1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdio.h>
11 #include <limits.h>
12 #include <errno.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "../packet_local.h"
19 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AESNI_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 )
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
28 #endif
29
RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER * rl,SSL * s)30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
31 {
32 rl->s = s;
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
35 }
36
RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER * rl)37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
38 {
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
40
41 /*
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
44 * that right?
45 */
46
47 rl->packet = NULL;
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
49 rl->wnum = 0;
50 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
51 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
52 rl->wpend_tot = 0;
53 rl->wpend_type = 0;
54 rl->wpend_ret = 0;
55 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
56
57 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
59 rl->numrpipes = 0;
60 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
61
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
64
65 if (rl->d)
66 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
67 }
68
RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER * rl)69 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
70 {
71 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
72 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
73 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
74 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
75 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
76 }
77
78 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)79 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 {
81 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
82 }
83
84 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)85 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
86 {
87 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
88 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
89
90 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
91 curr_rec++;
92
93 return curr_rec < num_recs;
94 }
95
RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)96 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
97 {
98 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
99 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
100 }
101
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER * rl)102 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
103 {
104 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
105 }
106
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER * rl)107 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
108 {
109 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
110 }
111
ssl3_pending(const SSL * s)112 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
113 {
114 size_t i, num = 0;
115
116 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
117 return 0;
118
119 /* Take into account DTLS buffered app data */
120 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
121 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
122 pitem *item, *iter;
123
124 iter = pqueue_iterator(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
125 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
126 rdata = item->data;
127 num += rdata->rrec.length;
128 }
129 }
130
131 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
132 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
133 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
134 return num;
135 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
136 }
137
138 return num;
139 }
140
SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX * ctx,size_t len)141 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
142 {
143 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
144 }
145
SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL * s,size_t len)146 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
147 {
148 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
149 }
150
SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL * s)151 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
152 {
153 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
154 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
155 return "read header";
156 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
157 return "read body";
158 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
159 return "read done";
160 default:
161 return "unknown";
162 }
163 }
164
SSL_rstate_string(const SSL * s)165 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
166 {
167 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
168 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
169 return "RH";
170 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
171 return "RB";
172 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
173 return "RD";
174 default:
175 return "unknown";
176 }
177 }
178
179 /*
180 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
181 */
ssl3_read_n(SSL * s,size_t n,size_t max,int extend,int clearold,size_t * readbytes)182 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
183 size_t *readbytes)
184 {
185 /*
186 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
187 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
188 * s->rlayer.rbuf.buf specified by s->rlayer.packet and
189 * s->rlayer.packet_length. (If s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may
190 * be stored in rbuf [plus s->rlayer.packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
191 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
192 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
193 */
194 size_t len, left, align = 0;
195 unsigned char *pkt;
196 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
197
198 if (n == 0)
199 return 0;
200
201 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
202 if (rb->buf == NULL)
203 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
204 /* SSLfatal() already called */
205 return -1;
206 }
207
208 left = rb->left;
209 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
210 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
211 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
212 #endif
213
214 if (!extend) {
215 /* start with empty packet ... */
216 if (left == 0)
217 rb->offset = align;
218 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
219 /*
220 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
221 * alignment...
222 */
223 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
224 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
225 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
226 /*
227 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
228 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
229 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
230 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
231 * overrun can be triggered.
232 */
233 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
234 rb->offset = align;
235 }
236 }
237 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
238 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
239 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
240 }
241
242 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
243 pkt = rb->buf + align;
244 /*
245 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
246 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
247 */
248 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
249 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
250 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
251 rb->offset = len + align;
252 }
253
254 /*
255 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
256 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
257 * the buffer).
258 */
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
260 if (left == 0 && extend)
261 return 0;
262 if (left > 0 && n > left)
263 n = left;
264 }
265
266 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
267 if (left >= n) {
268 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
269 rb->left = left - n;
270 rb->offset += n;
271 *readbytes = n;
272 return 1;
273 }
274
275 /* else we need to read more data */
276
277 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
278 /* does not happen */
279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
281 return -1;
282 }
283
284 /*
285 * Ktls always reads full records.
286 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
287 */
288 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead
289 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
290 /* ignore max parameter */
291 max = n;
292 } else {
293 if (max < n)
294 max = n;
295 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
296 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
297 }
298
299 while (left < n) {
300 size_t bioread = 0;
301 int ret;
302
303 /*
304 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
305 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
306 * possible)
307 */
308
309 clear_sys_error();
310 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
311 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
312 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
313 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
314 if (ret >= 0)
315 bioread = ret;
316 } else {
317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
318 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
319 ret = -1;
320 }
321
322 if (ret <= 0) {
323 rb->left = left;
324 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
325 if (len + left == 0)
326 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
327 return ret;
328 }
329 left += bioread;
330 /*
331 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
332 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
333 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
334 */
335 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
336 if (n > left)
337 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
338 }
339 }
340
341 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
342 rb->offset += n;
343 rb->left = left - n;
344 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
345 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
346 *readbytes = n;
347 return 1;
348 }
349
350 /*
351 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
352 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
353 */
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL * s,int type,const void * buf_,size_t len,size_t * written)354 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
355 size_t *written)
356 {
357 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
358 size_t tot;
359 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
360 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
361 size_t nw;
362 #endif
363 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
364 int i;
365 size_t tmpwrit;
366
367 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
368 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
369 /*
370 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
371 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
372 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
373 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
374 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
375 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
376 * report the error in a way the user will notice
377 */
378 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
379 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
381 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
382 return -1;
383 }
384
385 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
386 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
388 return -1;
389 }
390
391 s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
392
393 /*
394 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we
395 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first.
396 */
397 if (wb->left == 0 && s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE)
398 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
399
400 /*
401 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
402 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
403 * messages yet.
404 */
405 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
406 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
407 i = s->handshake_func(s);
408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
409 if (i < 0)
410 return i;
411 if (i == 0) {
412 return -1;
413 }
414 }
415
416 /*
417 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
418 * will happen with non blocking IO
419 */
420 if (wb->left != 0) {
421 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
422 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
423 &tmpwrit);
424 if (i <= 0) {
425 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
426 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
427 return i;
428 }
429 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
430 }
431 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
432 /*
433 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
434 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
435 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
436 * compromise is considered worthy.
437 */
438 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
439 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
440 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
441 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
442 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0) &&
443 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
444 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
445 unsigned char aad[13];
446 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
447 size_t packlen;
448 int packleni;
449
450 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
451 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
452 max_send_fragment -= 512;
453
454 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
455 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
456
457 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
458 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
459 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
460
461 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
462 packlen *= 8;
463 else
464 packlen *= 4;
465
466 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
468 return -1;
469 }
470 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
471 /* free jumbo buffer */
472 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
473 *written = tot;
474 return 1;
475 }
476
477 n = (len - tot);
478 for (;;) {
479 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
480 /* free jumbo buffer */
481 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
482 break;
483 }
484
485 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
486 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
487 if (i <= 0) {
488 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
489 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
490 return i;
491 }
492 }
493
494 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
495 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
496 else
497 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
498
499 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
500 aad[8] = type;
501 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
502 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
503 aad[11] = 0;
504 aad[12] = 0;
505 mb_param.out = NULL;
506 mb_param.inp = aad;
507 mb_param.len = nw;
508
509 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
510 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
511 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
512 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
513 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
514 /* free jumbo buffer */
515 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
516 break;
517 }
518
519 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
520 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
521 mb_param.len = nw;
522
523 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
524 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
525 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
526 return -1;
527
528 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
529 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
530 int j = 6;
531 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
532 }
533
534 wb->offset = 0;
535 wb->left = packlen;
536
537 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
538 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
539 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
540 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
541
542 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
543 if (i <= 0) {
544 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
545 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
546 /* free jumbo buffer */
547 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
548 }
549 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
550 return i;
551 }
552 if (tmpwrit == n) {
553 /* free jumbo buffer */
554 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
555 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
556 return 1;
557 }
558 n -= tmpwrit;
559 tot += tmpwrit;
560 }
561 } else
562 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
563 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
564 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
565 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
566
567 *written = tot;
568 return 1;
569 }
570
571 n = (len - tot);
572
573 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
574 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
575 /*
576 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
577 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
578 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
579 * explicit IVs
580 */
581 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
582 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
583 /*
584 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
585 * shouldn't get here
586 */
587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
589 return -1;
590 }
591 if (maxpipes == 0
592 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
593 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
594 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
595 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
596 maxpipes = 1;
597 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
598 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
599 /*
600 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
601 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
602 */
603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
605 return -1;
606 }
607
608 for (;;) {
609 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
610 size_t numpipes, j;
611
612 if (n == 0)
613 numpipes = 1;
614 else
615 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
616 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
617 numpipes = maxpipes;
618
619 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
620 /*
621 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
622 * pipelines
623 */
624 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
625 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
626 }
627 } else {
628 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
629 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
630 remain = n % numpipes;
631 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
632 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
633 if (j < remain)
634 pipelens[j]++;
635 }
636 }
637
638 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
639 &tmpwrit);
640 if (i <= 0) {
641 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
642 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
643 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
644 return i;
645 }
646
647 if (tmpwrit == n ||
648 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
649 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
650 /*
651 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
652 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
653 */
654 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
655
656 if (tmpwrit == n
657 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
658 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
659 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
660
661 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
662 return 1;
663 }
664
665 n -= tmpwrit;
666 tot += tmpwrit;
667 }
668 }
669
do_ssl3_write(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t * pipelens,size_t numpipes,int create_empty_fragment,size_t * written)670 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
671 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
672 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
673 {
674 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
675 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
676 WPACKET *thispkt;
677 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
678 unsigned char *recordstart;
679 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
680 size_t prefix_len = 0;
681 int eivlen = 0;
682 size_t align = 0;
683 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
684 SSL_SESSION *sess;
685 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
686 size_t j;
687
688 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
689 totlen += pipelens[j];
690 /*
691 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
692 * will happen with non blocking IO
693 */
694 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
697 }
698
699 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
700 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
701 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
702 if (i <= 0) {
703 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
704 return i;
705 }
706 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
707 }
708
709 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
710 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
711 /* SSLfatal() already called */
712 return -1;
713 }
714 }
715
716 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
717 return 0;
718
719 sess = s->session;
720
721 if ((sess == NULL) ||
722 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
723 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
724 mac_size = 0;
725 } else {
726 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
727 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
728 if (mac_size < 0) {
729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
731 goto err;
732 }
733 }
734
735 /*
736 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
737 */
738 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
739 /*
740 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
741 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
742 */
743
744 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
745 /*
746 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
747 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
748 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
749 * payload)
750 */
751 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
752 int ret;
753
754 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
755 if (ret <= 0) {
756 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
757 goto err;
758 }
759
760 if (prefix_len >
761 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
762 /* insufficient space */
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
765 goto err;
766 }
767 }
768
769 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
770 }
771
772 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
773 /*
774 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
775 * discard the const qualifier.
776 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
777 * switching to ktls.
778 */
779 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf);
780 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0);
781 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1);
782 goto wpacket_init_complete;
783 }
784
785 if (create_empty_fragment) {
786 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
787 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
788 /*
789 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
790 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
791 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
792 */
793 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
794 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
795 #endif
796 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
797 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
798 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
799 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
802 goto err;
803 }
804 wpinited = 1;
805 } else if (prefix_len) {
806 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
807 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
808 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
809 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
810 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
811 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
814 goto err;
815 }
816 wpinited = 1;
817 } else {
818 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
819 thispkt = &pkt[j];
820
821 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
822 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
823 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
824 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
825 #endif
826 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
827 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
828 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
829 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
832 goto err;
833 }
834 wpinited++;
835 }
836 }
837
838 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
839 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
840 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
841 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
842 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
843 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
844 if (eivlen <= 1)
845 eivlen = 0;
846 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
847 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
848 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
849 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
850 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
851 }
852 }
853
854 wpacket_init_complete:
855
856 totlen = 0;
857 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
858 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
859 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
860 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
861 : s->version;
862 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
863 size_t maxcomplen;
864 unsigned int rectype;
865
866 thispkt = &pkt[j];
867 thiswr = &wr[j];
868
869 /*
870 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
871 * record type
872 */
873 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
874 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
875 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
876 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
877 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
878 else
879 rectype = type;
880 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
881
882 /*
883 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
884 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
885 */
886 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
887 && !s->renegotiate
888 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
889 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
890 version = TLS1_VERSION;
891 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
892
893 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
894 if (s->compress != NULL)
895 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
896
897 /*
898 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
899 * Otherwise write the header now
900 */
901 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
902 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
903 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
905 || (eivlen > 0
906 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
907 || (maxcomplen > 0
908 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
909 &compressdata)))) {
910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
912 goto err;
913 }
914
915 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
916 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
917 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
918 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
919 totlen += pipelens[j];
920
921 /*
922 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
923 * thiswr->data
924 */
925
926 /* first we compress */
927 if (s->compress != NULL) {
928 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
929 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
931 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
932 goto err;
933 }
934 } else {
935 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
936 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]);
937 } else {
938 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
941 goto err;
942 }
943 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
944 }
945 }
946
947 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
948 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
949 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
950 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
951 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
952 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
953
954 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 goto err;
958 }
959 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
960
961 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
962 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
963 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
964 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
965 size_t padding = 0;
966 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
967 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
968 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
969 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
970 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
971 size_t remainder;
972
973 /* optimize for power of 2 */
974 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
975 remainder = rlen & mask;
976 else
977 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
978 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
979 if (remainder == 0)
980 padding = 0;
981 else
982 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
983 }
984 if (padding > 0) {
985 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
986 if (padding > max_padding)
987 padding = max_padding;
988 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
991 goto err;
992 }
993 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
994 }
995 }
996 }
997
998 /*
999 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
1000 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
1001 * in the wb->buf
1002 */
1003
1004 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1005 unsigned char *mac;
1006
1007 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1008 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1011 goto err;
1012 }
1013 }
1014
1015 /*
1016 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. If
1017 * we are adding the MAC independently of the cipher algorithm, then the
1018 * max encrypted overhead does not need to include an allocation for that
1019 * MAC
1020 */
1021 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
1022 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt,
1023 SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
1024 - mac_size,
1025 NULL)
1026 /*
1027 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1028 * sub-packet
1029 */
1030 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
1031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1033 goto err;
1034 }
1035
1036 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1037 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
1038 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
1039 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
1040 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
1041 }
1042 }
1043
1044 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
1045 /*
1046 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1047 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1048 */
1049 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
1050 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1052 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1053 }
1054 goto err;
1055 }
1056 } else {
1057 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
1058 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
1059 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1061 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1062 }
1063 goto err;
1064 }
1065 }
1066 }
1067
1068 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
1069 size_t origlen;
1070
1071 thispkt = &pkt[j];
1072 thiswr = &wr[j];
1073
1074 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio))
1075 goto mac_done;
1076
1077 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1078 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
1079 /* Check we allowed enough room for the encryption growth */
1080 || !ossl_assert(origlen + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
1081 - mac_size >= thiswr->length)
1082 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1083 || origlen > thiswr->length
1084 || (thiswr->length > origlen
1085 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
1086 thiswr->length - origlen,
1087 NULL))) {
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 goto err;
1091 }
1092 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1093 unsigned char *mac;
1094
1095 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1096 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1098 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 goto err;
1100 }
1101 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
1102 }
1103
1104 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
1106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 goto err;
1109 }
1110
1111 if (s->msg_callback) {
1112 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
1113 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1114 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
1115 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1116 s->msg_callback_arg);
1117
1118 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
1119 unsigned char ctype = type;
1120
1121 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
1122 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1123 }
1124 }
1125
1126 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1129 goto err;
1130 }
1131
1132 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1133 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1134
1135 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1136 /*
1137 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1138 * out anything here
1139 */
1140 if (j > 0) {
1141 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 goto err;
1145 }
1146 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1147 return 1;
1148 }
1149
1150 mac_done:
1151 /*
1152 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1153 * is thiswr->length long
1154 */
1155 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1156 * debugging */
1157
1158 /* now let's set up wb */
1159 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1160 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1161 }
1162
1163 /*
1164 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1165 * retries later
1166 */
1167 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1168 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1169 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1170 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1171
1172 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1173 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1174 err:
1175 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1176 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1177 return -1;
1178 }
1179
1180 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1181 *
1182 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1183 */
ssl3_write_pending(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t len,size_t * written)1184 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1185 size_t *written)
1186 {
1187 int i;
1188 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1189 size_t currbuf = 0;
1190 size_t tmpwrit = 0;
1191
1192 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1193 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
1194 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
1195 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1197 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1198 return -1;
1199 }
1200
1201 for (;;) {
1202 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1203 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1204 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1205 currbuf++;
1206 continue;
1207 }
1208 clear_sys_error();
1209 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1210 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1211
1212 /*
1213 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1214 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1215 */
1216 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1217 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1218 if (i <= 0)
1219 return i;
1220 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type);
1221 }
1222 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1223 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1224 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1225 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1226 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1227 if (i >= 0)
1228 tmpwrit = i;
1229 } else {
1230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1231 SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1232 i = -1;
1233 }
1234
1235 /*
1236 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS,
1237 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte
1238 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value.
1239 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte
1240 * writes to permit this case.
1241 */
1242 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1243 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1244 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1245 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1246 continue;
1247 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1248 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1249 return 1;
1250 } else if (i <= 0) {
1251 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1252 /*
1253 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1254 * using a datagram service
1255 */
1256 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1257 }
1258 return i;
1259 }
1260 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1261 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1262 }
1263 }
1264
1265 /*-
1266 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1267 * 'type' is one of the following:
1268 *
1269 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1270 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1271 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1272 *
1273 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1274 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1275 *
1276 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1277 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1278 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1279 * argument is non NULL.
1280 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1281 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1282 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1283 * Change cipher spec protocol
1284 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1285 * Alert protocol
1286 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1287 * Handshake protocol
1288 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1289 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1290 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1291 * Application data protocol
1292 * none of our business
1293 */
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL * s,int type,int * recvd_type,unsigned char * buf,size_t len,int peek,size_t * readbytes)1294 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1295 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1296 {
1297 int i, j, ret;
1298 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1299 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1300 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
1301 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1302 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
1303
1304 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1305
1306 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1307 /* Not initialized yet */
1308 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
1309 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1310 return -1;
1311 }
1312 }
1313
1314 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1315 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1316 && (type !=
1317 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1320 return -1;
1321 }
1322
1323 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1324 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1325 {
1326 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1327 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1328 unsigned int k;
1329
1330 /* peek == 0 */
1331 n = 0;
1332 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1333 *dst++ = *src++;
1334 len--;
1335 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1336 n++;
1337 }
1338 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1339 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1340 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1341
1342 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1343 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1344
1345 *readbytes = n;
1346 return 1;
1347 }
1348
1349 /*
1350 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1351 */
1352
1353 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1354 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1355 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1356 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1357 if (i < 0)
1358 return i;
1359 if (i == 0)
1360 return -1;
1361 }
1362 start:
1363 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1364
1365 /*-
1366 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1367 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1368 * rr[i].data, - data
1369 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1370 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1371 */
1372 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1373 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1374
1375 do {
1376 /* get new records if necessary */
1377 if (num_recs == 0) {
1378 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1379 if (ret <= 0) {
1380 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1381 return ret;
1382 }
1383 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1384 if (num_recs == 0) {
1385 /* Shouldn't happen */
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 return -1;
1389 }
1390 }
1391 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1392 for (curr_rec = 0;
1393 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1394 curr_rec++) ;
1395 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1396 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1397 num_recs = 0;
1398 curr_rec = 0;
1399 }
1400 } while (num_recs == 0);
1401 rr = &rr[curr_rec];
1402
1403 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
1404 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1405 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1407 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
1408 return -1;
1409 }
1410
1411 /*
1412 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1413 * record that isn't an alert.
1414 */
1415 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1416 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1417 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1418
1419 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1420
1421 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1422 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1423 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1425 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1426 return -1;
1427 }
1428
1429 /*
1430 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1431 * 'peek' mode)
1432 */
1433 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1434 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1435 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1436 return 0;
1437 }
1438
1439 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1440 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1441 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1442 && !is_tls13)) {
1443 /*
1444 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1445 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1446 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1447 */
1448 /*
1449 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1450 * doing a handshake for the first time
1451 */
1452 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1453 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1455 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1456 return -1;
1457 }
1458
1459 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1460 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1461 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1463 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1464 return -1;
1465 }
1466
1467 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1468 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1469
1470 if (len == 0) {
1471 /*
1472 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1473 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1474 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1475 */
1476 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1477 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1478 return 0;
1479 }
1480
1481 totalbytes = 0;
1482 do {
1483 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1484 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1485 else
1486 n = len - totalbytes;
1487
1488 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1489 buf += n;
1490 if (peek) {
1491 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1492 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1493 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1494 } else {
1495 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1496 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1497 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1498 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1499 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1500 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1501 }
1502 }
1503 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1504 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1505 curr_rec++;
1506 rr++;
1507 }
1508 totalbytes += n;
1509 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1510 && totalbytes < len);
1511 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1512 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1513 goto start;
1514 }
1515 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1516 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1517 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1518 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1519 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1520 return 1;
1521 }
1522
1523 /*
1524 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1525 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1526 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1527 */
1528
1529 /*
1530 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1531 */
1532 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1533 /*
1534 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1535 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1536 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1537 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1538 */
1539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 return -1;
1542 }
1543
1544 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1545 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1546 /*
1547 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1548 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1549 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1550 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1551 */
1552 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1554 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1555 return -1;
1556 }
1557
1558 /*-
1559 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1560 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1561 */
1562
1563 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1564 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1565 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1566 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1567 PACKET alert;
1568
1569 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1570 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1571 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1572 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1574 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1575 return -1;
1576 }
1577
1578 if (s->msg_callback)
1579 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1580 s->msg_callback_arg);
1581
1582 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1583 cb = s->info_callback;
1584 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1585 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1586
1587 if (cb != NULL) {
1588 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1589 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1590 }
1591
1592 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
1593 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
1594 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1595 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1596
1597 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1598 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1600 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1601 return -1;
1602 }
1603 }
1604
1605 /*
1606 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1607 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1608 */
1609 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1610 goto start;
1611 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1612 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
1613 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1614 return 0;
1615 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
1616 char tmp[16];
1617
1618 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1619 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1621 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1622 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1623 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1624 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1625 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1626 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1627 return 0;
1628 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1629 /*
1630 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1631 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1632 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1633 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1634 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1635 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1636 */
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1638 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1639 return -1;
1640 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1641 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1642 goto start;
1643 }
1644
1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1646 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1647 return -1;
1648 }
1649
1650 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
1651 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1652 BIO *rbio;
1653
1654 /*
1655 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1656 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1657 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1658 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1659 * sent close_notify.
1660 */
1661 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1662 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1663 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1664
1665 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
1666 goto start;
1667
1668 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1669 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1670 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
1671 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
1672 return -1;
1673 }
1674 } else {
1675 /*
1676 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1677 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1678 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1679 * above.
1680 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1681 */
1682 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1683 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1685 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1686 return -1;
1687 }
1688 }
1689
1690 /*
1691 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1692 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1693 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1694 * that we're just going to discard.
1695 */
1696 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1697 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1698 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1699 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1700
1701 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1702 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1703 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1704
1705 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1706 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1707 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1708 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1709 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1710 *dest_len += n;
1711 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1712 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1713
1714 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1715 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1716 }
1717
1718 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1720 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1721 return -1;
1722 }
1723
1724 /*
1725 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1726 * protocol violation)
1727 */
1728 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1729 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1730 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1731
1732 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1733 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1734
1735 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1736 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1737 if (i < 0)
1738 return i;
1739 if (i == 0) {
1740 return -1;
1741 }
1742
1743 /*
1744 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1745 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1746 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1747 */
1748 if (ined)
1749 return -1;
1750
1751 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1752 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1753 /* no read-ahead left? */
1754 BIO *bio;
1755 /*
1756 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1757 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1758 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1759 * problems in the blocking world
1760 */
1761 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1762 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1763 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1764 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1765 return -1;
1766 }
1767 }
1768 goto start;
1769 }
1770
1771 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1772 default:
1773 /*
1774 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1775 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1776 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1777 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1778 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1779 */
1780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1781 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1782 return -1;
1783 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1784 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1785 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1786 /*
1787 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1788 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1789 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1790 */
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1793 return -1;
1794 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1795 /*
1796 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1797 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1798 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1799 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1800 * started), we will indulge it.
1801 */
1802 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1803 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1804 return -1;
1805 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1806 /*
1807 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1808 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1809 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1810 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1811 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1812 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1813 * record.
1814 */
1815 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1816 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1818 return -1;
1819 }
1820 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1821 goto start;
1822 } else {
1823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1824 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1825 return -1;
1826 }
1827 }
1828 }
1829
ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char * seq)1830 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1831 {
1832 int i;
1833
1834 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1835 ++seq[i];
1836 if (seq[i] != 0)
1837 break;
1838 }
1839 }
1840
1841 /*
1842 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1843 * format and false otherwise.
1844 */
RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1845 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1846 {
1847 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1848 }
1849
1850 /*
1851 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1852 */
RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1853 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1854 {
1855 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
1856 }
1857