto parse_error;
1929
1930 /*
1931 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1932 * length-prefixed strings.
1933 */
1934 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1935 data_len -= 2;
1936 data += 2;
1937 if (data_len != i)
1938 goto parse_error;
1939
1940 if (data_len < 2)
1941 goto parse_error;
1942
1943 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1944 proto_len = data[i];
1945 i++;
1946
1947 if (proto_len == 0)
1948 goto parse_error;
1949
1950 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1951 goto parse_error;
1952
1953 i += proto_len;
1954 }
1955
1956 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1957 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1958 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1959 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1960 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1961 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1962 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1963 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 return -1;
1965 }
1966 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1967 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1968 }
1969 return 0;
1970
1971 parse_error:
1972 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1973 return -1;
1974 }
1975
ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL * s,unsigned char ** p,unsigned char * limit,int * al)1976 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1977 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1978 {
1979 unsigned short type;
1980 unsigned short size;
1981 unsigned short len;
1982 unsigned char *data = *p;
1983 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1984
1985 s->servername_done = 0;
1986 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1987 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1988 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1989 # endif
1990
1991 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1992 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1993 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1994 }
1995 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1996 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1997 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1998 # endif
1999
2000 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2001 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2002 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
2003 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2004
2005 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2006 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2007 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2008 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2009 }
2010 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2014 }
2015 # endif
2016
2017 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2018
2019 if (data == limit)
2020 goto ri_check;
2021
2022 if (data > (limit - 2))
2023 goto err;
2024
2025 n2s(data, len);
2026
2027 if (data + len != limit)
2028 goto err;
2029
2030 while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
2031 n2s(data, type);
2032 n2s(data, size);
2033
2034 if (data + size > (limit))
2035 goto err;
2036 # if 0
2037 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2038 # endif
2039 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2040 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2041 /*-
2042 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2043 *
2044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2057 * the value of the Host: field.
2058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2061 * extension.
2062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2063 *
2064 */
2065
2066 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2067 unsigned char *sdata;
2068 int servname_type;
2069 int dsize;
2070
2071 if (size < 2)
2072 goto err;
2073 n2s(data, dsize);
2074 size -= 2;
2075 if (dsize > size)
2076 goto err;
2077
2078 sdata = data;
2079 while (dsize > 3) {
2080 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2081 n2s(sdata, len);
2082 dsize -= 3;
2083
2084 if (len > dsize)
2085 goto err;
2086
2087 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2088 switch (servname_type) {
2089 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2090 if (!s->hit) {
2091 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2092 goto err;
2093
2094 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2095 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2096 return 0;
2097 }
2098 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2099 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2101 return 0;
2102 }
2103 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2104 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2105 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2106 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2107 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2108 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2109 return 0;
2110 }
2111 s->servername_done = 1;
2112
2113 } else
2114 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2115 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2116 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2117 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2118
2119 break;
2120
2121 default:
2122 break;
2123 }
2124
2125 dsize -= len;
2126 }
2127 if (dsize != 0)
2128 goto err;
2129
2130 }
2131 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2133 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
2134 goto err;
2135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2136 goto err;
2137 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2138 return -1;
2139 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2140 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2141
2142 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2143 goto err;
2144 }
2145 # endif
2146
2147 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2149 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2150 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2151
2152 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2153 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2154 goto err;
2155 if (!s->hit) {
2156 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2157 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2158 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2159 }
2160 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2161 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2162 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2163 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2164 return 0;
2165 }
2166 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2167 ecpointformatlist_length;
2168 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2169 ecpointformatlist_length);
2170 }
2171 # if 0
2172 fprintf(stderr,
2173 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2174 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2175 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2176 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2177 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2178 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2179 # endif
2180 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2181 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2182 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2183 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2184
2185 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2186 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2187 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2188 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2189 goto err;
2190
2191 if (!s->hit) {
2192 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2193 goto err;
2194
2195 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2196 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2197 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2198 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2199 return 0;
2200 }
2201 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2202 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2203 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2204 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2205 }
2206 # if 0
2207 fprintf(stderr,
2208 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2209 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2210 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2211 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2212 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2213 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2214 # endif
2215 }
2216 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2217 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2219 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2220
2221 if (size < 2) {
2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 return 0;
2224 }
2225 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2226 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 return 0;
2229 }
2230
2231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2232 /* shouldn't really happen */
2233 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2234 }
2235
2236 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2238 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2239 else
2240 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2241 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2242 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2243 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2244 return 0;
2245 }
2246 }
2247 # endif
2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2251 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2252 {
2253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2254 return 0;
2255 }
2256 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2257 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2258 return 0;
2259 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2260 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2261 int dsize;
2262 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2263 goto err;
2264 n2s(data, dsize);
2265 size -= 2;
2266 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2267 goto err;
2268 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2269 goto err;
2270 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2271
2272 if (size < 5)
2273 goto err;
2274
2275 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2276 size--;
2277 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2278 const unsigned char *sdata;
2279 int dsize;
2280 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2281 n2s(data, dsize);
2282 size -= 2;
2283 if (dsize > size)
2284 goto err;
2285 while (dsize > 0) {
2286 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2287 int idsize;
2288 if (dsize < 4)
2289 goto err;
2290 n2s(data, idsize);
2291 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2292 size -= 2 + idsize;
2293 if (dsize < 0)
2294 goto err;
2295 sdata = data;
2296 data += idsize;
2297 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2298 if (!id)
2299 goto err;
2300 if (data != sdata) {
2301 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2302 goto err;
2303 }
2304 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2305 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2306 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2307 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2309 return 0;
2310 }
2311 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2312 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2313 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2314 return 0;
2315 }
2316 }
2317
2318 /* Read in request_extensions */
2319 if (size < 2)
2320 goto err;
2321 n2s(data, dsize);
2322 size -= 2;
2323 if (dsize != size)
2324 goto err;
2325 sdata = data;
2326 if (dsize > 0) {
2327 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2328 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2329 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2330 }
2331
2332 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2333 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2334 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2335 goto err;
2336 }
2337 }
2338 /*
2339 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2340 */
2341 else
2342 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2343 }
2344 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2345 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2346 switch (data[0]) {
2347 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2348 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2349 break;
2350 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2351 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2352 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2353 break;
2354 default:
2355 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2356 return 0;
2357 }
2358 }
2359 # endif
2360 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2361 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2362 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2363 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2364 /*-
2365 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2366 * renegotiation.
2367 *
2368 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2369 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2370 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2371 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2372 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2373 * anything like that, but this might change).
2374 *
2375 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2376 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2377 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2378 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2379 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2380 */
2381 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2382 }
2383 # endif
2384
2385 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2386 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2387 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2388 return 0;
2389 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2390 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2391 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2392 # endif
2393 }
2394
2395 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2396 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2397 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2398 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2399 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2400 return 0;
2401 }
2402 # endif
2403
2404 data += size;
2405 }
2406
2407 /* Spurious data on the end */
2408 if (data != limit)
2409 goto err;
2410
2411 *p = data;
2412
2413 ri_check:
2414
2415 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2416
2417 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2418 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2419 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2421 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2422 return 0;
2423 }
2424
2425 return 1;
2426 err:
2427 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 return 0;
2429 }
2430
2431 /*
2432 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2433 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2434 */
2435
ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL * s,const unsigned char * data,const unsigned char * limit,int * al)2436 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2437 const unsigned char *data,
2438 const unsigned char *limit,
2439 int *al)
2440 {
2441 unsigned short type, size, len;
2442 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2443 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2444 return 1;
2445
2446 if (data >= limit - 2)
2447 return 1;
2448 n2s(data, len);
2449
2450 if (data > limit - len)
2451 return 1;
2452
2453 while (data <= limit - 4) {
2454 n2s(data, type);
2455 n2s(data, size);
2456
2457 if (data + size > limit)
2458 return 1;
2459 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2460 return 0;
2461
2462 data += size;
2463 }
2464
2465 return 1;
2466 }
2467
ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL * s,unsigned char ** p,unsigned char * limit)2468 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2469 unsigned char *limit)
2470 {
2471 int al = -1;
2472 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2473 /*
2474 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2475 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2476 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2477 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2478 */
2479 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2480 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2481 return 0;
2482 }
2483
2484 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2486 return 0;
2487 }
2488
2489 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2490 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2491 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2492 return 0;
2493 }
2494
2495 return 1;
2496 }
2497
2498 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2499 /*
2500 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2501 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2502 * fill the length of the block.
2503 */
ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char * d,unsigned len)2504 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2505 {
2506 unsigned int off = 0;
2507
2508 while (off < len) {
2509 if (d[off] == 0)
2510 return 0;
2511 off += d[off];
2512 off++;
2513 }
2514
2515 return off == len;
2516 }
2517 # endif
2518
ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL * s,unsigned char ** p,unsigned char * d,int n,int * al)2519 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2520 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2521 {
2522 unsigned short length;
2523 unsigned short type;
2524 unsigned short size;
2525 unsigned char *data = *p;
2526 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2527 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2528
2529 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2530 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2531 # endif
2532 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2533
2534 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2535 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2536 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2537 }
2538 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2539 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2540 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2541 # endif
2542
2543 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2544 goto ri_check;
2545
2546 n2s(data, length);
2547 if (data + length != d + n) {
2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 return 0;
2550 }
2551
2552 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2553 n2s(data, type);
2554 n2s(data, size);
2555
2556 if (data + size > (d + n))
2557 goto ri_check;
2558
2559 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2560 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2561
2562 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2563 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2565 return 0;
2566 }
2567 tlsext_servername = 1;
2568 }
2569 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2571 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2572 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2573
2574 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2576 return 0;
2577 }
2578 if (!s->hit) {
2579 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2580 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2581 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2582 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2583 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2584 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2585 return 0;
2586 }
2587 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2588 ecpointformatlist_length;
2589 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2590 ecpointformatlist_length);
2591 }
2592 # if 0
2593 fprintf(stderr,
2594 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2595 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2596 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2597 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2598 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2599 # endif
2600 }
2601 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2602
2603 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2604 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2605 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2606 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2607 {
2608 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2609 return 0;
2610 }
2611 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2612 || (size > 0)) {
2613 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2614 return 0;
2615 }
2616 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2617 }
2618 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2620 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2621
2622 if (size < 2) {
2623 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2624 return 0;
2625 }
2626 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2627 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2628 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2629 return 0;
2630 }
2631
2632 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2633 /* shouldn't really happen */
2634 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2635 }
2636 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2637 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2638 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2639 } else {
2640 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2641 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2642 }
2643
2644 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2645 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2646 return 0;
2647 }
2648 }
2649 # endif
2650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2651 /*
2652 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2653 * request message.
2654 */
2655 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2657 return 0;
2658 }
2659 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2660 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2661 }
2662 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2664 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2665 unsigned char *selected;
2666 unsigned char selected_len;
2667
2668 /* We must have requested it. */
2669 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2671 return 0;
2672 }
2673 /* The data must be valid */
2674 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2676 return 0;
2677 }
2678 if (s->
2679 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2680 size,
2681 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2682 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2683 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 return 0;
2685 }
2686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2687 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2688 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 return 0;
2690 }
2691 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2692 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2694 }
2695 # endif
2696
2697 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2698 unsigned len;
2699
2700 /* We must have requested it. */
2701 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2703 return 0;
2704 }
2705 if (size < 4) {
2706 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2707 return 0;
2708 }
2709 /*-
2710 * The extension data consists of:
2711 * uint16 list_length
2712 * uint8 proto_length;
2713 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2714 */
2715 len = data[0];
2716 len <<= 8;
2717 len |= data[1];
2718 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2720 return 0;
2721 }
2722 len = data[2];
2723 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 return 0;
2726 }
2727 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2728 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2729 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2730 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2731 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2732 return 0;
2733 }
2734 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2735 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2736 }
2737
2738 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2739 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2740 return 0;
2741 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2742 }
2743 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2744 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2745 switch (data[0]) {
2746 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2747 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2748 break;
2749 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2750 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2751 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2752 break;
2753 default:
2754 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2755 return 0;
2756 }
2757 }
2758 # endif
2759 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2760 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2761 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2762 return 0;
2763 }
2764 # endif
2765 /*
2766 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2767 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2768 */
2769 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2770 return 0;
2771
2772 data += size;
2773 }
2774
2775 if (data != d + n) {
2776 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 return 0;
2778 }
2779
2780 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2781 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2782 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2783 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2784 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2785 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2786 return 0;
2787 }
2788 } else {
2789 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2790 return 0;
2791 }
2792 }
2793 }
2794
2795 *p = data;
2796
2797 ri_check:
2798
2799 /*
2800 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2801 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2802 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2803 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2804 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2805 * initial connect only.
2806 */
2807 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2808 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2809 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2811 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2812 return 0;
2813 }
2814
2815 return 1;
2816 }
2817
ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL * s)2818 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2819 {
2820
2821 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2822 {
2823 int r = 1;
2824
2825 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2826 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2827 s->
2828 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2829 if (!r)
2830 return -1;
2831 }
2832
2833 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2835 /* shouldn't really happen */
2836 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2837 }
2838
2839 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2840 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2841 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2842 } else {
2843 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2844 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2845 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2846 }
2847 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2849 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2850 return -1;
2851 }
2852 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2853 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2854 }
2855
2856 if (r == 2)
2857 /*
2858 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2859 * server opaque PRF input
2860 */
2861 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2862 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2863 }
2864 # endif
2865
2866 return 1;
2867 }
2868
ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL * s)2869 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2870 {
2871 return 1;
2872 }
2873
ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL * s)2874 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2875 {
2876 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2877 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2878
2879 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2880 /*
2881 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2882 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2883 */
2884 /*
2885 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2886 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2887 */
2888 # endif
2889
2890 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2891 ret =
2892 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2893 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2894 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2895 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2896 ret =
2897 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2898 s->
2899 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2900
2901 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2902 {
2903 /*
2904 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2905 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2906 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2907 */
2908
2909 int r = 1;
2910
2911 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2912 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2913 s->
2914 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2915 if (!r) {
2916 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2917 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2918 goto err;
2919 }
2920 }
2921
2922 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2923 /* shouldn't really happen */
2924 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2925 }
2926 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2927
2928 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2929 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2930 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2931 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2932 /*
2933 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2934 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2935 */
2936
2937 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2938 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2939 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2940 } else {
2941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2942 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2943 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2944 }
2945 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2948 goto err;
2949 }
2950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2951 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2952 }
2953 }
2954
2955 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2956 /*
2957 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2958 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2959 * handshake.
2960 */
2961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2962 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2963 }
2964 }
2965
2966 err:
2967 # endif
2968 switch (ret) {
2969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2971 return -1;
2972
2973 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2974 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2975 return 1;
2976
2977 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2978 s->servername_done = 0;
2979 default:
2980 return 1;
2981 }
2982 }
2983
tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL * s)2984 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2985 {
2986 int al;
2987 size_t i;
2988 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2989 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2990 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2991 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2992 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2993 }
2994 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2995 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2996 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2997 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2998 }
2999
3000 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3001 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3002 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3004 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 goto err;
3006 }
3007 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3008 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3010 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3011 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3012 goto err;
3013 }
3014 } else
3015 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3016 return 1;
3017 err:
3018 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3019 return 0;
3020 }
3021
ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL * s)3022 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3023 {
3024 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3025 int al;
3026
3027 /*
3028 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3029 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3030 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3031 * influence which certificate is sent
3032 */
3033 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3034 int r;
3035 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3036 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3037 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3038 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3039 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3040 return 1;
3041 }
3042 /*
3043 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3044 * et al can pick it up.
3045 */
3046 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3047 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3048 switch (r) {
3049 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3051 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3052 break;
3053 /* status request response should be sent */
3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3055 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3056 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3057 else
3058 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3059 break;
3060 /* something bad happened */
3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3062 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3063 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3064 goto err;
3065 }
3066 } else
3067 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3068
3069 err:
3070 switch (ret) {
3071 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3073 return -1;
3074
3075 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3076 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3077 return 1;
3078
3079 default:
3080 return 1;
3081 }
3082 }
3083
ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL * s)3084 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3085 {
3086 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3087 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3088
3089 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3090 /*
3091 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3092 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3093 * must contain uncompressed.
3094 */
3095 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3096 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3097 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3098 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3099 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3100 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3101 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3102 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3103 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3104 size_t i;
3105 unsigned char *list;
3106 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3107 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3108 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3109 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3110 found_uncompressed = 1;
3111 break;
3112 }
3113 }
3114 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3116 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3117 return -1;
3118 }
3119 }
3120 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3121 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3122
3123 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3124 ret =
3125 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3126 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3127 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3128 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3129 ret =
3130 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3131 s->
3132 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3133
3134 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3135 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3136 /*
3137 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3138 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3139 * value from the server too.
3140 */
3141
3142 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3143 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3144 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3145 }
3146
3147 /*
3148 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3149 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3150 */
3151 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3152 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3153 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3154 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3155 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3156 }
3157 }
3158 # endif
3159
3160 /*
3161 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3162 * callback
3163 */
3164 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3165 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3166 int r;
3167 /*
3168 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3169 * response.
3170 */
3171 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3172 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3173 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3174 }
3175 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3176 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3177 if (r == 0) {
3178 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3179 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3180 }
3181 if (r < 0) {
3182 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3183 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3184 }
3185 }
3186
3187 switch (ret) {
3188 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3190 return -1;
3191
3192 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3193 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3194 return 1;
3195
3196 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3197 s->servername_done = 0;
3198 default:
3199 return 1;
3200 }
3201 }
3202
ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL * s,unsigned char ** p,unsigned char * d,int n)3203 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3204 int n)
3205 {
3206 int al = -1;
3207 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3208 return 1;
3209 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3210 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3211 return 0;
3212 }
3213
3214 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3216 return 0;
3217 }
3218 return 1;
3219 }
3220
3221 /*-
3222 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3223 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3224 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3225 *
3226 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3227 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3228 * extension, if any.
3229 * len: the length of the session ID.
3230 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3231 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3232 * point to the resulting session.
3233 *
3234 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3235 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3236 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3237 *
3238 * Returns:
3239 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3240 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3241 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3242 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3243 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3244 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3245 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3246 *
3247 * Side effects:
3248 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3249 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3250 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3251 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3252 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3253 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3254 */
tls1_process_ticket(SSL * s,unsigned char * session_id,int len,const unsigned char * limit,SSL_SESSION ** ret)3255 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3256 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3257 {
3258 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3259 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3260 unsigned short i;
3261
3262 *ret = NULL;
3263 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3264
3265 /*
3266 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3267 * resumption.
3268 */
3269 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3270 return 0;
3271 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3272 return 0;
3273 if (p >= limit)
3274 return -1;
3275 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3276 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3277 i = *(p++);
3278 p += i;
3279 if (p >= limit)
3280 return -1;
3281 }
3282 /* Skip past cipher list */
3283 n2s(p, i);
3284 p += i;
3285 if (p >= limit)
3286 return -1;
3287 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3288 i = *(p++);
3289 p += i;
3290 if (p > limit)
3291 return -1;
3292 /* Now at start of extensions */
3293 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3294 return 0;
3295 n2s(p, i);
3296 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3297 unsigned short type, size;
3298 n2s(p, type);
3299 n2s(p, size);
3300 if (p + size > limit)
3301 return 0;
3302 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3303 int r;
3304 if (size == 0) {
3305 /*
3306 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3307 * one.
3308 */
3309 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3310 return 1;
3311 }
3312 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3313 /*
3314 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3315 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3316 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3317 * calculate the master secret later.
3318 */
3319 return 2;
3320 }
3321 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3322 switch (r) {
3323 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3324 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3325 return 2;
3326 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3327 return r;
3328 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3329 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3330 return 3;
3331 default: /* fatal error */
3332 return -1;
3333 }
3334 }
3335 p += size;
3336 }
3337 return 0;
3338 }
3339
3340 /*-
3341 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3342 *
3343 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3344 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3345 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3346 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3347 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3348 * point to the resulting session.
3349 *
3350 * Returns:
3351 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3352 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3353 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3354 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3355 */
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL * s,const unsigned char * etick,int eticklen,const unsigned char * sess_id,int sesslen,SSL_SESSION ** psess)3356 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3357 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3358 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3359 {
3360 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3361 unsigned char *sdec;
3362 const unsigned char *p;
3363 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3364 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3365 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3367 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3368 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3369 if (eticklen < 48)
3370 return 2;
3371 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3372 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3374 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3375 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3376 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3377 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3378 if (rv < 0)
3379 return -1;
3380 if (rv == 0)
3381 return 2;
3382 if (rv == 2)
3383 renew_ticket = 1;
3384 } else {
3385 /* Check key name matches */
3386 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3387 return 2;
3388 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3389 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
3390 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3391 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3392 etick + 16) <= 0) {
3393 goto err;
3394 }
3395 }
3396 /*
3397 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3398 * checks on ticket.
3399 */
3400 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3401 if (mlen < 0) {
3402 goto err;
3403 }
3404 eticklen -= mlen;
3405 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3406 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3407 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3408 goto err;
3409 }
3410 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3411 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3413 return 2;
3414 }
3415 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3416 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3417 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3418 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3419 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3420 if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3422 return -1;
3423 }
3424 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3426 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3427 return 2;
3428 }
3429 slen += mlen;
3430 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3431 p = sdec;
3432
3433 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3434 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3435 if (sess) {
3436 /*
3437 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3438 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3439 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3440 * standard.
3441 */
3442 if (sesslen)
3443 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3444 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3445 *psess = sess;
3446 if (renew_ticket)
3447 return 4;
3448 else
3449 return 3;
3450 }
3451 ERR_clear_error();
3452 /*
3453 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3454 */
3455 return 2;
3456 err:
3457 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3458 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3459 return -1;
3460 }
3461
3462 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3463
3464 typedef struct {
3465 int nid;
3466 int id;
3467 } tls12_lookup;
3468
3469 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3470 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3471 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3472 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3473 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3474 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3475 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3476 };
3477
3478 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3479 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3480 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3481 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3482 };
3483
tls12_find_id(int nid,tls12_lookup * table,size_t tlen)3484 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3485 {
3486 size_t i;
3487 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3488 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3489 return table[i].id;
3490 }
3491 return -1;
3492 }
3493
tls12_find_nid(int id,tls12_lookup * table,size_t tlen)3494 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3495 {
3496 size_t i;
3497 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3498 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3499 return table[i].nid;
3500 }
3501 return NID_undef;
3502 }
3503
tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char * p,const EVP_PKEY * pk,const EVP_MD * md)3504 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3505 const EVP_MD *md)
3506 {
3507 int sig_id, md_id;
3508 if (!md)
3509 return 0;
3510 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3511 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3512 if (md_id == -1)
3513 return 0;
3514 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3515 if (sig_id == -1)
3516 return 0;
3517 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3518 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3519 return 1;
3520 }
3521
tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY * pk)3522 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3523 {
3524 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3525 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3526 }
3527
tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)3528 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3529 {
3530 switch (hash_alg) {
3531 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3532 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3533 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3534 if (FIPS_mode())
3535 return NULL;
3536 # endif
3537 return EVP_md5();
3538 # endif
3539 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3540 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3541 return EVP_sha1();
3542 # endif
3543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3544 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3545 return EVP_sha224();
3546
3547 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3548 return EVP_sha256();
3549 # endif
3550 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3551 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3552 return EVP_sha384();
3553
3554 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3555 return EVP_sha512();
3556 # endif
3557 default:
3558 return NULL;
3559
3560 }
3561 }
3562
tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)3563 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3564 {
3565 switch (sig_alg) {
3566 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3567 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3568 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3569 # endif
3570 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3571 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3572 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3573 # endif
3574 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3575 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3576 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3577 # endif
3578 }
3579 return -1;
3580 }
3581
3582 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
tls1_lookup_sigalg(int * phash_nid,int * psign_nid,int * psignhash_nid,const unsigned char * data)3583 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3584 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3585 {
3586 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3587 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3588 return;
3589 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3590 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3591 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3592 if (phash_nid)
3593 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3594 }
3595 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3596 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3597 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3598 if (psign_nid)
3599 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3600 }
3601 if (psignhash_nid) {
3602 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3603 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3604 else
3605 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3606 }
3607 }
3608
3609 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS * shsig,const unsigned char * pref,size_t preflen,const unsigned char * allow,size_t allowlen)3610 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3611 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3612 const unsigned char *allow,
3613 size_t allowlen)
3614 {
3615 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3616 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3617 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3618 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3619 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3620 continue;
3621 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3622 continue;
3623 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3624 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3625 nmatch++;
3626 if (shsig) {
3627 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3628 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3629 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3630 &shsig->sign_nid,
3631 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3632 shsig++;
3633 }
3634 break;
3635 }
3636 }
3637 }
3638 return nmatch;
3639 }
3640
3641 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL * s)3642 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3643 {
3644 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3645 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3646 size_t nmatch;
3647 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3648 CERT *c = s->cert;
3649 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3650 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3651 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3652 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3653 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3654 }
3655 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3656 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3657 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3658 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3659 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3660 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3661 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3662 } else
3663 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3664 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3665 pref = conf;
3666 preflen = conflen;
3667 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3668 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3669 } else {
3670 allow = conf;
3671 allowlen = conflen;
3672 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3673 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3674 }
3675 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3676 if (nmatch) {
3677 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3678 if (!salgs)
3679 return 0;
3680 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3681 } else {
3682 salgs = NULL;
3683 }
3684 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3685 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3686 return 1;
3687 }
3688
3689 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3690
tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL * s,const unsigned char * data,int dsize)3691 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3692 {
3693 CERT *c = s->cert;
3694 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3695 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3696 return 1;
3697 /* Should never happen */
3698 if (!c)
3699 return 0;
3700
3701 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3702 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3703 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3704 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3705 return 0;
3706 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3707 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3708 return 1;
3709 }
3710
tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL * s)3711 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3712 {
3713 int idx;
3714 size_t i;
3715 const EVP_MD *md;
3716 CERT *c = s->cert;
3717 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3718 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3719 return 0;
3720
3721 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3722 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3723 /*
3724 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3725 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3726 */
3727 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3728 if (s->server)
3729 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3730 else
3731 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3732 if (sigs) {
3733 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3734 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3735 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3736 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3737 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3738 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3739 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3740 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3741 }
3742 }
3743 }
3744 # endif
3745
3746 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3747 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3748 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3749 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3750 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3751 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3752 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3753 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3754 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3755 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3757 }
3758 }
3759
3760 }
3761 /*
3762 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3763 * the certificate for signing.
3764 */
3765 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3766 /*
3767 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3768 * supported it stays as NULL.
3769 */
3770 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3771 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3772 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3773 # endif
3774 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3775 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3776 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3777 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3778 }
3779 # endif
3780 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3781 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3782 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3783 # endif
3784 }
3785 return 1;
3786 }
3787
SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL * s,int idx,int * psign,int * phash,int * psignhash,unsigned char * rsig,unsigned char * rhash)3788 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3789 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3790 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3791 {
3792 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3793 if (psig == NULL)
3794 return 0;
3795 if (idx >= 0) {
3796 idx <<= 1;
3797 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3798 return 0;
3799 psig += idx;
3800 if (rhash)
3801 *rhash = psig[0];
3802 if (rsig)
3803 *rsig = psig[1];
3804 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3805 }
3806 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3807 }
3808
SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL * s,int idx,int * psign,int * phash,int * psignhash,unsigned char * rsig,unsigned char * rhash)3809 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3810 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3811 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3812 {
3813 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3814 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3815 return 0;
3816 shsigalgs += idx;
3817 if (phash)
3818 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3819 if (psign)
3820 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3821 if (psignhash)
3822 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3823 if (rsig)
3824 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3825 if (rhash)
3826 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3827 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3828 }
3829
3830 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL * s)3831 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3832 {
3833 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3834 unsigned short hbtype;
3835 unsigned int payload;
3836 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3837
3838 if (s->msg_callback)
3839 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3840 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3841 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3842
3843 /* Read type and payload length first */
3844 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3845 return 0; /* silently discard */
3846 hbtype = *p++;
3847 n2s(p, payload);
3848 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3849 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3850 pl = p;
3851
3852 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3853 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3854 int r;
3855
3856 /*
3857 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3858 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3859 */
3860 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3861 bp = buffer;
3862
3863 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3864 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3865 s2n(payload, bp);
3866 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3867 bp += payload;
3868 /* Random padding */
3869 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
3870 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3871 return -1;
3872 }
3873
3874 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3875 3 + payload + padding);
3876
3877 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3878 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3879 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3880 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3881
3882 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3883
3884 if (r < 0)
3885 return r;
3886 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3887 unsigned int seq;
3888
3889 /*
3890 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3891 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3892 */
3893 n2s(pl, seq);
3894
3895 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3896 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3897 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3898 }
3899 }
3900
3901 return 0;
3902 }
3903
tls1_heartbeat(SSL * s)3904 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3905 {
3906 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3907 int ret = -1;
3908 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3909 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3910
3911 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3912 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3913 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3915 return -1;
3916 }
3917
3918 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3919 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3921 return -1;
3922 }
3923
3924 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3925 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3927 return -1;
3928 }
3929
3930 /*
3931 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3932 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3933 */
3934 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3935
3936 /*-
3937 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3938 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3939 * some random stuff.
3940 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3941 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3942 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3943 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3944 * - Padding
3945 */
3946 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3947 p = buf;
3948 /* Message Type */
3949 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3950 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3951 s2n(payload, p);
3952 /* Sequence number */
3953 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3954 /* 16 random bytes */
3955 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
3956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3957 goto err;
3958 }
3959 p += 16;
3960 /* Random padding */
3961 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
3962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3963 goto err;
3964 }
3965
3966 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3967 if (ret >= 0) {
3968 if (s->msg_callback)
3969 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3970 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3971 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3972
3973 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3974 }
3975
3976 err:
3977 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3978
3979 return ret;
3980 }
3981 # endif
3982
3983 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3984
3985 typedef struct {
3986 size_t sigalgcnt;
3987 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3988 } sig_cb_st;
3989
sig_cb(const char * elem,int len,void * arg)3990 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3991 {
3992 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3993 size_t i;
3994 char etmp[20], *p;
3995 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3996 if (elem == NULL)
3997 return 0;
3998 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3999 return 0;
4000 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4001 return 0;
4002 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4003 etmp[len] = 0;
4004 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4005 if (!p)
4006 return 0;
4007 *p = 0;
4008 p++;
4009 if (!*p)
4010 return 0;
4011
4012 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4013 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4014 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4015 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4016 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4017 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4018 else
4019 return 0;
4020
4021 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4022 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4023 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4024 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4025 return 0;
4026
4027 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4028 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4029 return 0;
4030 }
4031 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4032 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4033 return 1;
4034 }
4035
4036 /*
4037 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4038 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4039 */
tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT * c,const char * str,int client)4040 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4041 {
4042 sig_cb_st sig;
4043 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4044 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4045 return 0;
4046 if (c == NULL)
4047 return 1;
4048 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4049 }
4050
tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT * c,const int * psig_nids,size_t salglen,int client)4051 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4052 int client)
4053 {
4054 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4055 int rhash, rsign;
4056 size_t i;
4057 if (salglen & 1)
4058 return 0;
4059 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4060 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4061 return 0;
4062 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4063 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4064 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4065 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4066 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4067
4068 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4069 goto err;
4070 *sptr++ = rhash;
4071 *sptr++ = rsign;
4072 }
4073
4074 if (client) {
4075 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4076 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4077 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4078 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4079 } else {
4080 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4081 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4082 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4083 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4084 }
4085
4086 return 1;
4087
4088 err:
4089 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4090 return 0;
4091 }
4092
tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT * c,X509 * x,int default_nid)4093 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4094 {
4095 int sig_nid;
4096 size_t i;
4097 if (default_nid == -1)
4098 return 1;
4099 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4100 if (default_nid)
4101 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4102 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4103 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4104 return 1;
4105 return 0;
4106 }
4107
4108 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF (X509_NAME)* names,X509 * x)4109 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4110 {
4111 X509_NAME *nm;
4112 int i;
4113 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4114 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4115 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4116 return 1;
4117 }
4118 return 0;
4119 }
4120
4121 /*
4122 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4123 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4124 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4125 * attempting to use them.
4126 */
4127
4128 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4129
4130 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4131 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4132 /* Strict mode flags */
4133 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4134 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4135 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4136
tls1_check_chain(SSL * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pk,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,int idx)4137 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4138 int idx)
4139 {
4140 int i;
4141 int rv = 0;
4142 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4143 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4144 CERT *c = s->cert;
4145 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4146 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4147 if (idx != -1) {
4148 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4149 if (idx == -2) {
4150 cpk = c->key;
4151 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4152 } else
4153 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4154 x = cpk->x509;
4155 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4156 chain = cpk->chain;
4157 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4158 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4159 if (!x || !pk)
4160 goto end;
4161 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4162 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4163 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4164 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4165 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4166 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4167 return rv;
4168 }
4169 # endif
4170 } else {
4171 if (!x || !pk)
4172 return 0;
4173 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4174 if (idx == -1)
4175 return 0;
4176 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4177 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4178 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4179 else
4180 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4181 strict_mode = 1;
4182 }
4183
4184 if (suiteb_flags) {
4185 int ok;
4186 if (check_flags)
4187 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4188 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4189 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4190 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4191 else if (!check_flags)
4192 goto end;
4193 }
4194
4195 /*
4196 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4197 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4198 */
4199 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4200 int default_nid;
4201 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4202 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4203 default_nid = 0;
4204 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4205 else {
4206 switch (idx) {
4207 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4208 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4209 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4210 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4211 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4212 break;
4213
4214 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4215 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4216 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4217 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4218 break;
4219
4220 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4221 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4222 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4223 break;
4224
4225 default:
4226 default_nid = -1;
4227 break;
4228 }
4229 }
4230 /*
4231 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4232 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4233 */
4234 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4235 size_t j;
4236 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4237 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4238 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4239 break;
4240 }
4241 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4242 if (check_flags)
4243 goto skip_sigs;
4244 else
4245 goto end;
4246 }
4247 }
4248 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4249 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4250 if (!check_flags)
4251 goto end;
4252 } else
4253 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4255 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4256 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4257 if (check_flags) {
4258 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4259 break;
4260 } else
4261 goto end;
4262 }
4263 }
4264 }
4265 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4266 else if (check_flags)
4267 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4268 skip_sigs:
4269 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4270 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4271 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4272 else if (!check_flags)
4273 goto end;
4274 if (!s->server)
4275 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4276 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4277 else if (strict_mode) {
4278 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4279 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4280 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4281 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4282 if (check_flags) {
4283 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4284 break;
4285 } else
4286 goto end;
4287 }
4288 }
4289 }
4290 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4291 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4292 int check_type = 0;
4293 switch (pk->type) {
4294 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4295 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4296 break;
4297 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4298 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4299 break;
4300 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4301 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4302 break;
4303 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4304 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4305 {
4306 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4307 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4308 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4309 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4310 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4311 }
4312 }
4313 if (check_type) {
4314 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4315 int ctypelen;
4316 if (c->ctypes) {
4317 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4318 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4319 } else {
4320 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4321 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4322 }
4323 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4324 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4325 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4326 break;
4327 }
4328 }
4329 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4330 goto end;
4331 } else
4332 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4333
4334 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4335
4336 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4338
4339 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4340 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4342 }
4343 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4344 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4345 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4346 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4348 break;
4349 }
4350 }
4351 }
4352 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4353 goto end;
4354 } else
4355 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4356
4357 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4358 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4359
4360 end:
4361
4362 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4363 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4364 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4365 else if (cpk->digest)
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4367 } else
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4369
4370 /*
4371 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4372 * chain is invalid.
4373 */
4374 if (!check_flags) {
4375 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4376 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4377 else {
4378 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4379 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4380 return 0;
4381 }
4382 }
4383 return rv;
4384 }
4385
4386 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL * s)4387 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4388 {
4389 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4390 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4391 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4392 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4393 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4394 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4395 }
4396
4397 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
SSL_check_chain(SSL * s,X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * pk,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)4398 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4399 {
4400 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4401 }
4402
4403 #endif
4404